CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Scott Thompson appeals the trial court’s entry of judgment after an order sustaining Respondent California State Teachers Retirement System’s (CalSTRS) general demurrer to his third amended complaint (sometimes TAC) without leave to amend. Thompson attempts to allege violations of Labor Code section 1102.5; undesignated section references are to the Labor Code. Thompson argues the trial court erred in determining he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint. Thompson also argues that, if the exhaustion of his administrative remedies was required, his failure to exhaust those remedies was excused by what has become known as “the futility exception.” Finally, he argues for the first time on appeal, that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint because it stated a viable cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. We affirm the judgment.

Abdur Shareef appeals from a parole revocation order which sentences him to 180 days in county jail for violating the terms of his parole. We affirm.

Evelyn O. (mother) and Edison T. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s March 14, 2017 order declaring minors A.O., Jasmine T., A.T., and Julian G. dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on two counts. Mother and father contend substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. We affirm the juvenile court’s order in part and reverse it in part.

Defendants and appellants Wendy Martinez (Martinez), Art Macias (Macias), Jerry Leone (Leone), and Miguel Ochoa (Ochoa) were convicted of first degree robbery, home invasion robbery in concert, burglary, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon—all stemming from an altercation between defendants and Michael Veneris (Veneris). As to defendants Ochoa and Leone, we consider whether they are entitled to reversal of their convictions due to alleged infringements on their right not to testify and their right to remain silent. As to defendant Ochoa, we consider whether substantial evidence supports his convictions for robbery and burglary. As to all defendants, we consider whether the robbery and assaults were part of a single course of conduct, such that the sentence imposed on the assault charges should have been stayed. We also decide a variety of sentencing-related issues that apply to some or all of the defendants.

Appellant Manuela Herzer challenges the dismissal of her petition seeking to invalidate the revocation of an advance health care directive executed by her one-time friend, Sumner Redstone, in which she was named as Redstone’s health care agent. Following testimony from Redstone that he did not trust Herzer and did not want her acting as his agent, the probate court dismissed the petition, reasoning that the proceeding was not reasonably necessary to protect Redstone’s interests.

Michael Barela appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count of attempted murder. The jury found true the allegations that the offense was willful, deliberate and premeditated; that appellant used a deadly weapon; and that appellant inflicted great bodily injury. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the allegation that the offense was willful, premeditated, and deliberate. He also contends the jury instructions lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof and thus violated his constitutional rights. Finally, appellant challenges the award of attorney fees under Penal Code section 987.8. We strike the award of attorney fees, order the minute order and abstract of judgment modified to reflect the change, and otherwise affirm.

John Anthony Malone failed to repay his Canadian student loans. A Canadian court entered a judgment against Malone and, 10 years later, entered an order renewing the judgment. The judgment creditor, Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Canada, by and through her representative, the Attorney General of Canada (Attorney General), filed this civil action in California to recognize the foreign judgment and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Attorney General.
Malone contends the 10-year statute of limitations for an action to recognize a foreign judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 1721) bars the domestication of the Canadian judgment in California. We agree. Accordingly, summary judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Jason George and Justin Hupalo, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (collectively plaintiffs), filed a class action complaint against Guitar Center, Inc., Guitar Center Stores, Inc., and Guitar Center Holdings, Inc. (collectively Guitar Center) alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Act; Civ. Code, § 1747 et seq.). Plaintiffs challenge Guitar Center’s practice of requesting and recording personal identification information when customers in its California stores pay using a credit card. Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of their class certification motion contending the trial court improperly denied the motion based on its erroneous interpretation of the statute.

Jose Salazar sued his former employer, Lakeshore Equipment Company, doing business as Lakeshore Learning Materials, for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lakeshore. On appeal Salazar contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that Lakeshore had fired another employee for making similar complaints. We affirm.

After a bail bond has been forfeited, the bonding company has a certain amount of time—called the appearance period—in which it can seek to vacate the forfeiture on specified grounds, such as the defendant’s appearance in court. (Pen. Code, § 1305.) Under certain circumstances, a court may grant a 180-day extension of the appearance period, thus allowing the bonding company additional time to move to vacate the forfeiture. (§ 1305.4.) This case concerns the proper calculation of the 180 day extension and the maximum time permitted by section 1305.4. Our Supreme Court has said the 180 day extension period is measured from the date of the trial court’s first order granting an extension of the appearance period. (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35, 43 & 46, fn. 2 (Financial Casualty).)

Appellant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. appeals from the trial court’s order denying its motion for relief from forfeiture of a bail bond. The trial court first denied appellant’s timely motion to extend the appearance period, after which summary judgment on the forfeited bond was issued. The trial court then denied appellant’s motion brought under Penal Code section 1305.6 to set aside the summary judgment, to vacate the forfeiture, and to exonerate the bond. Appellant argues it demonstrated the required “good cause” for granting its section 1305.6 motion. We agree appellant satisfied the good cause requirement for the requested relief and, therefore, we reverse.

Bradford Lund, the grandson of Walt and Lillian Disney, appeals from rulings by the trial court following a bench trial that centered on opposing claims by Brad and the trustees of three trusts of which he is the primary beneficiary. With respect to one of the trusts, Brad asserts that the trustees improperly exercised their discretion in refusing to make principal trust distributions due to him on his 35th and 40th birthdays. Thus, he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to compel these distributions. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his request to remove the trustees based on alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties and in limiting the scope of related discovery. With respect to the other two trusts, the trial court found Brad adequately exercised his right under the trust instruments to remove and replace the trustee.

Appellant Thomas Dee Engineering Company, Inc. appeals after the trial granted the motion of respondent Warren Kent Khtikian, to enforce a settlement between the parties, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred when it granted the motion because (1) the settlement agreement was based on “an unenforceable agreement to agree” in that documents containing a release and reservation of jurisdiction, to which the agreement referred, had not yet been prepared, (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to force appellant to consent to release and reservation of jurisdiction documents prepared by respondent and modified by the court, and (3) the court improperly refused to delete language excluding Arrowood from the release agreement or add language requiring respondent to dismiss with prejudice his cross-complaint against Arrowood Indemnity Company (Arrowood). We shall affirm the judgment.

Appellants Michael Lampe and Karen McNair appeal the trial court’s order denying class certification of their wage and hour claims against Queen of the Valley Medical Center (QVMC). The trial court concluded that individualized issues predominated and the claims could not be proven efficiently as a class. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and it did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. We affirm.