CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Ricky Wayne Cole pleaded guilty to numerous felony charges and admitted being previously convicted of a strike offense. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion to strike his prior strike. We affirm.

In the early morning hours of New Year’s Day 2013, the victim’s car was found on the side of River Road near McHenry Avenue and State Route 120; her body lay at the bottom of a ravine leading to the Stanislaus River. Defendant Michael McKuin, her estranged husband and father of her child, was arrested for her murder in April 2014. In September 2016, a jury found him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he was responsible for the victim’s death. We shall affirm the judgment.
Given that the gist of defendant’s argument requires an analysis of the evidence at trial, a separate statement of facts is not warranted. We instead include them in our Discussion.

In consolidated appeals from restraining orders granted against appellants Jason and Sandra Bross, we find sufficient evidence to support the restraining orders and affirm the orders in all three cases

This is an action under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) for damages arising out of plaintiff and appellant Jenifer Day’s detention in a Sacramento County jail for driving under the influence of alcohol.Day appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained defendants and respondents County of Sacramento and Sheriff Scott R. Jones’s demurrer to her amended complaint without leave to amend. The trial court held respondents were not subject to a lawsuit under section 1983 because, to the extent they were alleged to control medical services in the jail, they were state actors performing law enforcement functions. Day contends the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion and her pleading was sufficient to state a claim under section 1983. We affirm on the basis that her complaint failed to state a cause of action against respondents under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658 (Monell).

Joseph Mohamed, Sr. and Shirley Mohamed, trustees of a charitable trust that owns the property upon which the stable and restroom buildings were built (the owners), appeal from a judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate with respect to these buildings and upholding the collective assessment of Sacramento County (the County) and its Building Board of Appeals (the Board) that neither building qualified for agricultural exempt permits. We affirm.

Under a contract containing an indemnification clause, Valley Healthcare Systems, Inc. (Valley Healthcare) provided nursing services to inmates at the main jail operated by the County of Sacramento (County). One of the inmates died after two doctors employed by the County were actively negligent in their medical treatment of the inmate. The County settled a wrongful death claim with the mother of the deceased inmate for approximately $2 million. The County then sought indemnification of its own active negligence by bringing this action against Valley Healthcare.

Appellant Roberta G. is the biological grandmother and adoptive mother of three boys, An., Ai., and N. Roberta also served as the legal guardian of the boys’ teenage sister, T., and allowed their adult brother, J., to live in her home. After T. reported that J. had sexually abused her, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition on behalf of the boys under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), alleging they were at risk of serious physical harm and sexual abuse. The juvenile court sustained the allegations, ordered the boys placed in Roberta’s home under DCFS supervision, and ordered Roberta to participate in sexual abuse awareness counseling. Roberta appealed. We affirm. There is substantial evidence that Roberta took no protective action toward T. or the boys upon learning of the abuse.

The juvenile court denied minor M.W.’s motion to suppress a handgun and sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition charging him with possession of a firearm by a minor in violation of Penal Code section 29610. M.W. challenges the denial of the motion to suppress and contends the juvenile court erred in permitting the police officer to testify based on his background, training, and experience that he reasonably suspected minor was armed, thereby justifying the investigative stop and detention. We affirm.

Diane Neal, in propria persona, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), alleging wrongful termination and related claims. The trial court granted LAUSD’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment on the complaint. Neal appeals. However, she has failed to support her contentions with an adequate record on appeal; therefore, we affirm the judgment.

After the trial court ruled defendant Kenneth Terrell Parker mentally competent to stand trial, a jury found him guilty of kidnapping to commit rape, attempted forcible rape, and two counts of assault with intent to rape. The court imposed the mandatory sentence of seven years to life on the kidnapping count and consecutive determinate sentences on the remaining counts; it stayed the sentence for attempted forcible rape pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
On appeal, defendant contends the court’s competency determination was supported by inadequate evidence, namely “fundamentally flawed expert opinions” that ignored his seizure disorder and impermissibly incorporated case-specific hearsay in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).

D.Y. (Mother), mother of 11-month-old A.Y., seeks review by extraordinary writ, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, of the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the court erred when it terminated her reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), and further contends the court erred when it reduced her visitation pending the section 366.26 hearing. We shall deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

After Juan V. pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor charge of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, he was adjudged a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and the juvenile court imposed various conditions of probation. In view of Juan’s admitted association with Sureño gang members and his recognition that it would be hard for him to dissociate himself from the gang lifestyle, the juvenile court imposed gang conditions. In this appeal, Juan challenges the electronics search condition that the juvenile court imposed in light of the gang conditions, arguing that it is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad. We will affirm.

Following the denial of his to Penal Code section 995 motion challenging the magistrate’s denial of his motion to suppress and pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Mohammed Ghassan Aleqabi pleaded no contest to two misdemeanors: (1) a violation of Health & Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (a), (possession of not more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, or not more than four grams of concentrated cannabis) (count 4) and (2) section 25400, subdivision (a)(1), (carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle) (count 5). On appeal from the grant of probation, defendant challenges the denial of the section 995 motion. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).) Defendant now argues that his initial detention was not based on reasonable suspicion since urinating in a deserted parking lot at midnight is not criminal, the detention was unduly prolonged, and his consent to search the vehicle was obtained beyond the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the stop.

Following a court trial, defendant Alfredo Argueta, Jr., was convicted of carrying a loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)). The trial court also found that defendant was not the registered owner of the firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c)(6)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation. We conclude that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and reverse.