CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Julio Martinez guilty of robbery after a trial at which Martinez represented himself. After the verdict, Martinez refused to return to the courtroom from his cell in lockup for the trial on the allegations of seven prior convictions, one of which was for a serious felony. The trial court appointed stand-by counsel to represent Martinez, including for the trial on the allegations of Martinez’s prior convictions, which the jury found true.
At the sentencing hearing two weeks later, Martinez was again absent. Based on Martinez’s conduct after the verdict and statements he made to his attorney and the bailiff, the trial court ruled that Martinez was voluntarily absent from the sentencing hearing. The court proceeded with the hearing in Martinez’s absence and sentenced Martinez to a prison term of 11 years.

Reina M. is the mother of 15-year-old J.R., 11-year-old B.R., 8-year-old A.T., and 3-year-old L.T. Reina appeals from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring all four children dependents of the juvenile court and removing them from her custody. Because Reina does not raise a justiciable controversy in challenging the jurisdiction findings, and because the juvenile court has returned the children to her custody, rendering her challenge to the disposition order moot, we dismiss the appeal.

Shortly after midnight, Michael Velez fled from the police, driving a stolen car at speeds in excess of 95 miles per hour through the streets of Pomona before crashing into a palm tree. A jury found Velez guilty of driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of a person or property while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer and unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. The police officer who engaged in the pursuit lost sight of the fleeing vehicle before he found an injured Velez lying on the ground near a damaged car. Velez contends the trial court erred by admitting the officer’s opinion testimony that Velez was ejected from the car as a result of the collision. Velez argues that because the officer was not qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction, the admission of his opinion was prejudicial error.
We conclude the officer’s testimony was admissible as lay opinion, and, in any event, any error in admitting the opinion testimony was harmless. We therefore

Defendant Bayer U.S. LLC appeals from the summary judgment in favor of plaintiff 21st Capital Corporation. Bayer also appeals from the trial court’s denial of its own motion for summary judgment. The underlying contractual dispute arises from Bayer’s relationship with a non-party to this case, AGR Premier Consulting, Inc. AGR provided Bayer with information technology services for many years. 21st Capital, a factoring company, in turn bought Bayer’s accounts receivable from AGR and then billed Bayer for AGR’s services. Each time 21st Capital presented Bayer with an invoice for AGR’s services, 21st Capital asked a Bayer representative to confirm on 21st Capital’s website the accuracy of the invoice. At the same time, 21st Capital required that the Bayer representative “authenticate” an “Invoice Confirmation Agreement” with a number of provisions, including a waiver of defenses that could be asserted against 21st Capital.

Michael Neal Boyd pled no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance. At his sentencing, the court imposed a criminal laboratory analysis fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5) and a drug program fee (§ 11372.7). The court also imposed penalty assessments and surcharges on these fees. Boyd challenges the penalty assessments and surcharges and takes issue with the court’s failure to award him two days of good conduct credits.
Boyd contends the amounts payable under sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 are administrative fees rather than criminal fines. Because penalty assessments and surcharges can only be imposed on criminal fines, penalties, or forfeitures, Boyd argues he should not have to pay the penalty assessments and surcharges. Boyd also contends that because he served two days in custody with good behavior he is entitled to two days of conduct credits.

Defendant Randall Wilson was convicted of assaulting the mother of his child with a knife and driving a family friend’s car without consent. On appeal, he contends the court erred in denying his motion to represent himself at trial and violated his Confrontation Clause rights by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify that the car owner had reported the car stolen. We affirm.

Petitioner Paula Mitchell appeals from the order of the trial court setting aside the default and default judgment of dissolution taken against her husband, respondent Rodger Mitchell. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Paula’s appeal also challenges the court’s subsequent order denying her motion for reconsideration. (§ 1008.) We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant statutory relief under section 473 and Rodger did not seek relief under the relevant provisions of the Family Code. Accordingly, we reverse both orders.

