CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Arti Denterlein was a law student at San Francisco Law School (SFLS). Shortly before she was scheduled to graduate, she received low grades in two classes, and her grade point average (GPA) for her final year declined. SFLS informed her she was academically disqualified, and she was not allowed to graduate because her fourth-year GPA was too low.
Plaintiff brought this action against SFLS and two of its administrators for breach of contract, unfair trade practices, violation of her constitutional rights, fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and declaratory relief. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment. We shall affirm the judgment.

The trial court denied defendant Robert R. Deets’s petition to recall his indeterminate third strike sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126 (part of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, enacted by the voters as Proposition 36), finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Defendant argues the definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” in Penal Code section 1170.18 (part of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014, enacted by the voters as Proposition 47) applies to the Penal Code section 1170.126 risk of danger inquiry. Defendant alternatively contends that in order to find an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under Penal Code section 1170.126, the court was required to find that he posed an unreasonable risk of committing a serious or violent felony. And defendant argues that under any standard of dangerousness, the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring, misunderstanding, and misstating evidence

Appellant Robert Horn is a developmentally disabled adult who was convicted of sexually molesting a friend’s son on a regular basis over a period of about three years. On appeal, he contends 1) he was unlawfully convicted of both continuous sexual abuse and a lewd act encompassed within that abuse; 2) his indeterminate life sentence is cruel and unusual; and 3) the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the trial court’s sentencing decision. Appellant’s first and third contentions have merit. We will therefore reverse one of his convictions for lewd conduct with a child and amend the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.

Plaintiffs Julio Palomino and Jackie Robinson are legally registered domestic partners who are civilly detained as sexually violent predators (SVP’s) at the Department of State Hospitals–Coalinga (DSH–C or the hospital) under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. Robinson was initially housed with Palomino in a residential recovery unit (RRU) at DSH–C, but was transferred to an intermediate care facility (ICF) within the hospital. Palomino and Robinson filed a civil complaint against defendants DSH–C and its employees, S. Brazier and P. Blevins. Plaintiffs allege they have an unfettered right to be housed together in the RRU, and defendants unlawfully interfered with their right to cohabitate when they transferred Robinson to the ICF. According to plaintiffs, Robinson was transferred because of his sexual orientation and race.

Appellant Jackie Robinson is a patient at the Department of State Hospitals–Coalinga (DSH–C or hospital) detained under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). He seeks the return of items considered contraband by the DSH–C. Robinson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking the return of the confiscated items, as well as compensation for any lost or destroyed property.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted Robinson’s petition in part and denied the petition in part. The court denied Robinson’s petition to the extent he argued the disputed items were improperly seized, but granted the petition on the basis that the indefinite retention of Robinson’s property violated Robinson’s right to due process. The court ordered the DSH–C to allow Robinson to mail the disputed items, at his own expense, to a party of his own choosing outside the hospital.
On appeal of his petition for writ of habeas co

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendant and appellant J.H. (Mother) to her son K.L.H. (Minor). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) Mother contends the juvenile court erred because a proper investigation was not conducted under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224 et seq.) We affirm the judgment.

Erik Barajas (Erik) and his sister, Stacy Barajas (Stacy), appeal from a judgment following jury verdicts awarding Leonard Epps over $4.5 million in compensatory damages against both of them and $1 million in punitive damages against each of them on his claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence per se. Erik and Stacy contend we must reverse the judgment because of faulty jury instructions on Epps's negligence per se claim, the retention of a juror who had prejudged the case, repeated misconduct by Epps and his counsel, and the admission of impermissible expert testimony on what a "green light" is and how it is effectuated. Stacy separately contends we must reverse the judgment as to her because the court prevented her from attending the trial in person notwithstanding her incarceration.

Heritage Custom Estates Association (Heritage) successfully obtained a writ of execution and levied on certain personal property of judgment debtor Kevin Tucker. Contending that the levy was an abuse of court process, Tucker sued Heritage, a homeowners' association for a development of single-family homes located in Poway; Sridhar Gopalakrishnan, a member of Heritage's board of directors; and Howard F. Burns, an attorney who represented Heritage in its postjudgment collection efforts.
Pursuant to California's anti SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the trial court granted special motions to strike a cross complaint in which Tucker alleged causes of action against Heritage, Gopalakrishnan, and Burns (together Cross defendants) based on the levy of the writ of execution.

Thomas Matthews appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint against Supervisor Ron Roberts of the San Diego County Board of Supervisors following an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. The superior court sustained the demurrer on the ground Matthews did not adequately allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement (Gov. Code, §§ 911.2, 945.4) in the Government Claims Act (id., § 810 et seq.). Matthews contends we must reverse the judgment because the court failed to allow him to introduce evidence proving his compliance with the requirement and, regardless, the record shows he substantially complied with the requirement as to the County of San Diego (County) and two of the County's code enforcement employees.
We conclude the court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend because the record shows Matthews did not comply with the claim presentation requirement as to Supervisor Roberts and the time to do so has exp

In 2000, defendant Steven Lee Varnum killed the man who reported him for child abuse. (People v. Varnum (May 27, 2004, C042701) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 4.) He was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code) with the special circumstance of murder to prevent the testimony of a witness (§ 190.2), along with an enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of a murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). (Varnum, at p. 1.) He was sentenced to life without parole plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life. (Ibid.)
On February 1, 2017, defendant filed a petition for recall of sentence pursuant to section 3051, asserting he was entitled to relief because he was 19 years old when he committed his crimes. The trial court denied the petition as it lacked jurisdiction for resentencing.
Defendant appeals from the denial.

In 2003, petitioner Raymond Salvador Ramirez was convicted of first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance finding (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subds. (a)(17), (d)), and sentenced to state prison for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Recently, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our Supreme Court explained the requirements for a special circumstance finding as to an aider and abettor of felony-murder. In April 2017, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming the special circumstance finding against him is not supportable under Banks and Clark. We agree and accordingly grant the petition.

Appellant Dwayne Terrell Wince appeals from a judgment entered after a plea of no contest, following a hung jury on one of two counts. Appellant was charged with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) (count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 2). As to both counts, the information alleged enhancements for gang activity (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The information also alleged that appellant previously had been convicted of burglary (§ 459), which qualified as a strike prior (§§ 667.5, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

A jury convicted Adrian Eugene Banks (Appellant or Banks) of sexual penetration with a foreign object of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (d) ). On appeal, Banks argues, inter alia, that his conviction must be reversed because there was “no direct evidence of penetration of anything” and the circumstantial evidence of penetration was insufficient as a matter of law because it was “based on speculation, and guessing alone.” We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment.

Luciano Rodriguez (defendant) was convicted by jury of one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192), a lesser included offense of the charged crime of murder. The jury found true the allegation that defendant used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the crime. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of three years for the manslaughter conviction plus a one-year enhancement term for the deadly weapon allegation.Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending the trial court erred prejudicially in denying his request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to call as a rebuttal witness an expert who should have been called in the case-in-chief.