CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Victor Lopez was convicted of first degree murder in 2007. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison and ordered to pay $5,187.44 in direct victim restitution and a $10,000 restitution fine. In 2021, approximately 14 years after his conviction, he filed a motion, in propria persona, “to strike or modify court ordered restitution, fees, or fines.” (Capitalization omitted.) The trial court understood the motion to challenge imposition of defendant’s direct victim restitution order and denied defendant’s motion for multiple reasons, including that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear the motion. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to construe his motion as a challenge to the restitution fine (rather than merely direct victim restitution) and failing to reach the merits of that portion of his motion. The People disagree, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendant’s motion, even insofar as it challenged restitution fines.

In a felony complaint filed on April 7, 2021, defendant Dewayne Keith Parker was charged with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), resisting an executive officer (§ 69), and possessing an instrument used for unlawfully injecting or ingesting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). The complaint further alleged that he was previously convicted of 11 felonies (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), four of which qualified as “strike” offenses under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). At his arraignment on April 26, 2021, defendant pled not guilty and denied the special allegations. In addition, the trial court—pursuant to section 1368—expressed doubt as to his mental competence, suspended criminal proceedings, and appointed a licensed psychologist to examine him.

In a felony complaint filed on March 26, 2021, defendant Dewayne Keith Parker was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The complaint further alleged that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). At his arraignment on April 26, 2021, defendant pled not guilty and denied the special allegation. In addition, the trial court—pursuant to section 1368—expressed doubt as to his mental competence, suspended criminal proceedings, and appointed a licensed psychologist to examine him. At a May 26, 2021 competency hearing, the court reviewed the psychologist’s report, declared defendant mentally incompetent, and referred the matter to the regional Conditional Release Program for a written recommendation in accordance with section 1370. After reviewing said recommendation, the court ordered that defendant be committed to the State Department of State Hospitals and specified that “[t]he maximum term of commitment exceeds 2 years.”

In this appeal, defendant Alfonso Vargas challenges the constitutional validity of a condition to his probation. Following a review of the record, including the allegations leading to defendant’s plea agreement, we find there was no error in the wording of the probation condition challenged here. We affirm the judgment below.

At the start of the court trial, defense counsel admitted that his client, the County of Stanislaus (County), was 100 percent liable for the traffic accident and then, after the close of evidence, argued County was not liable because plaintiff failed to prove she complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).
Stipulations are contracts and are interpreted using the rules for contract interpretation. In view of the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that, under an objectively reasonable interpretation of the parties’ stipulation to County’s liability, plaintiff was not required to prove at trial compliance with the claim presentation requirements.
We therefore affirm the judgment.

In 2014, a jury convicted appellant Dvontae Larome Pink of numerous crimes following separate shootings in 2013. His convictions included first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 8); attempted first degree murder (§§ 664/187, subd, (a); count 2); discharging a firearm from a vehicle at a person (§ 26100, subd. (c); count 1); shooting at various occupied vehicles (§ 246; counts 4, 5, 6 and 9); and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 14). The jury found true that appellant committed these crimes to benefit a criminal street gang, and numerous firearm enhancements were also found true. As stated by the trial court, appellant received an aggregated sentence of “life without the possibility of parole [LWOP], plus 25 years to life, plus 15 years to life, plus 25 years to life, plus 32 years to life, plus 27 years to life, plus 27 years to life, plus 27 years to life, plus seven years.”

In this appeal, defendant Ramon Apodaca Saavedra only challenges the sentence imposed. Following our review of the relevant legal standards governing the calculation of his sentence, along with a consideration of recent legislative changes, we find no error in the sentence imposed. We, therefore, affirm the judgment, and direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment accurately reflecting the full sentence imposed on defendant at the sentencing hearing, along with the presentence credits earned at the time of sentencing.

