CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant was convicted of inflicting corporal injury on Shannon, a cohabitant. Shannon’s son, Anthony, told police that he had heard his mother yell, “Stop Victor, you’re going to kill me.” At trial, Shannon refused to testify, and Anthony claimed he did not remember what was said during the incident. An audio recording of Anthony’s statement to police, in which he conveyed Shannon’s utterance to defendant, was played for the jury. Defendant contends this violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. We disagree. The confrontation clause was satisfied with respect to Anthony because he was “confronted” (i.e., available for cross-examination at trial); and the confrontation clause is inapplicable to Shannon because she was not a “witness[] against” defendant (i.e., her statement was not testimonial).

Cross-defendants and petitioners, Bryan O. and Sheryl O., presented government claims against cross-complainants, a school district and its personnel, arising out of a shooting on a high school campus. The claims were denied as untimely. Petitioners’ applications for leave to present late claims were also denied. Petitioners then petitioned the trial court for relief from the government claim presentation requirements, asserting that delayed discovery of their causes of action against cross-complainants made their claims timely; Sheryl also asserted her claim was timely based on estoppel. The trial court found petitioners had sufficient knowledge of the facts giving rise to their claims that their causes of action accrued more than one year before they presented their claims and their applications for leave to present late claims to the public entity; additionally, estoppel did not apply.

Appellant/defendant Terrance Davis, an inmate at Corcoran State Prison, was charged and convicted of count I, battery by a prisoner on a nonconfined person, Correctional Officer Burnitzki (Pen. Code, § 4501.5); and count II, obstructing Officers Burnitzki and Arellano from performing their duties (§ 69). The charges were based on an incident where correctional officers conducted a random search of defendant’s cell. Defendant was authorized to carry a state-issued cane because of disability issues. The officers reported that when Burnitzki attempted to remove defendant from his cell, defendant used the cane to strike him, refused to obey their orders, and physically resisted both officers. Defendant was sentenced to the second strike term of seven years four months.

On May 16, 2017, the juvenile court terminated defendant and appellant, S.B.’s (Mother), parental rights as to R.D. (Minor), born in March 2015. On appeal, Mother contends the court abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights without the benefit of a more recent report from plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), which Mother suggests would have contained more information on visitation, than the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 report filed on December 9, 2016. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Miguel Angel Ceja was convicted of driving under the influence (D.U.I) of drugs and alcohol after being convicted of three or more separate D.U.I. charges (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or above after being convicted of three or more separate D.U.I. charges (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and driving with a suspended license for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). On June 16, 2016, the trial court denied probation and sentenced him to a total term of two years in county jail; however, the court suspended execution of the second year of his county jail term and ordered defendant to serve 12 months of mandatory supervision with various terms and conditions. He appeals.

David Olvera, Amy Nicole Hillrich (Nikki), and Emilio Pelayo Saldana, were jointly tried for the murder of John Hillrich, Nikki's husband. The People filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence of out-of-court statements Nikki made prior to John's murder that incriminated Nikki, Olvera, and Saldana. The trial court decided the statements were admissible against Nikki, but inadmissible against her codefendants if she did not testify during the joint trial. Because Nikki was initially undecided on whether to testify or to invoke her right against self-incrimination, the court empaneled two juries to hear specified evidence; one jury would determine Nikki's guilt or innocence and the other would determine Olvera's and Saldana's guilt or innocence.

This appeal arises out of a quiet title dispute between family members. Defendants and appellants Julie Lopez, Lisette Lopez, and Manuel de Jesus Lopez, Jr. (Appellants) appeal from a judgment quieting title to a residential property in favor of Plaintiff and Respondent, Manuel de Jesus Lopez, Sr. (Respondent). Appellants contend they are entitled to a one-half interest in the property because Rosa E. Serna (Rosa), Respondent's estranged wife, executed a grant deed to Appellants for the property. We conclude the grant deed from Rosa to Appellants was ineffective because it violated the fiduciary duty provisions between spouses that are recognized by Family Code sections 1101 and 1102. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Lauren Van Laar challenges the trial court’s entry of judgment following its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings of defendant and respondent Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company (Nationwide). The sole question on appeal is one of statutory construction: Whether Insurance Code section 11580.2 requires a written waiver to reduce uninsured motorist coverage where the coverage offered is less than the policy’s bodily injury liability limits but exceeds $30,000 per person and $60,000 per accident. We conclude the trial court correctly found no written waiver is required in that circumstance. Therefore, we shall affirm the judgment.

We are called upon to decide whether a single act of setting fire can give rise to two arson convictions. Defendant Willie Bee Turner set fire to a dog carrier which held his dog and was convicted of one count of arson for burning the carrier and another for burning a sweatshirt inside the carrier. On appeal, he contends he cannot be convicted of both arson counts for his single act of setting fire to the dog carrier. We agree and will reverse one of the arson convictions.

A jury found defendant Andre Ramon Marzetta guilty of taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count one) and buying or receiving a stolen automobile (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count two). It also found that the value of the Camry exceeded $950. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12) and served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of six years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three years on count one, doubled for the prior strike. The trial court stayed execution of defendant’s sentence on count two pursuant to section 654 and struck the prior prison term enhancement.

A jury found defendant Tyrone Arthur Douglas guilty of grand theft from a person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c); count one), as a lesser included offense of robbery; making a criminal threat (§ 422; count two); false imprisonment (§ 236; count three); and misdemeanor domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count five). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true an allegation Douglas had a prior serious felony conviction for domestic violence with a great bodily injury enhancement (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(i)) and was in violation of his probation in case No. 12F01245.

A jury convicted defendant Joseph Louis Grazioli of sexual penetration by a foreign object, forcible rape, and lewd act upon a child who was 14 or 15 years old. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison sentence of 11 years 8 months.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of prior sexual conduct between the complaining witnesses; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the crime of sexual penetration by a foreign object was a general intent crime; (3) the count 4 lewd act conviction must be reversed because the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complaining witness was 14 or 15 years old at the time of the alleged offense; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction on count 4.
We will reverse the conviction on count 4 and otherwise affirm the judgment.

In 1987, a jury found Hess guilty of murder with special circumstances (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2) and robbery (§ 211). The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole. Thirty years later, Hess filed a petition for recall of sentence. The court denied the petition because Hess was 20 years old at the time of his crimes. (See § 1170, subd. (d)(2)(A)(i).)

In this extraordinary writ proceeding, S.N. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating his reunification services with his young daughter, D.N., and setting her dependency case for a permanency hearing. Father contends substantial evidence did not support the court’s implicit finding that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided him with reasonable reunification services. We agree.