CA Unpub Decisions

Following a contested parole revocation hearing, the trial court revoked defendant’s parole and sentenced him to 120 days in jail. Defendant contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his parole status. Because defendant is estopped from asserting the court lacked jurisdiction, we affirm.

After defendant Tyler Marie Conway pleaded guilty to embezzlement by an employee, a felony (Pen. Code, § 508), the trial court placed her on three years probation and imposed various terms and conditions. Defendant challenges several of the probation conditions and, as to those conditions to which she did not object below, claims she received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

After defendant Tyler Marie Conway pleaded guilty to embezzlement by an employee, a felony (Pen. Code, § 508), the trial court placed her on three years probation and imposed various terms and conditions. Defendant challenges several of the probation conditions and, as to those conditions to which she did not object below, claims she received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

A jury convicted Rodney ONeil Williams of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court found Williams’s prior convictions true, struck one prior, and sentenced Williams to 31 years to life in state prison.
Williams appeals. He contends the court erred by: (1) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the right to self-defense: mutual combat or initial aggressor (CALCRIM No. 3471); (2) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter; and (3) admitting the victim’s hearsay statements. He also seeks reversal based on cumulative error.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Gary Lee Bullock of murder, torture, and other crimes and found true several special circumstance allegations. The court sentenced him to a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP). On appeal, defendant argues the trial court should have suppressed certain statements he made during a police interview after he asked the interviewer, “Can I see a lawyer?” Defendant also argues the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the torture conviction and the torture-murder special circumstance. Finally, defendant contends that Penal Code section 654 bars punishment for both the murder and the torture convictions. We affirm.

Appellant Dean Kim (Dean) appeals from a defense judgment following an order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent Young Oak Kim (Young), based on a determination that Dean’s complaint was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Dean contends: (1) there are triable issues of fact as to whether his complaint was timely filed; (2) the trial court erroneously denied his request to continue the hearing on Young’s summary judgment motion pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (h) of the Code of Civil Procedure ; and (3) the trial court erroneously denied his section 1008 motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling.

Defendant Dale Douglas Adkison appeals following the trial court’s denial of his Romero motion to strike his prior serious felony conviction, arguing that the court abused its discretion.

Defendants Angelo Garcia and Eric Ruiz, inmates at the Salinas Valley State Prison, appeal from judgments entered after a jury trial resulting in their convictions of attempted murder and related crimes against a fellow inmate. Both defendants seek reversal based on the court’s denial of their joint “Pitchess” motion to discover personnel records of correctional officer witnesses. Defendants further assert error in an instruction relating to the intent necessary for attempted murder; in addition, defendants contend they should have received instructions on self defense by Ruiz and defense of others by Garcia. Both also assert ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to object to prosecutor misconduct, and Garcia contests the sentence he received on one of the counts. We find merit in the last argument by Garcia; accordingly, on that ground alone we will modify the judgment as to that defendant.

Defendant Michael Garcia appeals following his conviction of a number of sex crimes. On appeal, he requests that this court independently review the victim’s medical records to determine if the trial court erred by not disclosing discoverable material related to the victim’s veracity. In addition, he asserts that the trial court erred by not staying his sentences for threatening to kill the victim (Pen. Code, § 422; count 6), and for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 7) pursuant to section 654, and by imposing a $500 sex offender fine pursuant to section 290.3. Finally, defendant asks that we correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.

Defendant John Wessley Gleason was convicted by jury trial of felony possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 30510, subd. (a)(11)). The trial court refused to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b) and placed defendant on felony probation. On appeal, defendant contends that prohibiting him from possessing an assault weapon violates his Second Amendment rights, and he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. We reject both of his contentions and affirm the court’s order of probation.

This is a legal malpractice action in which plaintiff and appellant Nancy T. Chu sued her former attorney, defendant and respondent Patricia Lynne Conkling. Chu claimed that Conkling failed to properly advise Chu regarding a potential legal malpractice action that Chu wished to bring against Jessica Wang, an attorney who drafted her late mother’s trust and other testamentary documents.
The trial court granted Conkling’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Chu could not establish that Wang owed her a duty as a third-party beneficiary of Chu’s late mother’s trust, or as a client. As a result, Chu was not damaged by any alleged negligence on Conkling’s part in advising her regarding a potential malpractice action against Wang.

“The attorney-client privilege . . . confers a privilege on the client ‘to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer . . . .’” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 (Costco).) Courts “may not require disclosure of information claimed to be privileged . . . in order to rule on the claim of privilege . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 915, subd. (a) (section 915); see Costco, supra, at pp. 736-740.) “[S]ection 915 prohibits a court from reviewing an allegedly privileged attorney-client communication to determine whether it is privileged because the nature of the attorney-client privilege requires absolute protection for all confidential communications between an attorney and a client regardless of their content. [Citation.] Courts have no power to create exceptions to section 915’s mandate. [Citation.] The court therefore may not review the content of the communication to

This is either the ninth or tenth appeal (we have long lost count) arising out of a “knock-down, drag-out saga engulfing what must surely be a residential area bereft of neighborly pleasantries.” (Keegan v. Three Arch Bay Community Services District et al. (June 11, 2015, G048609) [nonpub. opn.] (Keegan).) At some far earlier point, this case arose out of problems relating to drainage and parking. At this point, it has degenerated into what can reasonably be characterized as an attempt by plaintiff Charles Kinney, a now disbarred attorney who lives in the community, to inflict as much pain and expense on his neighbors as he possibly can.

Previously declared a vexatious litigant, Janetta Sconiers-Melikian (Sconiers-Melikian) appeals from the probate court’s order awarding sanctions against her share of her mother’s estate for attorney fees and costs incurred by the attorney for Frankie Freitas, the estate’s executor. We affirm the order.