CA Unpub Decisions

Rudie Thomas, Jr., appearing in propria persona, appeals from a judgment dismissing his second amended complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure related causes of action after the trial court sustained the demurrer of Southland Home Mortgage II, LLC (Southland) without leave to amend. Thomas makes several arguments, none of which have merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Joseph Alexander Macy appeals from a civil harassment order entered against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Macy contends there was insufficient evidence to support issuing the order. However, there is no reporter's transcript of the proceedings and without a reporter's transcript or authorized substitute the evidence is conclusively presumed to support the order. (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 (Fain).) Accordingly, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Andre Tyrone Davis has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We briefly recount the facts and procedural history in accordance with People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.

Defendant William Charles Slaughter pleaded no contest to burglary of a residence when someone other than an accomplice was present and while a principal was armed with a firearm. He was released on his own recognizance after entering a Cruz waiver as part of the plea agreement. If defendant complied with the terms and conditions of the Cruz waiver he would receive three years. If he did not, he stipulated to the maximum sentence of seven years. The court found defendant violated the Cruz waiver by not timely reporting to the Yuba County Probation Department, one of the Cruz waiver conditions. He was sentenced to seven years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the court erroneously relied on improper criteria when ruling on the Cruz waiver violation, and that insufficient evidence supports a finding defendant more likely than not intentionally failed to comply with the probation reporting requirement.

In this probate dispute, the primary issue is whether certain properties should be treated as part of the Mixed Doubles Trust (Doubles Trust), established by Robert and Shirley Hewitt. Their son Robbin Hewitt--who stood to gain from the Doubles Trust--sued his siblings (Adrianne Parks, Blythe Hewitt, and Robert R. Hewitt) and his brother-in-law (Tom Parks, Adrianne’s husband). Robbin claimed Shirley, who survived Robert for a time, improperly moved certain real properties into her own trust, the Test Family Trust (Test Trust), as to which Robbin has only a minor personalty interest (as he was to receive a ceramic plate and a Lladro figurine). The trial court took judicial notice of relevant recorded deeds and then sustained (without leave to amend) a demurrer filed by defendants Adrianne and Tom--a demurrer in effect joined by Blythe and Robert R.--on the ground that those real properties were never held by the Doubles Trust.

Before conducting a parole search of a car in which defendant Michael Kirri Morris had been sitting in the driver’s seat, a sheriff’s deputy placed defendant in handcuffs and in the back of his patrol car for officer safety. When the deputy asked if there were weapons or a gun in the car, defendant volunteered that there were bullets in the driver’s side door. The deputy found six rounds of ammunition there. Only after he found the ammunition did the deputy give defendant Miranda warnings.
On appeal from a conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition, defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective because defense counsel did not move to exclude his pre- and post-Miranda statements as being a product of a custodial interrogation. We conclude defense counsel was not ineffective because defendant was not in custody when he first told the deputy there were bullets in the car. Accordingly, we affirm.

A jury found defendant Oscar Ramon Dominguez guilty of infliction of corporal injury upon a person with whom he had a dating relationship (count one), assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a car (count two), and hit and run resulting in death or permanent serious injury (count three). In connection with counts 1 and 2, the jury found that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence. In connection with count 1, the jury also found that defendant used a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, a car.
Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 11 years, defendant appeals. His sole contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper terms rather than the middle terms. We conclude that defendant has forfeited the contention. Even if not forfeited, his contention fails on the merits.

Appellant Yuba County Health and Human Services Department (Department) appeals the juvenile court’s order continuing reunification services to L.O., mother of the minor D.O., and denying the Department’s request for a second psychological evaluation of mother for purposes of invoking the bypass provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), which allows for bypass of reunification services when the parent “is suffering from a mental disability . . . that renders . . . her incapable of utilizing those services.”
Subsequent to the filing of the Department’s opening brief on appeal, the juvenile court entered an order terminating mother’s reunification services and setting the matter for a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26. We requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing regarding why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot.

Defendant Deon Hampton was convicted of two counts of felony child endangerment, one count for felony evading a law enforcement officer, one count of felony failure to appear, and various sentencing enhancements. He now appeals his judgment, contending the trial court made prejudicial instructional errors and also erred in sentencing. We will affirm the judgment.

Gabriela M. appeals a juvenile court exit order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4) terminating dependency jurisdiction over appellant’s three-year old daughter, M.M., and awarding sole physical custody to M.M.’s father, Ova C., with joint legal custody to father and appellant. We affirm.

Defendant Francisco Nila Rojas appeals from the judgment following his conviction for first degree murder. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of sudden quarrel or heat of passion. We affirm.

The trial court found that defendant and appellant Angelica Maravilla was in violation of the terms of her probation and revoked the suspension of her four-year prison sentence for felony child abuse. (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) Maravilla’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review the record. We affirm.

Samuel Bolden appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury of three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of child pornography. (§ 311.11, subd. (a).) The trial court found true two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and one prior serious or violent felony conviction (“strike”) within the meaning of California’s “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The court struck the prior prison terms and sentenced appellant to prison for 26 years, 4 months.