CA Unpub Decisions

Jeremiah R., age 16, appeals from orders of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court based on the finding that he committed first degree residential burglary in violation of Penal Code sections 459 and 460. He contends there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that he entered the residence in question with the intent to commit a felony. We disagree and shall affirm the orders.

The juvenile court committed 18-year-old I.D. to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) after finding he committed assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child.
On appeal, I.D. claims law enforcement’s failure to preserve evidence denied him due process, and that the court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJJ. He also contends—and the Attorney General agrees—the court erred when calculating his maximum period of confinement and custody credits. We modify the judgment to correct these errors. In all other respects, we affirm.

J.B. appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), challenging only no-contact conditions of probation that were imposed in connection with that order. The Attorney General acknowledges that those conditions must be stricken.

In this dissolution action, Tony Crawford (Husband) appeals following a statement of decision on property issues. We affirm.

In August 2016, the trial court issued a restraining order protecting plaintiff and respondent Subeida Rodriguez (respondent) from defendant and appellant Melvin Emilio de Leon (appellant). Appellant, who appeared pro per, contends the order must be reversed because he did not understand the nature of the proceedings below. We reject the claim.

Appellant Fernando Barboza appeals the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Webcor Construction L.P. Barboza alleged employment discrimination based upon his termination three months after a workplace injury. The trial court properly found, based on the undisputed evidence, that Barboza could not prevail on his claims under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) or the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). We affirm.

In these consolidated actions, Fedco Construction, Inc. (Fedco) sought to recover damages for breach of contract from two entities developing three subdivisions, their owners, Daniel Morgan and James Clifford, and from the developers’ surety, International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC), on payment bonds. During a jury trial, the trial court granted the individual defendants’ motion for directed verdict and, after deeming alter ego issues moot, entered judgment in their favor. However, the jury found the developers failed to pay Fedco balances due under the construction contracts, and that IFIC owed Fedco the total amount of $15,657.85. Judgment was entered accordingly.

This case comes to us a second time on appeal following a decision by the trial court on remand in response to our opinion in People v. Doss (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 46 (Doss I), which conditionally reversed an order revoking Doss’s self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). The trial court, we said in Doss I, had applied an incorrect legal standard. (Doss I, at p. 55.) The correct standard, articulated in People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 10–11 (Carson), allows for revocation only if the defendant has engaged in “ ‘obstructive behavior [that] seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial.’ ” (Doss I, at p. 55, quoting Carson, at pp. 10–11.) On remand, the court again revoked Doss’s Faretta status, this time applying the Carson standard, and reinstated the prior judgment. On appeal, Doss claims the court still did not comply with the Carson standard. We disagree and will affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Charles Benton Bryan pleaded no contest to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court imposed a two-year prison term, suspended execution of sentence, and granted three years’ probation. About half-way through his probationary term, defendant violated probation by moving and failing to report his change of address to his probation officer. After defendant admitted the violation, the court terminated probation and ordered that the previously imposed prison sentence be executed.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it executed his prison sentence for a “relatively minor” violation of probation. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Christian Edward Cary of felony false imprisonment but acquitted him of kidnapping. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on informal probation. Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his false imprisonment conviction, and the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial on the ground the verdict was contrary to the evidence. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Adam A. is the innocent father in this family tragedy. In the spring of 2015, his wife Meghan took a photo of their four-year-old daughter’s vagina and sent it to a Marine with whom she had developed a secret online relationship. Adam and Meghan are now separated, but they were still together in October 2015, when she was arrested. A juvenile dependency petition was filed in early November 2015. Eighteen months later, Adam had complied with his reunification plan, which obviously included a lot of counseling for the sexual exploitation of their daughter, the eldest of three young children, including a newborn son born in September 2015.The juvenile dependency system is essentially structured as a two-stage process: Reunification and permanency planning. At the 18-month review hearing the burden is on SSA to prove detriment. The legislative goal remains the preservation of the parent-child relationship, not a search for excuses for its destruction.

The sole contention on this appeal is that the juvenile court erred when it failed to address the visitation order between Larry G. (father) and three of his four children. Father does not contest the order terminating his parental rights to one of his children, nor the “planned permanent living arrangement” for his other three children. We affirm.

Seven children were removed from mother’s care due to her ongoing substance abuse and failure to protect them. The juvenile court found applicable the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights, under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) , with respect to the three youngest children, R.R., J.G., and E.M. The Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appeals, seeking to overturn the juvenile court’s decision not to terminate the parental rights to the youngest three children. We agree with the department and reverse the order.

This appeal involves two related criminal actions, Kings County Superior Court case numbers 15CMS1060 and 16CMS1099B (collectively the Underlying Matter). On April 28, 2016, appellant Jose Jesus Martinez appeared in court and the parties announced a negotiated deal to resolve the Underlying Matter (the Plea Agreement). Although appellant indicated his desire to take the Plea Agreement, he laughed while speaking with the trial court. The trial court, without addressing the merits of the Plea Agreement, ordered a scheduled preliminary hearing to commence. A little over two months later, appellant resolved the Underlying Matter for a longer sentence.
Based primarily on this court’s opinion in People v. Loya (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 932 (Loya), appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the Plea Agreement. We agree. Because the trial court failed to articulate why that deal was inappropriate, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.