CA Unpub Decisions

Robert M. Jaffe, as Trustee of the Robert M. Jaffe Trust dated October 8, 1990 (Jaffe), appeals from a judgment against him in the litigation with his neighbor Robert Bradshaw (Bradshaw). Jaffe contends that the trial court erred in issuing an injunction preventing Jaffe from parking on an easement road that leads to Jaffe's property and passes through Bradshaw's property. Further, Jaffe contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for an injunction, which would have required Bradshaw to return to a natural state a portion of Bradshaw's property that he graded in anticipation of constructing a tennis court. We conclude that Jaffe's arguments lack merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

K.S., mother of the minor E.T., appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26 and 395. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) failed to provide her and the minor’s siblings with adequate visitation, thus preventing her from asserting the beneficial parental relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to the permanent plan of adoption (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (c)(1)(B)(v)). Finding mother forfeited her claim on appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.

A jury convicted defendant Lester Tubin of felony unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license. Based on our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 24 Cal.3d 436, 442, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant S.R. (Mother), mother of Hailey E. and Enzo R., appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders finding jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and removing the children from her care. Four factual findings supported the assertion of jurisdiction: (1) Mother’s use of drugs rendered her incapable of providing the children with regular care and supervision and placed them at risk of serious harm; (2) Mother’s physical, mental and emotional problems rendered her incapable of providing the children with regular care and supervision and placed them at risk of serious arm; (3) Hailey’s father’s history of substance abuse and current substance abuse rendered him incapable of providing the children with regular care and supervision and placed them at risk of serious harm, and Mother failed to protect the children from him; and (4) Mother allowed her boyfriend Josh F., a known drug user, unli

Appellant Otis Anderson was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377), and of having a previous conviction for an offense requiring registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290, subdivision (c). Appellant was also alleged to have served two prior prison terms and to have committed another felony within five years of release from custody (see § 667.5, subd. (b)) arising from an August 2005 conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5) and a June 1998 conviction for domestic violence/burglary (§ 273.5, subd. (a)/§ 459), and to have suffered three serious and/or violent prior convictions: the June 1998 conviction for burglary and two convictions in March 1982 for rape by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and forced oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (d)).

Appellant Craig Wimberly, currently serving a 25-year-to-life sentence imposed in 1997 for solicitation of murder (Pen. Code, § 653f, subd. (b)), sought and was denied resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court concluded appellant was not eligible for resentencing due to the nature of his most recent offense. Appellant contends the court misinterpreted the statutory provisions governing eligibility for resentencing. We conclude otherwise, and affirm.

The trial court sustained a demurrer to a cause of action to reform a loan guaranty because that cause of action was “pled in the alternative” to other causes of action seeking to enforce the guaranty. This was incorrect. We nevertheless affirm the dismissal of this cause of action because the only plaintiff before us in this appeal assigned away its rights to the guaranty and no longer has standing to sue for reformation.

Augustus Golden appeals the trial court’s order revoking and restoring his parole on the condition that he serve 180 days in county jail. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1203.2, 3000.08.) Appellant contends the order was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Plaintiff Pissamai Than appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation (“QLS”) to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. Because Than, on appeal, has demonstrated that she can plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to allow her leave to amend.

C.H., a minor, appeals an order for victim restitution (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6) in the amount of $7,247.11 for costs of obtaining a service dog. We affirm.
C.H. admitted hitting M.S. (the victim) in the head with a hammer. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) C.H. was declared a ward of the court under section 602, and he was placed home on probation.
After the assault, M.S. suffered from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and he obtained a service dog to treat his symptoms. At the restitution hearing, M.S.’s mother testified that the service dog helped calm M.S. and made him feel more comfortable in public, which became an issue after the assault. She submitted a “Confirmation of Disability and Applicant Health Form,” in which his doctor recommended a service dog for him. She stated that she did not intend to get M.S. a service dog until after the assault occurred.

Plaintiff Mark Brooks had been employed as a police officer by defendant City of Los Angeles for over 20 years when he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. His cancer treatments required him to take medical leave a number of times between October 2009 and March 2013, but at times he was able to perform his job with work restrictions imposed by his doctor. Plaintiff retired in March 2013. Following his retirement, a workers’ compensation qualified medical examiner determined that plaintiff was “not able to perform any of his . . . customary occupational duties” and was permanently disabled.

Plaintiffs William Powers, Jr., William Powers III and Lindsey Keyes appeal the trial court’s order denying their motions to strike $1,451.57 in costs requested by defendants Gary F. Nelson, individually and dba Webber-Nelson Realtors, and Ty Christensen (collectively “the Nelsons”), and $897.52 in costs requested by defendants Donald C. Jensen and Judith L. Jensen (collectively “the Jensens”). Plaintiffs contend the costs were not necessary or reasonable because the Nelsons and the Jensens failed to adequately meet and confer with plaintiffs before paying filing fees to appear in the case. Plaintiffs assert that had these defendants met and conferred with plaintiffs prior to filing their demurrers, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(1), plaintiffs would have dismissed the action against them without the necessity of appearance costs. The court rejected this assertion. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Eugene Everal Baird pleaded no contest to three counts of grand theft, and was sentenced to a prison term. He contends that Penal Code section 669, subdivision (b), requires that his sentence be ordered to run concurrently with that imposed in a prior case. We agree, and order the judgment modified accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm.

Greg Jaquez Bail Bonds, Inc. (Bail Agent) appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion to vacate the forfeiture of a $100,000 bail bond posted by Bankers Insurance Company (Surety) to secure the release of a criminal defendant.
When the defendant failed to appear in court, the trial court ordered the bail forfeited. Following expiration of the 180-day appearance period in which to challenge the forfeiture, the Surety requested that the court retroactively toll the appearance period under Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (e) [hereafter section 1305(e)], to allow it to submit evidence establishing the right to exoneration of the bond under section 1305, subdivision (d) [hereafter section 1305(d)]. The court denied the tolling request.