CA Unpub Decisions

Donaldo Rodriguez appeals an order granting plaintiff Ivana Diaz’s petition for a restraining order. Rodriguez, who was self-represented at trial and remains so on appeal, contends the court granted the restraining order and awarded Diaz custody of their daughter in violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm.

Before us is an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike a complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The purchaser of real property at a foreclosure sale brought this action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process based on allegations that the foreclosed homeowner and his attorney, appellant Thomas P. Kelly III, wrongly prosecuted an action to set aside the sale. The trial court denied Kelly’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the purchaser carried its burden of establishing a probability of success on the complaint. We disagree and shall reverse the order and remand with directions to strike the complaint.

In 1982, Ismael Jordan pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to charges including murder (Penal Code, § 187), and assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220). The court found Jordan insane, and committed him to an indeterminate term in a state hospital. In 2016, Jordan moved the court for an order “deleting any requirement that he register as a sex offender.” The court denied the motion, and Jordan appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff W. Reed Foster, attempting to collect a judgment against defendant Hiram Woo, obtained a writ of execution and levied property located on Clement Street in San Francisco. Third party claimants Jeffery Woo and Shirly Tan moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that Hiram Woo had transferred his interest in the property to them more than five years before. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Woo and Tan held title to the property and that Foster’s challenge to the transfer of title was barred by the statute of limitations. Foster timely appealed. We shall affirm.

Defendant Charles Winans was declared mentally incompetent to stand trial (IST) for the second time on assault charges enhanced due to the infliction of great bodily injury. Though he was previously on outpatient treatment the first time he was deemed incompetent, the second time Winans was committed to Porterville Developmental Center (Porterville) under Penal Code sections 1370.1 and 1601 for treatment to restore his competency. The Department of Developmental Services (DDS), which operates Porterville, moved to vacate the order, arguing in part that Winans’s placement there was futile based on a psychologist’s opinion that Winans could not be restored to competency in the foreseeable future. The trial court declined to vacate the commitment. In these consolidated appeals, Winans appeals the trial court’s initial order revoking his outpatient status and seeks to vacate his Porterville placement as well as orders directing his involuntary medication.

Intervenor law firm Evans & Page appeals from an order awarding it $428,142.50 in attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5; hereafter § 1021.5). On appeal appellant presents numerous arguments, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating attorney fees. We affirm.

Defendant Anthony Wilkerson pleaded no contest to assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)) and lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
Defendant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and which asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We notified defendant of his right to submit a written argument on his own behalf, but he has not done so.
After an independent review of the record, we have concluded that there are no arguable issues on appeal. As required by People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, we will provide “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.

Defendant Robert E. Marshall pleaded guilty to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5) and admitted eight prison prior enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The People dismissed two of the 10 alleged prison prior enhancements.
As the factual basis for his plea, defendant stated the following: “In Orange County, California, on 4/20/16, I did unlawfully by means of force and fear take the personal property against the will of & from the person, possession and immediate presence of Kris M.” As the factual basis for his plea, defendant stated the following: “In Orange County, California, on 4/20/16, I did unlawfully by means of force and fear take the personal property against the will of & from the person, possession and immediate presence of Kris M.”

Plaintiffs Shafar Toranji and his wife Firoozeh Arghavani (collectively plaintiffs) sued, inter alia, Clark Kim and his wife Kyoung Kim (collectively the Kims) after the plaintiffs’ efforts to purchase the Kims’ home in Newport Coast failed. Toranji, Arghavani, and Clark Kim each signed a purchase agreement which included a prevailing party attorney fees provision stating that in any action between the buyer and seller arising out of the agreement, the prevailing buyer or seller shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs against the non-prevailing buyer or seller. However, the purchase agreement further provided that a prevailing party who commenced an action without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, or who before commencement of an action, refused a request to mediate, would not be entitled to recover attorney fees that would otherwise have been available.

Soon Young Kim represented herself at trial. The jury found her guilty of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); count one) and money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a); count two), and found the money involved was more than $1,000,000, and less than $2,500,000 (§ 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Kim to four years in prison, consisting of a one-year term on count two, a consecutive three-year term on the enhancement, and a concurrent two-year term on count one. The court credited Kim with four years for time she served in Korea on a related conviction and the time she spent in custody awaiting trial in California. The court also ordered Kim to make restitution. On appeal, Kim contends she was not competent to stand trial and the trial court erred in permitting her to represent herself. She further appears to argue that even if she was competent to stand trial, the due process right to a fair trial prevails over the right to self-representation.

A.K. (father) appeals from a probate court order granting a petition for guardianship and appointing respondents R.P. (stepfather) and M.P. (maternal grandmother or grandmother) as guardians over his minor children, R.K.1 (son) and R.K.2 (daughter). Son and daughter were living with stepfather, maternal grandmother, and S.K. (mother) when mother died of leukemia. The court granted the petition under Family Code section 3041, finding it would be detrimental to place the children in father’s custody and the best interest of the children required nonparental custody. Father appeals raising several overlapping contentions we have consolidated into two basic attacks. First, an attack on the court’s exercise of discretion in awarding custody to stepfather and grandmother, which includes the court’s determination stepfather and grandmother qualified as de facto parents. Second, an attack on the constitutionality of the court’s order as applied. Accordingly, we affirm.

S.B. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order issued in September 2017, setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her now 10-year-old son, Antonio, and five-year-old daughter, Guadalupe. The September 2017, hearing was a contested 12-month review hearing at which the court terminated reunification services for the children’s father, Alexander V. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Mother was denied reunification services at the dispositional hearing in August 2016. We conclude mother failed to raise a claim of juvenile court error and dismiss her petition as facially inadequate for review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450 & 8.452.)

Appointed counsel for defendant Andrew Douglas Burnett asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

Defendant appeals from the superior court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Health & Safety Code section 11361.8, subdivision (b) (Proposition 64). We affirm.