CA Unpub Decisions

Bradford David Jones and his son Forbes Bradford Jones collided while riding jet skis—Bradford was injured in the collision. Bradford, Forbes, and Bradford’s wife (Maria Jones) sued The Barge, LLC and David Hubert for negligence and other tort claims. The trial court granted summary adjudication in Hubert’s favor on three of the four causes of action, finding that Bradford and Forbes released Hubert from liability when they rented jet skis from The Barge, LLC. After plaintiffs dismissed the remaining cause of action, the court entered judgment for Hubert and The Barge, LLC.
Plaintiffs contend the court erred by granting summary adjudication because Hubert is not a party to the releases and there is no evidence that he owns The Barge, LLC, the releases are unenforceable as a matter of law, and a triable issue of fact exists on the gross negligence question. For his part, Hubert contends the appeal must be dismissed as untimely, and in any event the trial court’s ruling was

Petitioner A.Y. (Mother), mother of one-year-old A.Y. (Minor), challenges the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services, continuing Minor in out-of-home care, and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 (366.26 hearing). She contends the court: (1) violated her right to due process by failing to provide adequate notice of the six-month review hearing; (2) erred in terminating reunification services; and (3) abused its discretion by denying her request for a continuance. We deny Mother’s petition.

Minor C.G. was removed from the home of his mother, Shannon M. (Mother), and placed in the home of his biological father, Daniel G. (Father) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2. After a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court upheld the removal, ordered Father to assume custody of the minor, declined Mother’s request for reunification services, and terminated its jurisdiction. Mother now appeals from the juvenile court’s order and contends the court erred in failing to retain jurisdiction and exercise its discretion to order reunification services. Mother further argues the court erred by not making specific factual findings in support of its decision to terminate jurisdiction. We disagree, and affirm the order at issue.

This appeal arises from a child custody and visitation dispute between appellant Robert T. and respondent B.M. Robert contends when he sought legal custody of his daughter, B.M. accused him of drug and alcohol abuse. After a hearing, the trial court ordered Robert to submit to a hair follicle test. On appeal, Robert argues the trial court erred in ordering him to submit to the hair follicle drug test over his objection. Because the law is clear a trial court cannot compel a party to a custody or visitation proceeding to submit to a hair follicle drug test under Family Code section 3041.5, we find the trial court erred. We reverse the order directing Robert to submit to and pay for a hair follicle drug test and related visitation orders.

A.F. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order directing him to submit to hair follicle drug testing as part of his reunification plan. He argues the test constitutes an invasion of privacy and is unrelated to his reunification with his children. As we explain below, we disagree. Given father’s history of drug use, requiring a hair follicle drug test was both reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Defendant Lonnie Glenn Schmidt pleaded no contest to five counts of recording a false instrument (Pen. Code, § 115) and one count of using personal identifying information without authorization (§ 530.5). Appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436 (Wende) on behalf of defendant. The brief states the case and the facts, but raises no issues. Defendant has submitted written argument on his own behalf. Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there are no arguable issues on appeal. We affirm.

In this action for misrepresentation and related causes of action, plaintiffs sought to recover losses they had incurred as a result of a fraudulent investment scheme operated by three individual defendants and promoted by respondent Santa Cruz County Bank (the Bank). The superior court sustained the Bank’s demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiffs’ action was precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA or the Act). (15 U.S.C. §78bb, subd. (f)(1); §77p, subds. (b), (f).) Plaintiffs maintain that SLUSA is inapplicable. We disagree and therefore must affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Appellant N.Z. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to her now three-year-old daughter, Ariana L. After reviewing the juvenile court record, appellant’s court appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Mother filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant Jorge Alberto Garcia was convicted by no contest plea of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) with a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1) (12022(a)(1)). Many years after that felony conviction, defendant moved to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b)(3) (17(b)(3)), so he could seek to end immigration proceedings against him. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying the motion. We affirm.

Defendant was charged with several crimes in connection with his false imprisonment of his girlfriend in a motel room. Before trial, the court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competency and suspended proceedings. After a psychologist evaluated defendant, the court reinstated proceedings. Shortly thereafter, the defense requested another competency hearing, but the request was denied.
At trial, evidence of two prior incidents of domestic violence were introduced. One of the incidents was an assault that allegedly occurred in 2012. The prosecutor in the present case also prosecuted the 2012 assault. Defendant was found not guilty of the 2012 assault and sued the prosecutor civilly for malicious prosecution. The civil case was dismissed about two months before the charges were filed in the present case. After he was convicted on all counts, defendant argued in a new trial motion that the prosecutor had a disabling conflict of interest arising from the civil suit.

Alejandro Arredondo and David Alejandro Perez appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence—i.e., a revolver and approximately nine grams of cocaine—recovered from Arredondo’s truck when police officers searched it after a traffic stop. Defendants contend the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We will affirm the denial of defendants’ suppression motions.

Defendant Kevin Robinson pulled out his gun and pointed it at his acquaintance while in the acquaintance's bedroom, and waved the gun towards two other individuals in the room. The witnesses reported that defendant also fired one bullet during this incident. No one was injured.
Based on this event, defendant was charged with: (1) one count of attempted murder; (2) three counts of assault with a firearm (one for each individual in the room); and (3) two counts of attempted robbery. The jury found defendant not guilty of the attempted murder and attempted robbery charges. But the jury found defendant guilty of the three counts of assault with a firearm, and found true the allegations that he personally used a firearm in committing each of these assaults. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a) (2), 12022.5, subds. (a), (d).) Defendant admitted prior strike and prison term allegations. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (a).) The court imposed a 25-year prison term.

A jury found John Edward Jimenez guilty of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422; count 1); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2); and battery (§ 242; count 3). After the jury returned its verdicts, Jimenez admitted having served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and having suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, & 668). The trial court granted Jimenez's motion to dismiss one of his prior strike convictions and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 17 years 4 months in prison.
On appeal, Jimenez claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury.

A jury convicted Jonathon Benjamin Cohen of five counts of arson of forest land (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c)) that occurred on five separate dates. The court sentenced Cohen to nine years, four months in state prison, consisting of the middle term of four years on count 1 plus consecutive one-third middle terms of 16-months each on counts 2 through 5. On appeal, Cohen contends the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by admitting evidence of prior uncharged acts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), and the court's limiting instruction did not prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence. Specifically, he argues the three prior unrelated and uncharged fires were not sufficiently similar to prove identity, common plan, and intent. Cohen maintains the error was prejudicial in that the verdict could have been different had the court excluded the evidence of uncharged acts, warranting reversal of his convicti