CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Regina Louise Butler appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found her guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187). The jury also found that defendant personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had two prior convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 75 years to life in prison consecutive to an 11-year term. On appeal, defendant contends: there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support her first degree murder conviction; and the prosecutor committed misconduct. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a wife needs evidence of agency in order to retain an attorney on behalf of her husband after he has been incapacitated in an accident, thereby giving the attorney a lien against anticipated damages for the husband’s personal injuries.
Here a wife signed a legal services agreement on behalf of her husband, who had been seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. After the wife discharged the attorney, she successfully resisted the attorney’s assertion of a lien on the ground that she lacked authority to enter into the agreement. Relying on recent case law grounded on decisions dating back to a time when husbands had exclusive management and control of community property, the trial court found that, because there was no evidence of agency, the wife was not authorized to sign the agreement on her husband’s behalf.

The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to the complaint filed by plaintiff and appellant, Parviz Montazer (husband), against defendant and respondent, Parvin R. Montazer (wife). The court ruled jurisdiction over the matter resided in the family court and the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Husband argues the trial court had jurisdiction, the complaint stated a cause of action, and he should have been allowed to amend the pleading. He also claims the case should not have been dismissed because he had good cause for not attending the order to show cause (OSC) re dismissal.
We agree the court lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the action. Consequently we have no need to discuss any other arguments. We affirm.

Plaintiff Cheryll Goto, as Trustee of the Robert K. Garren Revocable Trust (Trust), sued defendants William Soto for breach of an unsecured promissory note. The trial court conducted a bench trial on Goto’s claim and announced at the close of evidence a tentative decision in Soto’s favor. The court stated Goto failed to meet her burden, but provided no other explanation for its decision.

A jury convicted Joel Aguilar of premeditated attempted murder; all further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless noted), conspiracy to commit murder, active participation in a criminal street gang, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The jury also found Aguilar committed attempted murder and conspiracy for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal gang, and intentionally and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury. Aguilar contends the trial court erred by admitting testimonial hearsay recounted by the prosecution’s gang expert in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). He also argues the expert improperly testified Aguilar acted with actual knowledge his fellow gang members had engaged in criminal gang activity (People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644 (Killebrew), and that the court erred by admitting Aguilar’s tape-recorded jailhouse telephone conversations o

On appeal, Watkins contends the trial court erred by failing to also instruct the jury regarding involuntary manslaughter and the heat-of-passion theory of voluntary manslaughter. He also contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence of prior incidents during which George and Christopher allegedly became belligerent when drinking alcohol together. We find no error, and affirm.

Appellant P.L., father of minor S.L., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) He contends the El Dorado County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) by failing to notify the Blackfeet Tribe of the dependency proceedings.
The Agency filed a letter in response stating it agreed the Blackfeet Tribe was not noticed and conditional reversal was required.
We agree with the parties and shall conditionally reverse.

I.H. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) He contends he was deprived of due process because he did not receive notice of the impending section 366.26 hearing, and the error is reversible per se. We dismiss the appeal as untimely.

Appellant Michele Dudley filed an affidavit of contempt against respondent Grady Williams, accusing him of repeatedly violating a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). Williams sought to modify the DVRO, and Dudley opposed the modification and sought the DVRO’s extension.
Following a contested trial, the court found Williams not guilty of contempt and granted the modification, but declined to renew the DVRO.
Dudley appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying her request to renew the DVRO and in modifying it over her objection. We conclude the court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to extend the DVRO. Because the DVRO has expired by its own terms, we need not address the propriety of the decision to modify. Accordingly, we affirm.

The minor K. B. appeals from a dispositional order, arguing the juvenile court erred in failing to calculate her maximum term of confinement pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726. The People concede. We agree and will remand the matter to the juvenile court.

A jury found defendant Ezeque Shau-Doe Greer guilty of two counts of second degree robbery, one count of attempted second degree robbery, and three counts of assault likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to reopen the case to present additional evidence in response to the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. He further contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Veit Johnson and Karen Johnson appeal from the judgment entered following the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Gary Curry, ORBA Insurance Services, Inc., Murphy Retirement Management, Inc., and Intersecurities, Inc., now known as Transamerica Financial Advisors, Inc., based on its finding that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statutes of limitations. We shall affirm the judgment.

An attempted home invasion robbery of a drug dealer in 2007 resulted in the shooting deaths of a young father and his infant son. In 2014, a jury found defendants Donald Ortez-Lucero and Christopher Strong guilty of two counts of murder with three special circumstances (murder in the commission of a burglary, murder in the commission of attempted robbery, and multiple murders), first degree burglary, and attempted robbery with firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Ortez-Lucero, the shooter, to two indeterminate sentences of life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years to life, plus a determinate term of 26 years. The court sentenced Strong to two indeterminate sentences of life without the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 36 years.

J.J.A. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth in 2016, was detained at the hospital, and went directly into foster care. His parents, appellants Vanessa A. (Mother) and Jorge A. (Father) have a long history of drug abuse. Reunification services were bypassed owing to Father’s violent felony conviction and Mother’s resistance to court-ordered drug treatment.
The juvenile court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply, declined to move J.J.A. to the home of his paternal grandmother and, one year after detention, terminated parental rights. The record supports these rulings.