CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs Robert Martin and Hannah Martin (the Martins or plaintiffs) appeal a judgment in favor of defendant NationStar Mortgage LLC (NationStar) after the trial court sustained NationStar’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. The Martins and NationStar entered into a written agreement modifying the Martins’ mortgage loan. After sending their first monthly payment, the Martins began to receive account statements showing a deficiency. Plaintiffs inquired, and NationStar responded that the Martins were obligated to remit amounts sufficient not just to cover their principal and interest obligation, but also for “Escrow Items” (which they had not done). The Martins nonetheless continued to pay NationStar for principal and interest, only, and after a few months, NationStar issued a notice of default.

Defendant Joshua James Joaquin appeals from his conviction of one felony count of driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of section 10851, subdivision (a) of the Vehicle Code. He contends that the trial court erroneously denied his pre-plea motion to reduce the charges against him to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47). We conclude that the procedure employed to determine the applicability of Proposition 47 was unauthorized and, accordingly, reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings as set forth below.

Plaintiff and appellant Matthew McLaughlin, in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant and respondent Kamala Harris’s special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. As Attorney General, Harris refused to process two proposed ballot initiatives submitted by McLaughlin because the proposed initiatives were facially unconstitutional. McLaughlin alleged that by doing so, Harris violated his right to petition. We conclude that because McLaughlin’s complaint was based on decisions and statements made by Harris in connection with issues of public interest, and McLaughlin failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing, his complaint was properly stricken under section 425.16, subdivision(e) (section 425.16(e)). We therefore affirm.

Real estate broker Michael Cassell entered into a listing agreement granting him the exclusive right to sell a residential property. The agreement, which included an arbitration clause, identified Cassell as the broker and Robert Armani as the seller; those names appear on the respective signature lines. When a dispute concerning the agreement arose, Cassell filed a petition to compel arbitration. He named Stephania Armani, not Robert, as the respondent. Cassell asserted in an accompanying declaration that Stephania signed the agreement using the name of the property’s titleholder, her son, Robert, and represented to Cassell that she had the authority to list the property for sale. The clerk entered default against Stephania but the court declined to enter a default judgment. It directed Cassell to file a motion to compel arbitration, which he did.

Appellant Francesca Indigo Jacobs (Jacobs), in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s issuance on September 29, 2016 of a civil harassment restraining order after hearing (the restraining order) in favor of Brooke M. Brooke M. has not filed a brief or otherwise appeared on appeal. We affirm because of the inadequacy of the record and resulting failure to demonstrate error by the trial court.

Plaintiff Gustavo Vieyra is a member of defendant United University Church (Church). He sued the Church, seeking to enjoin it from selling its property located on West 34th Street in Los Angeles to real party in interest, University of Southern California (USC). Plaintiff alleges the Church violated its bylaws requiring a quorum of its members to be present at the meeting approving the sale, and that the sale contravenes a restrictive covenant contained in the deed by which the Church acquired the property, requiring that the property be used only for religious purposes. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s order sustaining USC’s and the Church’s demurrer to his claims regarding the restrictive covenant. The trial court found that plaintiff lacked standing to assert those claims because he held no ownership interest in the property. He contends the complaint could be amended to state a derivative action on behalf of the Church.

A man who underwent a total knee replacement on both knees sued his doctor for malpractice for using the wrong sized implant on one of his knees. The trial court granted summary judgment because the doctor’s expert witness opined that the doctor was not negligent and that the implant size was not the cause of the man’s injuries. The man appeals. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.

In Cardona v. Licher Direct Mail, Inc. (B254783, Aug. 6, 2015) [nonpub. opn.] (Cardona I), we affirmed the trial court’s order holding a debtor’s employer and its president liable for violating an earnings withholding order, but remanded to the trial court to recalculate the amount owed. The trial court elected to adopt the creditor’s proffered recalculation without further explanation. The employer and its president appeal. We conclude that trial court erred, and set forth what we conclude is the proper calculation of the amount to be withheld.

Is a company that sells solar energy to homeowners required to have a contractor’s license when it “arranges for” a licensed contractor to install the solar energy system and retains ownership of the system? We conclude the answer is “no.” Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the company in a homeowner’s action for a refund of money paid for the system and for damages.

Jose Delcarmen Sanchez appeals a judgment following conviction of felony resisting an executive officer, with a finding that he suffered a prior serious and violent felony strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 69, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to strike his 1967 strike conviction for first degree murder, and affirm. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504.)

In Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1336 (Schep I), we held that a trustee’s conduct in recording a notice of sale, a notice of default, and a trustee’s deed upon sale—all in conjunction with a nonjudicial foreclosure under a deed of trust—were, at a minimum, conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), such that the plaintiff could not state a claim for slander of title against the beneficiary who directed the trustee to record the trustee’s deed upon sale. This appeal involves the same case and asks: Does that plaintiff state a claim for slander of title against the trustee? We already answered this question in Schep I, but plaintiff in his opening brief just ignores Schep I, and in his reply brief either tries to distinguish it on grounds Schep I itself explicitly addressed or argues that Schep I is wrong.

Dirck Morgan White appeals a judgment following conviction of attempted premeditated murder of a police officer in the performance of his duties; assault on a police officer with a firearm; exhibition of a deadly weapon to a police officer to resist arrest; unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon; and second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subds. (e) & (f), 245, subd. (d)(2), 417.8, 29800, subd. (a)(1), 459, 12022.53, subd. (b) & (c).) We affirm.

Enrique Parra appeals from a restraining order entered against him in a civil harassment proceeding brought by Y.M. The restraining order expired by its own terms on March 30, 2017. Because the order has been extinguished, no appellate relief can be granted. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.

Seeking to avenge the death of a friend, Londale McNeil, Dayvion Deandre Combs, Cedric Octavia Harris and Paul Demetrius Allen, Jr., drove into a rival gang’s territory looking for the man they believed was responsible for their friend’s death—Keiun Harris. When they could not find Keiun, the four drove deeper into the gang’s territory. McNeil and Combs then opened fire on another vehicle they spotted. Two men—Leroy Bernardez and Diallo O’Quinn —occupied the vehicle. McNeil, who stood in front of Combs, fired a single shot from his .357-caliber revolver. Combs fired 15 shots, one of which fatally struck McNeil. Combs, Harris, and Allen were subsequently charged with conspiracy to commit murder, as well as the murder of McNeil, the attempted murder of Bernardez and O’Quinn, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. The People also charged defendants with various firearm and gang enhancement allegations.