Defendant Fredrick Wayne Kook appeals from a postconviction order denying his petition for recall of sentence under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36 or the Act) (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). The trial court denied the petition on the ground Kook committed a sexually violent offense, an enumerated exclusion under Proposition 36, making him ineligible for relief. Kook argues that because he was convicted for lewd or lascivious acts and not a sexually violent offense, the court erred by reviewing the trial transcript to make its finding that he committed a sexually violent offense. Kook also contends the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof and the evidence did not support the court’s conclusion. None of the arguments have merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

The City of Los Angeles filed a complaint against Mackone Development and its owner, Scott Yang, seeking civil penalties under California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, 17206) and false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17500, 17536.) The City alleged Mackone had failed to comply with the prevailing wage law and overtime requirements in connection with a public works project, and then attempted to conceal its misconduct by submitting falsified payroll records to a government entity.
Defendants filed demurrers arguing that: (1) the City’s claims were uncertain because they failed to identify which employees had been denied prevailing wage and overtime pay; (2) the complaint failed to allege any conduct that violated the false advertising law; and (3) Scott Yang could not be held personally liable for the misconduct of his company. The court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend.

Myung Ja Kang and 93 other unnamed class members (objectors), appeal from a judgment approving the settlement of a class action lawsuit and dismissing the action brought by plaintiffs and respondents Harry Hahn and James Hong (representative plaintiffs) against defendants and respondents Hanil Development, Inc. and Aroma Spa & Sports, LLC (defendants).
Before we can reach the merits of the objectors’ challenges to the trial court’s approval of the settlement, we address as a threshold matter whether the objectors have standing to prosecute this appeal. Only a “party aggrieved may appeal” from a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) The objectors, however, did not intervene in the action. Nor did the objectors take any other steps to become parties of record, ask to be named as class representatives, or demonstrate any willingness to take on the responsibilities and risks of the representative plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs and appellants Joung Hyen Lee, Hyen Uk Lee, and Esther Lee (plaintiffs) are former employees of The Christian Herald, Inc. (the Herald), a corporation they allege is solely owned and was managed by their former boss, defendant Jun Yang. Plaintiffs filed suit against Yang and the Herald asserting five wage-and-hour claims. Hyen Uk Lee asserted three additional causes of action (assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Yang, and premises liability against the Herald) arising out of alleged physical confrontations with Yang. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Yang after the trial court sustained his demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend as to all causes of action asserted against him individually. We reverse the judgment in part.

Defendant Sydney Jean Hill petitioned the trial court for resentencing under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, commonly known as Proposition 47. After a hearing, the court reduced Hill’s drug conviction to a misdemeanor, but denied Hill’s request to reduce the stolen property conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. In a prior opinion, we affirmed the court’s order. (People v. Hill (Mar. 28, 2016, B262390 [nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court granted Hill’s petition for review and deferred briefing pending its decision in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski). (People v. Hill (Aug. 16, 2017, No. S234180).) After issuing Romanowski, the Supreme Court transferred Hill’s case back to us for reconsideration in light of that opinion. Having reconsidered Hill’s claims on appeal, we again affirm the trial court’s order denying her Proposition 47 petition.

Petitioner A.M., Sr., father of A.M., Jr., challenges the juvenile court’s September 1, 2017 order terminating Father’s reunification services and setting a hearing, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 on the ground that he was not provided reasonable reunification services. Father contends that he began to exhibit signs of extreme mental illness during the review period, however the Agency failed to provide him with mental health services. Thus, according to Father, the services he was offered were deficient. For the reasons given below, we deny his petition.

Cindy A., the mother of five-year-old Lila A. and two-year-old Joel A., appeals from juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights and ordering adoption as the permanent plan pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the orders must be reversed because the court’s adoptability finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and that the court, instead of terminating her parental rights, should have identified adoption as the permanent placement goal and continued the hearing for six months pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3). We reject her arguments and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.