CA Unpub Decisions

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his felony complaint against Khrystina Elizabeth Austin Zablockis. The OCDA argues the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint pursuant to Penal Code section 1381 (section 1381). We agree and reverse the order.

Christina R. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 hearing as to her 15-year-old daughter, V.G., and four sons, Noel, George, Jr., Nathaniel and Fabian, now 13, 11, seven and four years old, respectively. She contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse) and (j) (abuse of sibling) and its dispositional orders removing the children from her custody and denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) and (10). We deny the petition.

Appointed counsel for defendant Tony Theontae Bailey asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

Plaintiff Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) appeals from a postjudgment order awarding costs of $240,156.07 to defendant HART High-Voltage Apparatus Repair and Testing Co., Inc. (HART). The award included expert witness costs totaling $207,974.63, which the court found HART was entitled to recover under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The judgment against PG&E was entered after the trial court granted HART’s motion for summary adjudication as to all of PG&E’s causes of action.
In case No. F072904, we reversed the judgment against PG&E and remanded for further proceedings on its causes of action for negligence and damages under Public Utilities Code section 7952. With the reversal of the underlying judgment, the award of costs to HART can no longer stand. We therefore vacate the order.

After judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs in this defamation action, defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granted the motion for new trial, unless plaintiffs consented to a reduction in the damage awards. Plaintiffs accepted the reduction. Defendants appeal, contending judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been entered in their favor because there was no substantial evidence supporting either liability or damages. Alternatively, they argue the motion for new trial should have been granted without the remittitur because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and misconduct of plaintiffs’ counsel deprived them of a fair trial. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, challenging the validity of the new trial order.

The petition challenges a trial court order disqualifying petitioner’s counsel on the theory that counsel had a conflict arising out of a previous representation. Because the way in which the trial court allowed and disallowed evidence supporting and opposing the motion adversely impaired petitioner’s due process rights, we grant the petition and remand for a new hearing.

M.S. (Father) appeals from a dispositional order, challenging the juvenile court's failure to detain his children, G.S., A.S., C.S., and Cu.S. (together, the children) with a relative on an emergency basis pending the dispositional hearing. He concedes the appeal is moot, but requests we exercise our discretion to clarify a point of law, which, as it turns out, is undisputed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

A jury convicted Wani Juma Kose of one count each of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1), attempting to dissuade a witness from prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2); count 2), and bribery of a witness (§ 138, subd. (a); count 3). Kose later admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (b) & 1170.12) and allegations that he committed counts 2 and 3 while released from custody on bail (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). After denying Kose's new trial motion, the trial court sentenced him to a term of 12 years in prison.
Kose appeals, contending (1) the trial court misinstructed the jury with a pinpoint instruction regarding the definition of perpetrators that lessened the prosecution's burden and deprived him of a fair trial, (2) insufficient evidence supported his robbery conviction, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his new trial motion, and (4) the trial court failed to understand its discretion when it imposed a consecutive sentence as to count 2

C.M. (mother) appeals following the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to minor S.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the juvenile court and the Colusa County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) failed to comply with the notice and inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and its California implementing statutes. We will remand for the limited purpose of conducting further inquiry under the ICWA.

A complaint charged defendant Dan Clayton Fallis with possession of obscene matter depicting persons under 18 (count 1; Pen. Code, § 311.10 [unless otherwise stated, statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code]), possession of child or youth pornography (count 2; § 311.11), possession of destructive device (count 3; § 18710, subd. (a)), possession of ingredients to make a destructive device (count 4; § 18720), possession of a short-barreled rifle or shotgun (count 5; § 33210), and possession of an unconventional pistol (count 6; § 31500). Defendant pleaded no contest to counts 1 and 4 in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts with a Harvey waiver (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754) and a sentencing “lid” of five years in state prison. The parties stipulated that the probation report would provide the factual basis for the plea.

Father of the minors appeals the juvenile court’s order continuing the minors in out-of-home placement, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of detriment barring return of the minors to his custody (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e) ). We conclude the basis relied upon by the juvenile court to find detriment lacks the necessary specificity for us to determine whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence without further clarification and explanation by the juvenile court. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A jury found defendant Nathan Stewart guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury with an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury. The trial court imposed a seven-year state prison term, suspended execution of sentence, and placed defendant on five years’ formal probation.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury it could not consider a witness’s improper response to a question, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the jury was properly admonished. We affirm.

Defendant James O. McChristian pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm in exchange for a two-year state prison sentence lid and dismissal of the remaining charge and two pending cases. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on a three-year term of probation. After an admitted violation, the court imposed a two-year prison sentence and suspended execution, reinstating probation. After finding a second violation, the court ordered the two-year sentence executed.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion by executing the previously suspended two-year prison sentence. In defendant’s view, the court mistakenly believed it lacked discretion to reinstate his probation after the second revocation. Disagreeing, we shall affirm.

A jury found defendant Lori Marie Hewitt guilty of domestic violence with use of a weapon (count one) and simple assault (count two). (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 273.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court granted her probation, and she timely filed this appeal.
This appeal centers on the introduction of evidence of defendant’s prior violent acts, introduced after she claimed self-defense. That evidence was used both to counter evidence that the victim was violent and that defendant was merely acting in self defense, and also to show defendant had made prior false allegations of domestic abuse. Defendant contends that this evidence was inadmissible, her trial counsel was ineffective regarding this evidence, and the trial court should have given the jury a limiting instruction regarding this evidence. We disagree with defendant’s claims of error and shall affirm the judgment.