CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Chrystian M. Bautista of two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), one count of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). The trial court suspended execution of concurrent four-year sentences on the burglary convictions, and placed Bautista on five years of formal probation. Bautista contends: (1) the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two burglary charges, (2) there was insufficient evidence that he neither owned nor lacked consent to take the property at issue, (3) the court should have granted his request to instruct the jury on a mistake-of-fact defense, (4) the court should have barred evidence of prior conduct as irrelevant to his intent to steal, and (5) the court erroneously reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof by labeling his prior conduct as an “alleged attempted burglary.” We

The California Department of Health Care Services (Department) moved to determine the amount of a Medi-Cal lien on the settlement of plaintiff’s medical malpractice action. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14124.76, subd. (a) .) The trial court determined the amount of the lien to be $39,004.41. Plaintiff appeals. We reduce the amount of the lien by 25 percent for statutory attorney fees. (§ 14124.72, subd. (d).) In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jeannette Martello challenges the trial court’s denial of her special motion to strike a cause of action pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Martello performed surgery on plaintiff and respondent Stella Madrid to repair injuries Madrid suffered from a faulty garage door. After Madrid filed suit against her landlord and the garage door manufacturer, Martello filed a notice of lien against the proceeds of the lawsuit. Madrid, represented by her attorney, Joshua Merliss, then sued Martello for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (IIPEA), and Martello filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Martello alleges that the trial court erred in finding that Madrid had shown a probability of succeeding on the merits of her claim. We affirm.

Craig Whitney appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) upon one victim and misdemeanor simple battery (§§ 242 & 243, subd. (a)) upon another. The jury further found to be true the special allegation that Whitney inflicted great bodily injury upon the assault victim. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison. Whitney contends we must reverse his assault conviction because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence establishing he did not act in self-defense. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation and imposing “an irrational and arbitrary” sentence. We reject Whitney’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Christopher Williams brought a wage and hour class action against his employer, Allstate Insurance Company, on behalf of a class of auto field adjusters. The class was initially certified, then decertified after the trial court found individual issues predominated. Williams successfully sought writ review in this court, and we directed the class to be recertified. The trial court did so, and subsequently decertified the class again – this time, on the basis that Williams had failed to present a viable trial plan for the class action. Williams again appeals. We reverse in part due to intervening authority and otherwise affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Chana and Jessica Andrews appeal the judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Mardean Alesso, the Alesso Family Trust, Donald Kenneth Black, and Steven Edward Black. After the Andrews purchased a home from defendants, they discovered that the home had a termite infestation, mold, and rotting wood, which they attributed to earlier water intrusions that defendants did not disclose. Alleging that they were deprived of the opportunity to rescind the purchase agreement, the Andrews filed a complaint alleging negligence, intentional misrepresentation (fraud), concealment (fraud), negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only the first four causes of action are at issue on appeal. The Andrews contend on appeal that the trial court erred by ignoring evidence supporting their claims and by requiring them to prove elements not present in their causes of action. We affirm.

Wesley and Julia Yu appeal from a judgment of dismissal in favor of Venkat Iyer and GEICO General Insurance Company.
In 2014, Iyer drove his car into the Yus’ parked car. His insurer, GEICO, agreed to adjust the Yus’ claim and pay for repairs. The Yus took their car to Final Touch Collision Center, which performed some work but then demanded more for the repairs than GEICO would pay. GEICO refused to pay, and Final Touch sued the Yus to foreclose on a garageman’s lien. The Yus incurred attorney fees to resist foreclosure.

Plaintiff and appellant Dov Charney appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant and respondent Colleen Brown’s special motion to strike Charney’s complaint (anti-SLAPP motion) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Following Charney’s highly publicized and contentious termination as chairman and CEO of American Apparel, Inc., Brown, the then-current chairperson, distributed an e-mail to the company’s employees assuring them that Charney would not be returning to American Apparel in either capacity, and explaining the underlying reasons for his termination. Charney sued Brown and American Apparel, claiming the e-mail was defamatory and showed him in a false light. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint.

Appellants Armando Gil and Williams Martinez-Carreon (Martinez) were each convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of attempted murder and one count of criminal street gang activity (or the gang offense). On appeal, Gil contends his retrial violated double jeopardy principles; the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever his trial from that of codefendant Martinez; and the prosecution’s expert witness was improperly permitted to relate case-specific testimonial hearsay. Martinez contends the trial court should have instructed the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctrine as to him with respect to the two attempted murder counts, and punishment on the gang offense should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654 since he was found guilty of attempted murder based on the same underlying conduct.

Defendant John Winston Boone pleaded no contest to grand theft (Pen. Code, (§§ 484-487, subd. (a)) , forgery of a bill due (§ 470, subd. (d)), three counts of use of personal identifying information without authorization (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), embezzlement (§§ 504, 487), and preparing false documentary evidence (§ 134). Defendant also admitted an excessive taking enhancement (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)) and an aggravated white collar crime enhancement (§ 186.11, subds. (a)(1), (a)(3)). At sentencing, the court ordered victim restitution totaling [amount redacted] to defendant’s two former employers.

Stephanie M. Duran prevailed in her lawsuit against car dealership Quantum Auto Sales, Inc. (Quantum) and financing company Veros Credit (Veros). A jury concluded Quantum violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA; Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., all further statutory references are to the Civil Code), and the California Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA; § 2981 et seq.). It awarded Duran $41,800 in punitive damages, rescission, and restitution. The trial court issued an injunction against Quantum, prohibiting it from misrepresenting a vehicle’s history of accidents and collision damage. In our concurrently filed opinion Duran v. Quantum (Dec. 12, 2017, G052968) [nonpub. opn.] (Duran I), we rejected Quantum’s and Veros’s contentions the court abused its discretion in determining Quantum did not qualify for CLRA’s affirmative defenses, and Veros was liable under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Holder in Due Course Rule (Holder Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2). (See Duran I, s

A jury found defendant Nader Meskin guilty of three counts of grand theft (Pen. Code § 487, subd. (a)), and found true an allegation that one of the thefts was in an amount exceeding $100,000 (§ 1203.045, subd. (a)), and also found true a sentencing enhancement allegation that defendant intentionally took, damaged, and destroyed property valued at over $50,000 (former § 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to four years in county jail on the first count (a three-year upper term, plus one year for the excess taking enhancement) and ordered that two years be spent in custody in county jail followed by two years on mandatory supervision. The sentence was stayed on the remaining counts under section 654. As part of his sentence, defendant was ordered to pay a restitution fine under section 1202.4 and a mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45.

A jury convicted defendant Reynaldo Hernandez, Jr., of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of street terrorism (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that each of the assaults with a deadly weapon was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) (the gang enhancement)). Defendant admitted having suffered three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(2)(A), two serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and having previously served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Eighteen-year-old Stephanie M. Duran purchased a 2003 Audi TT from the Quantum Auto Sales, Inc. (Quantum) for $11,995, using the dealership’s financing services. She later learned the vehicle was actually worth $3,000 due to damages sustained in several undisclosed prior collisions and transmission problems. Before filing a complaint for damages based on the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA; Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., all further statutory references are to the Civil Code), Duran complied with the CLRA’s requirement she notify Quantum about the alleged violations and demand it “correct, repair, replace, or otherwise rectify” those violations. (§ 1782, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) Under the CLRA, this pre-filing notice and demand letter gave Quantum the opportunity to voluntarily remedy its mistake, and if it made an appropriate correction offer, Duran would be precluded from maintaining an “action for damages.” (§ 1782, subd. (b).) In this case, Quantum sent Duran a settl