CA Unpub Decisions

R.H., the mother of the minor T.S., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) She contends the juvenile court committed structural error in appointing a guardian ad litem for her. We shall affirm.

Plaintiff Mary Jones appeals from a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. The case involves title to a particular piece of real property. Plaintiff sued defendants Michael Wilson and Joan Wilson in their individual capacity and as trustees in six causes of action related to an option to purchase the property and promises to gift title to the property via an estate plan. Defendants demurred to the complaint, asserting the statute of limitations barred all of plaintiff’s causes of action. In support, defendants cited a declaration filed by plaintiff in a separate case, a dissolution proceeding between Michael and plaintiff. The trial court agreed with defendants and sustained the demurrers.

In order to recover a debt with a principal amount of approximately $1,700, a law firm representing a collection agency recorded a judgment lien on the home of the debtor’s parents. The law firm then fought the parents’ attempts to remove the lien, which the trial court eventually declared void more than three years after the attorney recorded it. We consider whether the record on appeal establishes the trial court erred in finding, following an unreported bench trial, that the collection agency and its counsel were liable for violating the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff and appellant Melody Chacker (Chacker) sued to stop defendants, who had begun the nonjudicial foreclosure process, from proceeding with a foreclosure sale of her home. The gist of her third amended complaint (the operative complaint) is that defendants disregarded a statute that required them to contact her before beginning the foreclosure process; that the assignment of the deed of trust from Chase to a securitization trust for which U.S. Bank now serves as trustee is void (not merely voidable) because Chase claims it still holds the promissory note; and that the initiation of the foreclosure process violates state and federal debt collection statutes. The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrers to the operative complaint without leave to amend and denied her subsequent motion for reconsideration that invoked our Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 (Yvanova).

Defendant, The North River Insurance Company (North River), and real party in interest, Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bad Boys), appeal from a summary judgment on a bail bond forfeiture under Penal Code section 1306. Prior to the judgment, the trial court erred in determining the latest permissible date for the period during which the surety could surrender the criminal defendant or establish other grounds that support vacating the forfeiture. Nevertheless, we cannot find reversible error because even if the trial court had granted an extension to the latest permissible date, appellants have not established a ground for vacating the forfeiture. Furthermore, summary judgment was not premature because it was entered the day after the 180-day extension period—as measured from the date of the extension order—elapsed. We affirm.

After defendant pled no contest to false personation, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ formal probation, imposing various terms and conditions of probation. We affirm.

After sexually molesting Jane Doe on one occasion when she was nine years old, defendant Jaime Castroconde was charged with three counts of lewd acts upon a child under 14. A jury convicted him of two counts and acquitted him of the third, and the trial court sentenced him to three years in state prison. On appeal, Castroconde claims that the court erred by refusing to require the jury to make a special finding identifying the act relied upon to convict him of any count. He also claims that one of the acts relied upon by the prosecution, that he put a banana between Jane’s legs, violated the corpus delicti rule because the only evidence it occurred was his statement to the police. We reject these claims and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Ken Jay Jackson of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422), and the trial court sentenced defendant to a 16-month prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends the jury instruction regarding his right to self-defense was improper because it referenced his “use of force” rather than his use of a threat. Defendant contends that if he forfeited the error by failing to request the instruction be modified at trial, his trial counsel was ineffective. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

Following a trial, the jury found defendant Daniel Fuentes guilty of personally discharging a firearm with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)) (count 1), being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(l)) (count 2), carrying a concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)) (count 3), and resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4). With respect to count 3, the jury found true the penalty allegation that defendant had a loaded, concealable firearm for which he was not the registered owner within the meaning of section 25400, subdivision (c)(6), which made the offense punishable as felony.
On appeal, defendant raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and instructional error. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the penalty allegation on count three. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

This action arises out of a dispute concerning property located on 1310 N. First Street in San Jose upon which is located a motel (the Property). Appellants Kenneth S. and Rosemary Ann Manrao (collectively, the Manraos) through assignment, were sublessees under a sublease (Sublease) in which Metro Eight Properties, LLC (Metro Eight) was sublessor. The Property was owned by, among others, respondents Anita Chan (Chan) and William Joe (Joe; collectively, Chan/Joe). They were also two of the members of Metro Eight. In May 2015, the Manraos filed this action against Chan/Joe for breach of contract and other claims. The Manraos alleged, in essence, that they had rights in the Property that were abridged, consisting of (1) a right to demolish the structures located on the Property, and (2) a right of first refusal to purchase the Property.
Chan/Joe filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings challenging the first amended complaint (Complaint).

Defendant Juan Carlos Garcia Ayala was convicted after jury trial of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), misdemeanor using a controlled substance (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), misdemeanor hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), and driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) causing injury (former Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)). The jury found true the allegations that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a truck, regarding both assault counts (§§ 667, 1192.7), and found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury regarding one of the assault counts (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1203, subd. (e)(3)). Regarding the DUI count, the jury found true the allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1203, subd. (e)(3)) and that defendant proximately caused injury to an additional person (Veh. Code, § 23558).

A jury convicted defendant Marcus Casillas of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding the prosecution did not commit any discovery violations and by denying his requests for various sanctions for the claimed discovery violations. Defendant also contends the trial court erred by precluding him from introducing evidence of third party culpability. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court found true allegations R.M. (minor) committed assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, sub. (a)(4); count 1; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), with an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and battery (§ 242; count 2).
The court declared the assault a felony and the battery a misdemeanor, and placed minor on supervised probation under various terms and conditions, including that minor spend 100 days in juvenile hall. The court set minor’s maximum period of confinement at seven years and two months. Minor argues the court did not understand its discretion to declare count 1 a misdemeanor, and the matter must be remanded for a proper exercise of the juvenile court’s sentencing discretion. We conclude the court complied with Welfare and Institutions Code section 702, and properly declared the assault a felony.
Therefore, we affirm the judgm

This case is uncomfortably reminiscent of one of the plot lines in To Kill a Mockingbird. If it were up to us, we might very well conclude that 60-plus year old arthritic third-striker William Blaine Williams poses no danger to public safety and thus could be successfully released from prison under the sentencing recall provisions of either Proposition 36 or Proposition 47. But as an appellate court we are bound by rules that govern our review of cases; one applicable here is that determinations of dangerousness under Propositions 36 and 47 are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, a standard that recognizes the inevitable superiority of the trial judge’s knowledge of the case and the parties. Applying that standard, we are required to affirm the trial court’s finding that Williams poses a danger to public safety based on a 2010 prison stabbing incident in which Williams allegedly stabbed another inmate. Even so, it’s a closer case than just that description might