CA Unpub Decisions

Savannah C., mother of Caleb L., appeals the jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring Caleb a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and removing him from parental custody. Savannah challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional finding and dispositional order. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Abdifath Mohamed Said of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime, making a criminal threat, and burglary. The jury found that Said used a knife in connection with counts 1 and 2. Said admitted two prison priors; a serious felony prior and a "strike" prior. The trial court denied a motion to strike the "strike" prior and sentenced Said to a determinate term of 12 years in prison. The court struck one prison prior and stayed the other prison prior.
Said appeals, challenging only count 1 and the true finding that he used a knife during the offenses in counts 1 and 2. Said contends there is not sufficient evidence in this case to support count 1 or the allegation of the use of a knife. Applying the proper standard of review, we will find sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision.Said contends, and the People correctly agree, that the prison prior should have been stricken rather than stayed.

Appointed counsel for defendant Reynaldo Miramontes asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

Appointed counsel for defendant Alvaro Salazar asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On October 28, 2016, defendant deterred or prevented a peace officer from performing his or her duty by threats or violence.

A prelude: In two cases dating back 10 years, plaintiff MacKay & Somps, Civil Engineers, Inc. (MacKay), sought to recover its contractual fees for civil engineering and other services provided for two real estate developments in the City of Sacramento. The “Panhandle” project (case No. 34-2007-00883577-CU-CO-GDS) was in North Natomas, and the “Stone-Boswell” project (case No. 34-2008-0001226-CU-CL-GDS) was in Meadowview; an entwined pair of defendant real estate entities had undertaken the projects. MacKay filed “virtually identical” complaints respectively in December 2007 and January 2008, and the cases proceeded “in parallel fashion” (but not apparently in formal consolidation). In September 2009, MacKay unsuccessfully moved to amend the complaints to name Sidney B. Dunmore as a defendant under a theory of alter ego; the trial court denied the motions as failing to demonstrate good cause for bringing them on the eve of trial.

A jury convicted Alexander Markham Smith of one count each of rape of an intoxicated person and rape of an unconscious person. (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(3) & (4).) On appeal, Smith challenges the admissibility of website content that described his activities on the night of the alleged offenses as well as his strategies for seducing women, on the grounds that the evidence was unauthenticated, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. Smith also contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense of the charged offenses.
We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence or in failing to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant D.B. (Mother) appeals the order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services at the 12-month review hearing in the absence of her 17-year-old daughter A.B., who had been AWOL (absent without leave) from her group home placement for approximately two weeks at the time of the hearing. Mother contends the court lacked current information about A.B.’s condition necessary to select an appropriate permanent plan. We conclude Mother forfeited the issue by failing to object at the hearing or seek a continuance, and that in any event, the court had before it sufficient information to support its ruling. Accordingly, we affirm.

B.M. (Mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court dismissing the dependency proceeding and granting sole custody of her son K.M. to his father. K.M. is a child coming under the juvenile court law. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1). ) We conclude Mother has not shown that the court abused its discretion in making its orders. We affirm.

Defendant Haim Revah appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to compel arbitration of a contractual loan dispute. Revah and plaintiff Alain Dray entered into a loan agreement that contained an arbitration provision. They subsequently signed a promissory note regarding the same loan; that document contained no reference to arbitration. Dray sued for breach of the promissory note and Revah moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied arbitration, finding that the terms of the later agreement superseded the original contract. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion and affirm.

Tonya M. (Mother) appeals from the December 23, 2016 jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders. She argues there is no substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1) and (j) based on her failure to protect her children from domestic violence and her history of substance abuse. She also asserts there is insufficient evidence to support removal of the children from her physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c). Further, she contends the monitored visitation order was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.

Defendant Joseph Allan Little was convicted of 51 counts of forgery, identity theft, grand theft, and other crimes relating to six real estate transactions. He moved to reduce several of his felony forgery convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. The trial court denied his motions, finding that his convictions and sentences were not eligible for reduction under Proposition 47. We agree and affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant William Bustos brought this disability discrimination action against his former employers, defendants and respondents Global P.E.T., Inc. and Global Plastics, Inc. (collectively, Global). A jury found that Bustos’s physical condition or perceived physical condition was “a substantial motivating reason” for his termination, but nevertheless returned defense verdicts on each of his claims. After trial, Bustos sought an award of attorney fees under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code sections 12900 et seq., 12965 (FEHA), citing the holding of Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 (Harris) that “a plaintiff subject to an adverse employment decision in which discrimination was a substantial motivating factor may be eligible for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended for the purpose of redressing, preventing, or deterring that discrimination,” even if the discrimination did not “result in compensable injury” f

Jason Jones appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, added by Proposition 47 in 2014. By its own terms, section 1170.18 does not allow resentencing for crimes committed after the effective date of the voter initiative. We affirm the order.

Defendant Travell Lamont Bragg was convicted of first degree residential burglary. The court found true a prior strike and other priors allegations and sentenced defendant to state prison for 17 years. Defendant’s only claim on appeal is the court violated his due process rights by admitting evidence of a 2010 residential burglary conviction under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 1101(b)). Defendant contends the two burglaries were not sufficiently similar, and the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial impact.
We affirm.