CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from a superior court order extending defendant Allyn Hopkins’s civil commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) for an additional year, to November 26, 2017. (Pen. Code, § 2972.) He argues the court’s orders extending his commitment, and denying him release for outpatient treatment, are not supported by substantial evidence, and that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to be released for outpatient treatment. We affirm.

Defendant James McCurdy pleaded no contest to one count of heroin transportation and admitted to three sentence enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)) based on his having served prior prison terms for felony convictions. After the passage of Proposition 47 (The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act), he successfully applied for resentencing on one of those prior convictions, a 2009 conviction for a drug offense, and the offense was reduced to a misdemeanor. He then petitioned to strike the section 667.5(b) sentence enhancement imposed in this case based on the 2009 conviction, and the trial court denied the petition.

J.P., a minor, appeals from two victim restitution orders. He contends, primarily, that his restitution hearings were fundamentally unfair because he was denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge the victims’ claims; the evidence was insufficient to support the amount of the restitution awards; and his legal representation was constitutionally inadequate. In a consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus, J.P. contends his attorney’s failure to timely appeal from the first restitution order deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
We agree that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise J.P. of his appeal rights and file a timely notice of appeal from the first order, so we deem his notice of appeal from the second order timely as to both. On the merits, we conclude that the proceedings at the first restitution hearing violated J.P.’s due process rights. Accordingly, we reverse the first restitution order and remand for a new hearing.

A jury convicted Nicholas Huerta of felony theft from an elder of property valued more than $950 (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (d); count 1), misdemeanor forgery (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d); counts 2–4), and misdemeanor theft from an elder of property valued less than $950 (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (d); count 5). The convictions arose from the unauthorized cashing of three checks defendant wrote on a credit card account belonging to his elderly father. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant’s handwriting was on all three checks; that defendant arranged for an acquaintance, Rita Fong, to cash the checks and deliver the money to him; and that defendant later admitted culpability in a jail phone call with his father. During trial, the court allowed the prosecution to present evidence that defendant had previously obtained credit cards in his father’s name without permission and made charges on the accounts.

Defendant Gene Aubuchon was convicted by a jury of first degree burglary. At trial, Aubuchon admitted he entered the victim’s home but claimed to have done so at the invitation of a person he assumed was the owner of the home. After realizing this person was not the owner, and while already inside the victim’s garage, Aubuchon decided to steal the victim’s purse and other belongings. He then entered the foyer of her home, in possession of her things, but did so in order to leave the home and not to steal anything else. His counsel argued he did not commit a burglary because the evidence showed he neither entered the home, nor any room in it, with the intent to commit theft. On appeal, Aubuchon challenges his burglary conviction, claiming the trial court erred in responding to a question posed by the jury during deliberations concerning the intent element of burglary. He also argues that in any event, the court should have provided additional instructions to the jury. We disa

Defendant David Jason Castaneda was sentenced to eight years in prison after a jury found him guilty of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)), and battery upon a former dating partner (§ 243, subd. (e)). The charges arose from a violent encounter with a former girlfriend in which defendant rammed her car and then compelled her to accompany him several blocks to his parents’ house. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentences for aggravated assault and misdemeanor battery should have been stayed pursuant to section 654 because they were incidental to the kidnapping. We hold that the appeal is moot as to the battery and that the record contains substantial evidence that the assault was motivated by an objective distinct from the accomplishment of the kidnapping. Accordingly, we will affirm.

Defendant Mary Kay Brewster, a physician at a Monterey hospital, was married to another physician at the same hospital. The couple separated after Brewster discovered her husband was engaged in extramarital affairs with nurses at the hospital. Brewster began harassing her husband and one of the nurses through phone calls, messages, personal confrontations, and infliction of property damage. The trial court found her guilty of stalking, vandalism, and unauthorized entry of a dwelling house. The court granted a three-year term of probation. Brewster raises four claims on appeal. We conclude Brewster’s conduct constituted true threats of an intent to commit unlawful violence, such that her stalking convictions did not violate the First Amendment. Second, we conclude the denial of her section 17(b) motion was not an abuse of discretion. As to the probation conditions, we conclude the language meets constitutional requirements. We reject all other claims, and we will affirm.

Ashley G. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to her now two-year-old son, Joseph. After reviewing the juvenile court record, mother’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Mother filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Angel Medrano (appellant) appeals from his conviction following a plea of no contest to one count of violation of Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a)(1), conspiracy to introduce narcotics into a penal institution in violation of section 4573, and his admission to seven prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (e) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(e).
Appointed counsel for appellant asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to appellant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from appellant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to appellant, we affirm the judgment.

Former minor Timothy B. (Timothy) contends on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss his petition and seal his records pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. We affirm.

Defendant Jerome Clifford Golden, a sexually violent predator (SVP) committed to Coalinga State Hospital (CSH), was charged with possession of child pornography by a registered sex offender (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (b)). The information further alleged he had been convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under 14 years of age, a qualifying “strike” offense (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a) (d)), in 1992 and 1995. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the prior convictions. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends a suppression motion and a Romero motion should have been granted. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment.

Frederick Howe lives next to Gary and Jean Shekhter in Rancho Santa Fe. The Shekhters installed solar array panels on their property within 100 feet of Howe's property. About four or five years later, Howe sued the Shekhters seeking declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the Shekhters to remove or relocate the solar panels. Howe relied on a 1990 written agreement (Agreement) between the predecessor owners prohibiting a "building structure or improvement" within 100 feet of the boundary line. In response, the Shekhters agreed they were bound by the Agreement, but argued the Agreement's setback rule did not apply to the solar panels. The Shekhters also raised statutory and equitable defenses.

A jury convicted Cristian Anthony Puente of carrying a loaded firearm on his person in a public place (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation he was not the registered owner of the firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6)). The court granted Puente formal probation for three years under certain terms and conditions.
On appeal, Puente challenges three probation conditions: (1) condition 10.g. requiring the probation officer's approval of his residence and employment, (2) condition 6.n. requiring submission of "personal effects, property, computers, and recordable media" to search upon request, and (3) condition 6.k. requiring him to report " 'contact' with law enforcement." Puente contends the first two conditions are unconstitutionally overbroad and not reasonably related to his crime or to prevent future criminality and the third is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

Appointed counsel for defendant Alvin Nicholas filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.