CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Brian Bliven seeks review of the superior court’s grant of a motion in limine for judgment on the pleadings in favor of respondents John and Marcello LoCascio and their auto body repair business, Union Jack. Appellant contends that the court should not have granted judgment on the pleadings based on a settlement agreement without assuming the truth of the facts pleaded in his first amended complaint. We agree with appellant that the facts alleged in appellant’s complaint were sufficient to preclude judgment on the pleadings in this procedural context. Accordingly, we must reverse.

Rick Ryan Febbo appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of three counts of felony indecent exposure and found true prior conviction allegations. Febbo argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 1108, by denying his judicial disqualification motion, and by failing to instruct the jury with lewd conduct as a lesser included offense of indecent exposure. Although we agree there was some justification for the lesser included offense instruction, Febbo was not prejudiced. None of his other contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment.

A jury found Derek Jack Lantz guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)), of Mitchell George and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), on Roland Morris. The jury also found the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated (§ 664, subd. (a)), and Lantz personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd (b)(1)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), in the commission of the attempted murder. Lantz subsequently admitted having previously suffered five robbery convictions in 1995. (See §§ 667, subds. (a), (d), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A).) The court struck four of the five prior strikes for purposes of sentencing. On the attempted murder conviction, the court sentenced Lantz to life in prison with a minimum parole eligibility of 14 years with consecutive terms of one year (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), three years (§ 12022.7, subd. (a), and five years (§ 667, subd. (a)).

A jury convicted defendant, Isai Montes Briones, of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); count 1) and lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, with a true finding of substantial sexual conduct (masturbation) (§§ 288, subd. (a), 1203.066, subd. (a)(8); count 2). The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 28 years to life.
During closing argument, defendant conceded count 2. On count 1, defendant’s sole contention at trial was no penetration occurred during his sexual relations with the seven-year-old victim. On appeal, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on either count. Instead, defendant’s sole contention on appeal is his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to certain of the prosecution’s questions and during counsel’s closing argument. We need not reach defendant’s contention his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, because he has not demonstrat

Appointed counsel for defendant Decoda Ray Willis asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

Guillermo C. (father), the noncustodial parent of 10-year-old Christopher C. and eight-year-old Lizbeth C. (collectively, the children), who resides in Mexico, appeals the juvenile court’s January 25, 2017, order terminating his reunification services at the six month review hearing. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that father was provided reasonable reunification services, we affirm the order.

Minor A.M. contends on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss her petition and seal her record pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County entered on an order granting a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Rodolfo Cabello asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

This case is uncomfortably reminiscent of one of the plot lines in To Kill a Mockingbird. If it were up to us, we might very well conclude that 60-plus year old arthritic third-striker William Blaine Williams poses no danger to public safety and thus could be successfully released from prison under the sentencing recall provisions of either Proposition 36 or Proposition 47. But as an appellate court we are bound by rules that govern our review of cases; one applicable here is that determinations of dangerousness under Propositions 36 and 47 are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, a standard that recognizes the inevitable superiority of the trial judge’s knowledge of the case and the parties. Applying that standard, we are required to affirm the trial court’s finding that Williams poses a danger to public safety based on a 2010 prison stabbing incident in which Williams allegedly stabbed another inmate. Even so, it’s a closer case than just that description might

Defendant Pritpal Singh Dhillon was charged with falsely personating another (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3) [count 1]); driving a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a) [count 2]); falsely representing or identifying himself as another person to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a) [count 3]); giving false information to a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 31 [count 4]); failing to possess a valid driver’s license while driving a motor vehicle (id., § 12951, subd. (a) [count 5]); placing, installing, affixing, or applying transparent material upon the windshield or windows of a motor vehicle that alters the color or reduces the light transmittance of the windshield or windows (id., § 26708.5 [count 6]); and failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility for the motor vehicle (id., § 16028, subd. (a) [count 7]).

Jordan C. Leyva was traveling southbound on his motorcycle and collided with Richard William Crawford, Jr.’s, truck in a traffic intersection located in the City of Yucaipa (City). Leyva filed a lawsuit against the City, alleging the intersection was a dangerous condition and was negligently maintained. After a bench trial, the court concluded the City was immune from liability pursuant to Government Code section 830.6 (all further statutory references are to the Government Code). Leyva appeals from the judgment, arguing the City lost the defense of design immunity through changed conditions. The contention lacks merit, and we affirm the judgment.

In this appeal, defendant and appellant Rubien Earl Brandon challenges the trial court’s recent order, which reverses a previous order that had granted him relief under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. Brandon’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside its previous order; he does not contest the merits of the trial court’s determination that it had erred by designating his felony conviction for residential burglary as a misdemeanor.
We affirm the trial court’s order correcting its earlier error.

Defendant Casa Cabinets, Inc. appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff Jacob Heywood’s wrongful termination action. Defendant contends plaintiff signed an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes, and plaintiff has not provided evidence the arbitration agreement (Agreement) is unenforceable. Defendant argues that the Agreement is not procedurally or substantively unconscionable, and even if provisions of the Agreement are unconscionable, they are severable and do not invalidate the remainder of the Agreement. We reject defendant’s contentions and conclude the Agreement violates Armendariz requirements for an enforceable arbitration agreement of statutory claims. Furthermore, the Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is therefore affirmed.