CA Unpub Decisions

Health and Safety Code section 11361.8 (Proposition 64) and the subsequent sentencing order. Meza's appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, indicating she has not identified any reasonably arguable issue for reversal or modification of the orders. Counsel asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Meza the opportunity to file his own brief, but he has not responded. We affirm.

Melissa (Mother) and Gregory (Father) Stuman were married in 2000, and then had two children. In 2008, a court entered a dissolution judgment, ordering Father to pay child and spousal support. In June 2015, Mother moved to increase child support and sought an order requiring Father to pay past due amounts. After appointing a special master and holding several hearings, the court issued an order increasing child support beginning in July 2015, and ordering Father to pay arrearages and sanctions.
Father challenges three portions of the order: (1) the court's income determination for purposes of calculating Father's child support obligations after January 1, 2016; (2) the court's ruling on Father's prior support overpayments; and (3) the court's sanctions awards. We reject Father's contentions and affirm the order.

A jury found Ryan Louis Aldama guilty of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code,
§ 422; count 2) but found not true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). It found Aldama not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), and found not true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). In bifurcated proceedings, Aldama admitted he was convicted of a prior serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). The court sentenced Aldama to seven years as follows: the midterm of two years on the criminal threat conviction and five years on the serious felony prior conviction.
Aldama contends the court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on its own motion on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats, thus violating his due process rights under the federal Constitution. We affirm the judgment.

This case is before us on remand from the California Supreme Court. (People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424.) In 2013, defendant Ruthetta Lois Hopson was convicted by a jury of the 2011 first degree murder of her housemate, Laverna Brown. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The jury found true the special circumstances that she intentionally murdered Brown while lying in wait (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and while engaged in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery (id., subd. (a)(17)(A)). She was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and appealed her conviction on the grounds that her rights of confrontation were violated at trial by the admission of evidence about a stationhouse confession made by her boyfriend, Julius Thomas, before he killed himself in jail. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) As reported at trial by a detective, Thomas admitted during an interview that Hopson convinced him to participate in the killing at her residence.

Appointed counsel for defendant Keith Smith filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Thereafter, defendant filed a supplemental brief. After reviewing defendant’s supplemental brief and the entire record, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jose Eduardo Ruiz-Rodriguez of attempted kidnapping, assault with intent to commit rape, felony false imprisonment, and assault. The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years 10 months in prison, which included six years on the count two conviction for assault with intent to commit rape and a consecutive four years on the count one conviction for attempted kidnapping.
Defendant now contends the consecutive four-year sentence on the count one conviction for attempted kidnapping violates Penal Code section 654, because the attempted kidnapping was part of the same act or course of conduct as the assault with intent to commit rape. Finding no merit in the contention, we will affirm the judgment.

In October 2012, appellant Terry M. Ratterree lost his residence through nonjudicial foreclosure by respondents Federal National Mortgage Association and Seterus, Incorporated. After the foreclosure, Ratterree sued the respondents for violating the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (HBOR) and for wrongful foreclosure. Respondents demurred to Ratterree’s second amended complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Ratterree appeals from the subsequently entered judgment of dismissal. On appeal, Ratterree contends (1) the trial court erroneously ruled Ratterree could not state a cause of action under Civil Code section 2924.17 because it is preempted by federal law, and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing his cause of action for wrongful foreclosure on grounds Ratterree had not alleged compliance with the “tender rule.”

Guy H. Nelson filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his 2017 motion to withdraw his 2003 guilty plea and also contending that his sentence should be reduced due to a change in Penal Code section 212.5. He requested a certificate of probable cause, which the trial court granted. We appointed counsel to represent defendant on this appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and requested this court to independently review the record on appeal to determine whether any arguable issues exist. On October 11, 2017, we sent a notice to defendant, advising him he had 30 days in which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider.
Defendant has filed a supplemental brief contending there is no record showing that he entered a guilty or no contest plea to second degree robbery in this case and that he should be resentenced or the case dismissed.

Mark A. Butters appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). He contends the trial court erred when it so ruled. We affirm.

Defendant Jerry Anderson was convicted of one count of torture (Pen. Code, § 206), one count of injuring a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), one count of making criminal threats (§ 422) and one count of false imprisonment by violence (§ 236). The jury found true the allegations that defendant personally inflicted injury on his cohabitant under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison for the torture conviction plus nine years for the criminal threats conviction and related enhancements. Punishment for the remaining convictions was stayed pursuant to section 654.
Defendant appeals, contending there is insufficient evidence to show he harbored the requisite intent for torture and further contending the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on battery and/or aggravated battery as lesser included offenses of torture.

Aurelio Terrazaz and Enrique Ocampos Ortiz (collectively, Appellants) appeal from a judgment dismissing defendant Celia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) as a defendant in their wage and hour lawsuit charging her and Unlimited Baking Ingredients, Inc. (UBI) with multiple violations of the Labor Code and of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The trial court sustained Rodriguez’s general and special demurrers to all causes of action of Appellants’ first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered judgment terminating her personal involvement in the litigation. We reverse the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Phillip Lewis Randall (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36). He challenges the trial court’s discretion in determining that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment.

Marquise Treaivonn Fraise appeals from his judgment of conviction of first degree burglary, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.

After her motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied, Lisa Finley (defendant) entered a plea of nolo contendere to resisting an executive officer in violation of section 69. The trial court sentenced defendant to 333 days of time served in county jail and three years of formal probation. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence, contending the observations made by the detectives that she exhibited symptoms of drug use were made while she was subjected to an unlawful detention. We affirm the judgment of conviction.