CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Juan Lazaro guilty of making criminal threats and active participation in a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, §§ 186.22, subd. (a), 422.) The jury also found true the allegation that Lazaro made the criminal threats for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B).) The trial court imposed an aggregate term of three years.

This appeal arises from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; the anti-SLAPP statute.) Plaintiffs Todd Mueller and his company, Todd Mueller Autographs, LLC (collectively, Mueller), allege in their complaint that defendants have conspired to push Mueller out of the autographed memorabilia market by issuing fraudulent opinions regarding the authenticity of autographs on the products sold by Mueller. Collectors Universe, Inc. (Collectors), one of five defendants, filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Another defendant, R&R Auction Company, LLC (R&R), joined in the motion and we have consolidated the two appeals arising from the denial of the motion.
The issue boils down to this: Do opinions about the authenticity of celebrity autographs concern a public issue? We conclude they do not, and thus affirm the order.

This is a dispute over an award of attorney fees in a rather atypical context. The court determined the contract between the parties, plaintiff Hamid R. Assadian and defendants Reza Parsi, Manatel Communication & Energy, Inc., and Tele-Free Iran (collectively defendants) was illegal and unenforceable because Assadian had been engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while performing the contract. After further proceedings we will discuss below, the court awarded defendants approximately $347,000 in attorney fees. Assadian argues this was error, asserting that an attorney fee award under a contract is improper when the contract has been deemed illegal, and further, the amount awarded was erroneous and unreasonable. We find that this case falls into an exception to the general rule under which illegal contracts are entirely unenforceable, and conclude Assadian’s lack of specific argument in the trial court as to the amount of the fees waives the issue on appeal.

A jury convicted Barbara Ann Hamel of first degree felony murder, finding true the special circumstance allegation that she caused the victim’s death during a robbery in which the perpetrators followed the victim, Chi Bui, in his car after he departed a Hawaiian Gardens casino with substantial winnings. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A); all further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The jury also found Hamel guilty of second degree robbery and attempted second degree robbery. (§§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c).) Based on the special circumstance finding, the trial court sentenced Hamel to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP; see fn. 2, infra).

Defendant Jung Han Kim appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate a California judgment entered on an Oregon judgment obtained by default in 2009. The Oregon judgment held Kim liable for approximately $1.8 million. After accrued interest, the California judgment totaled over $2.7 million.
Kim asserts the Oregon court never had personal jurisdiction over him because he was never served. The trial court considered Kim’s testimony and that of the process server who claimed to have personally served Kim at an address in Fresno on August 26, 2008. The court stated the testimony of each was equally believable, concluded Kim failed to carry his burden of proof, and denied his motion to vacate the California judgment.

Appellant, Ernest Dean Soest, filed a complaint on August 27, 2015, alleging causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and violation of civil rights against respondents, Mojave Air and Space Port (MASP), and two MASP employees, Stuart Witt and Kevin Wojkiewicz. According to appellant, on September 10, 2013, respondents wrongfully caused the county sheriff to arrest appellant and take him into custody. Appellant asserts that respondents falsely accused appellant of taking an aircraft without the owner’s consent in violation of Penal Code section 499d. Respondents demurred to the complaint. The trial court sustained the general demurrer to the complaint on the ground that appellant failed to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend to the causes of action for false imprisonment and false arrest on the ground that the statute of limitations barred those two causes of action.

Petitioner R.A. is the paternal cousin of four-year-old Za.R. (Za.) and three-year-old Zy.R. (Zy.) After the children were removed from parental custody, they were eventually placed in the custody of R.A. Unfortunately, the children were later removed from R.A.’s care on an emergency removal after the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discovered R.A. had allowed her boyfriend, S.D., who had an extensive criminal history and was the subject of another criminal charge involving the physical abuse of his 17-year-old daughter, to reside in her home. In addition, suspicious marks were found on Zy., raising a concern of physical abuse. R.A. objected to the removal and was provided a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, R.A. attempted to refute the position of CFS through her own unsworn testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found it was in the children’s best interest to be removed from R.A.’s care.

Defendants and appellants, K.R. (mother), J.R. (father-1), and R.B. (father-2), appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for their children. Mother and father-1 argue insufficient evidence supports the finding that the children are adoptable. Father-2 joins mother’s argument. We disagree with the parents and affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Joseph Edward Thompson pled guilty to possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and admitted two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(a)). In accordance with the plea agreement, a trial court sentenced him to the low term of 16 months, doubled pursuant to the strikes, for a total state prison term of 32 months. The court awarded a total of 188 days of credit for time served. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to recall or dismiss his sentence, pursuant to section 11361.8. The prosecution argued that defendant was ineligible for relief because he was over 21 years old and he used his codefendant brother, who was 19 years old at the time, in committing his offense. (§ 11359, subd. (d).) The prosecution also argued that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 11361.8, subd. (b).)

J.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to her five-year-old daughter J.M. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court and social service agencies failed to comply with the notice and inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After a thorough review of the entire record, we agree that there was inadequate compliance with the ICWA notice provisions and will remand the matter for that limited purpose.

Defendant and appellant, Ronald Eugene Krieger, Jr., pled guilty to assault with a semiautomatic firearm. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b); count 7.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to the upper term of nine years of incarceration.
After defendant filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the facts, a statement of the case, and identifying one potentially arguable issue: whether the People or the court erred in failing to provide defense counsel with discovery, including ballistic testing, pictures taken by the forensic technician, and transcripts of a purported 911 call. We affirm.

K.B., the mother of J.M. (hereafter mother), appeals an order terminating her parental rights and freeing J.M. for adoption. She contends that her due process rights were violated because she was “without question . . . a fit parent” at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and because the minor’s attorney “advis[ed] the social worker to violate clearly established law.” We conclude that appellate review of the “fitness” issue was forfeited by mother’s failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review, as mandated by section 366.26, subdivision (l) (hereafter § 366.26(l)), following the 18-month review hearing. Mother’s contention concerning the alleged attorney misconduct, which occurred during the 12-month review hearing, could have been addressed by an appeal following that hearing and is also not cognizable in the current appeal. Moreover, the issue was not preserved for appeal in any event.

Defendant and appellant, Michelle Janet Lias, pled guilty to fraudulently making a material statement and representation for the purpose of obtaining compensation. (Ins. Code, § 187.14, subd. (a)(4); count 1.) The court granted defendant three years of summary probation and later imposed victim restitution in the amount of $35,525.08. On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in awarding that amount of restitution. We affirm.

A.M. appeals from a juvenile court adjudication finding true allegations he committed arson of property (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d)). He contends we must reverse the true finding because there is insufficient evidence to support the malice element of the offense. He further contends the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reduce the true finding to a misdemeanor under Esteybar v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial Dist. We conclude substantial evidence showed A.M. acted with malice by deliberately lighting a fire on private property when he knew doing so was wrong, and then leaving the fire unattended. We further conclude the court lacked the authority to reduce the true finding to a misdemeanor under the Esteybar case because arson of property is not an offense punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.