CA Unpub Decisions

In November 2017, the Agency filed a section 300 petition with respect to minor S.M. (then five years old) and his minor half-sibling (then two years old). The petition alleged that S.M. came within section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) [failure to protect] and (g) [no provision for support]. The petition alleged, among other things, that father’s whereabouts were unknown.
The November 2017 initial non-detaining report stated that on November 30, 2017, the social worker contacted Yolo County Child Support Services and learned that Father signed a declaration of paternity at Alta Bates Medical Center in Alameda County at the time of S.M.’s birth. The report also stated that the social worker submitted a due diligence search and attempted to contact father by phone and by mail.

In November 2017, the Agency filed a section 300 petition with respect to minor S.M. (then five years old) and his minor half-sibling (then two years old). The petition alleged that S.M. came within section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) [failure to protect] and (g) [no provision for support]. The petition alleged, among other things, that father’s whereabouts were unknown.
The November 2017 initial non-detaining report stated that on November 30, 2017, the social worker contacted Yolo County Child Support Services and learned that Father signed a declaration of paternity at Alta Bates Medical Center in Alameda County at the time of S.M.’s birth. The report also stated that the social worker submitted a due diligence search and attempted to contact father by phone and by mail.

G.D. solicited defendant for sex using a cell phone app. The two went to G.D.’s home, smoked methamphetamine supplied by G.D., and had consensual sex.
After the consensual sexual encounter, defendant hit G.D. repeatedly, saying “[w]e can do this the easy way or the hard way.” With his hands around G.D.’s throat, defendant demanded “easy way or hard way” and threatened to kill G.D. until G.D. said he wanted the “easy way.”
Defendant asked G.D. how much money was in the house. He resumed hitting G.D. when G.D. said he only had $30. G.D. then admitted he had $400.
When G.D. tried to run for the front door, defendant punched G.D. and put him in a chokehold so that G.D. could not breathe. He forced G.D. to perform oral sex on him. He penetrated G.D.’s anus with his finger and tongue multiple times. He also penetrated G.D.’s anus with his penis. G.D. did not consent to those sexual acts.

G.D. solicited defendant for sex using a cell phone app. The two went to G.D.’s home, smoked methamphetamine supplied by G.D., and had consensual sex.
After the consensual sexual encounter, defendant hit G.D. repeatedly, saying “[w]e can do this the easy way or the hard way.” With his hands around G.D.’s throat, defendant demanded “easy way or hard way” and threatened to kill G.D. until G.D. said he wanted the “easy way.”
Defendant asked G.D. how much money was in the house. He resumed hitting G.D. when G.D. said he only had $30. G.D. then admitted he had $400.
When G.D. tried to run for the front door, defendant punched G.D. and put him in a chokehold so that G.D. could not breathe. He forced G.D. to perform oral sex on him. He penetrated G.D.’s anus with his finger and tongue multiple times. He also penetrated G.D.’s anus with his penis. G.D. did not consent to those sexual acts.

On June 1, 1990, appellant was convicted by plea of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211) with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). According to the amended abstract of judgment, appellant was sentenced to three years in state prison for these offenses. Appellant’s three-year sentence in this case was ordered consecutive to the sentences imposed in three other cases, for a total term of 27 years in state prison.
On September 15, 2021, appellant filed a petition for reclassification of his felony convictions as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subds. (f)–(h)) and section 17, subdivision (b).

In this juvenile dependency appeal, S.P. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 3-year-old son J.C. (son). Mother makes two arguments on appeal. First, she argues the juvenile court erred when it refused to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights. We conclude both that the juvenile court did not run afoul of our Supreme Court’s recent decision addressing this exception to the termination of parental rights (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.)) and that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision.
Second, mother argues the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and the juvenile court failed to satisfy their initial inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)) and related California law.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), E.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. She contends we must reverse the order because the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the duty to make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of her daughter, Skyla G., under section 224.2, subdivision (e), California law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; (ICWA)). Mother argues DCFS failed to interview her brothers (Skyla’s maternal uncles) as part of DCFS’s further inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e), and remand is required for DCFS to conduct this further inquiry. She also contends DCFS’s misspelling of the maternal grandmother’s name on the ICWA notices DCFS sent to the tribes was prejudicial and requires remand for DCFS to comply with the notice requirements under ICWA and California law.

David Ariaz appeals from the superior court’s order summarily rejecting the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Secretary) under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), that the court recall Ariaz’s 26-year sentence based on a change in the law and resentence him with respect to his convictions arising from a 2010 gang shooting and attempted vehicle burglary. On June 2, 2021 the superior court read and considered the Secretary’s recommendation but summarily rejected it without appointing counsel for Ariaz. Effective January 1, 2022 Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) (Assembly Bill 1540) amended the recall provision in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), and moved it to new section 1170.03.

N.C. (Mother) challenges the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring six-year-old Marcus P. a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), and removing him from Mother’s custody. Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings Mother was unable to provide Marcus with care and supervision; Mother physically abused Marcus; and Mother and Mark P. (Father) engaged in physical altercations in Marcus’s presence. Mother also argues substantial evidence does not support the removal order, and the juvenile court failed to state the reasons for removal or consider reasonable means to prevent removal. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Gary Johnson (defendant) appeals from the July 24, 2020, summary denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Because we have already ordered the trial court to conduct further proceedings under section 1170.95, subdivision (c), with respect to a substantively identical petition for resentencing filed by defendant, we can provide no effective relief to defendant through this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

A jury convicted defendant Elmer Wilibaldo Escobar-Lopez of continuous sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, J.V. On appeal, Escobar-Lopez argues that his conviction must be reversed because (1) the information was amended to expand the time period of the alleged conduct after Escobar-Lopez waived his right to a preliminary hearing; (2) the trial court excluded evidence and limited examination regarding purported infidelity by J.V.’s mother; and (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during his rebuttal argument by arguing facts not in evidence regarding how J.V.’s mother could have sought a U visa for her participation in the case. We affirm.

In 2019, in resolving three criminal cases, appellant Ransom Huntley Griffin (Appellant) pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and admitted a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to the negotiated disposition, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years, four months
in prison, which included one year for the prior prison term enhancement.
On appeal, Appellant argued this court should strike the prior prison term enhancement due to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which limits imposition of the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses. Appellant argued the rest of his sentence under the plea agreement should remain intact.

In 2003, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began investigating a drug trafficking operation (DTO) headed by Jose Vargas Alvarez. Defendant Alejandro Ramirez was part of the DTO, which transported and sold large quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine throughout the San Francisco Bay Area as well as southern California.
Following a trial, a jury convicted Ramirez of multiple drug related offenses, as well as offenses related to the kidnapping of a third party whom Vargas Alvarez suspected was involved in the theft of $2 million and drugs from one of the operation’s “stash” houses. The trial court sentenced Ramirez to a term of life in prison without parole, consecutive to 25 years to life, consecutive to 33 years eight months.
On appeal, Ramirez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for: (1) conspiracy to commit murder (counts 4, 5); (2) the possession charges (counts 10 12, 14 16, & 28);

Defendant Darnell Leo Green was convicted of multiple offenses arising from a 1997 robbery of several individuals in a residence by several armed gang members. He was sentenced to 45 years eight months in prison. In 2021, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the sentencing court recommending that defendant be resentenced pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). After the issue was briefed, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to resentence defendant.