Defendant David Valdez Cruz contends on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove his prior conviction constituted a “strike” under the “Three Strikes” law to support a serious felony sentence enhancement (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)); (2) his sentence on count 4 should be stayed pursuant to section 654; and (3) his presentence report and booking fees must be vacated because Assembly Bill No. 1869’s (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1869) amendments to section 1203.1b and Government Code section 29550.2, must be applied to his case. The People agree.
The sentence is conditionally vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court to determine the validity of the prior serious felony conviction. If the trial court determines that defendant’s prior conviction constitutes a serious felony conviction, the sentence shall be reinstated.

In 1989, appellant Roman Galafate III (Roman) and his then-wife, codefendnat Leny Petersen Galafate (Leny), were convicted after a joint jury trial of count 1, first degree premeditated murder, with the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain; and count 2, conspiracy to commit murder for financial gain. They were both sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for count 1, with a stayed term of 25 years to life for count 2. In 1991, this court affirmed defendants’ convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
The instant appeal involves Roman’s petition for resentencing filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 in 2019, that alleged he was entitled to relief because he was not the actual killer, and his murder conviction was based on the felony-murder rule and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The superior court appointed counsel and the parties submitted briefing.

In 1989, appellant Leny Peterson Galafate and her then-husband, codefendant Roman Galafate III, were convicted after a joint jury trial of count 1, first degree premeditated murder, with the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain; and count 2, conspiracy to commit murder for financial gain. They were both sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for count 1, with a stayed term of 25 years to life for count 2. In 1991, this court affirmed defendants’ convictions and sentences on appeal. Thereafter, both defendants filed numerous writ petitions seeking postjudgment relief that were denied by the superior court and this court.

The charges in this case arose from multiple sexual offenses allegedly committed by defendant Jose Ayala between 2010 and 2012 against a victim under the age of 14 years. This appeal follows defendant’s conviction on one count by plea and sentencing. As discussed herein, defendant’s appeal is dismissed in part as barred by his waiver of appellate rights and in part because the postappeal fines and fees order he challenges was entered in the absence of jurisdiction, rendering it unappealable. As to the remaining issues, we strike the unauthorized fine of $1,000 imposed under Penal Code section 294, subdivision (b), and we remand the matter for further proceedings in light of the trial court’s failure to impose the mandatory penalty assessments attached to the $300 fine under section 290.3, subdivision (a).

Zachery Goodwin was charged with murder, attempted robbery, and shooting at an occupied vehicle after he shot and killed a man in a vehicle during an attempted robbery gone wrong. At the trial, jurors were instructed on second degree murder with two alternate theories: implied malice or felony murder based on shooting at an occupied vehicle.
The jury found Goodwin guilty of second degree murder but did not specify the murder theory it relied upon. It also found him guilty of the remaining charges.
On appeal, Goodwin raises several claims separately challenging the convictions and the resulting sentence. Most of these claims lack merit, but one demands closer inspection. Goodwin claims the court prejudicially erred in its instructions because felony murder was improperly predicated on shooting at an occupied vehicle. The People concede the error but argue it is harmless.
Our review of the record compels us to find the error prejudicial.

Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest.
M.C. (father) and K.T. (mother) petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court seeking to set aside the orders of the Riverside County juvenile court made at the 24-month review hearing. Those orders terminated family reunification services as to their two children, and set Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanent plan selection hearings as to them. Father claims his reunification plan was unreasonable and both parents argue the court’s findings that they were provided with reasonable reunification services are not supported by sufficient substantial evidence.

The People argue that Assembly Bill 333 does not apply retroactively because Smith’s convictions became final when we previously affirmed them. The People nevertheless concede, and the parties agree, that if we conclude that Smith’s judgment of conviction was not final when Assembly Bill 333 became effective, then the amendments apply retroactively to Smith’s case and we should vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements. We conclude that Smith’s judgment of conviction was not final when Assembly Bill 333 became effective, so Assembly Bill 333 applies to his case. We concur with the parties that the proper remedy is to vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements and to remand for further proceedings.