CA Unpub Decisions

On July 17, 2020, the Santa Barbara Department of Child Welfare Services (Santa Barbara Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleging G.B. (then six years old), A.B. (then five years old), and A.R. (then two years old) (collectively, Minors), who were in Mother’s custody, had suffered or had a substantial risk of suffering serious harm.
In a report submitted in advance of the detention hearing, the Santa Barbara Department reported Mother had been placed on a section 5150 hold on July 14, 2020, after telling law enforcement she was driving over 100 miles per hour and was planning to attack the aunt of her boyfriend, Abel E. Mother had a long history of mental illness, including defiance, aggression, and anxiety, starting when she was a minor in the dependency system.

This is our fifth opinion arising from litigation initiated in 2013 by J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. (JBB) and Silvester Rabic (collectively, plaintiffs) against R. Thomas Fair, Bronco RE Corporation (Bronco), BRE Boulevard (Boulevard) and BRE Cameron Creek LLC (Cameron) (collectively, Fair defendants). Plaintiffs successfully sued the Fair defendants to enforce a settlement agreement between the parties. In 2019, plaintiffs filed another lawsuit, against both the Fair defendants and their attorneys, asserting abuse of process and other claims related to the protracted underlying litigation. The attorneys filed a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) and requested fees as the prevailing party on the motion. The trial court granted the motion only as to the abuse of process claim and denied the fee request.

Appellant Sebastian Andre Chavez pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)) and was placed on probation for a two-year term. On appeal, he argues that several of the probation conditions related to electronic searches are overbroad and must be narrowly tailored. He also argues that the probation supervision fee should be vacated due to recent legislative changes. We agree that the unpaid portion of the fee should be vacated but reject as either forfeited or lacking in merit Chavez’s challenges to his probation conditions. As modified, we affirm the order granting probation.

Six-year-old Michael M. and 12-year-old M.K. (the children) were removed from S.K. (mother) and placed with the noncustodial parent, M.M. (father). Father appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order requiring him to participate in substance abuse counseling and to submit to random drug testing. We affirm.

Isaac Y. (father) and Esmeralda E. (mother) are the parents of E.E. (born December 2015). Father appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order denying his request for placement of E.E. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), after the court removed her from mother’s custody. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s detriment finding, and that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to participate in a domestic violence assessment with recommended treatment, a mental health assessment with recommended treatment, and parenting classes as part of his reunification plan.
We conclude that substantial evidence did not support the court’s detriment finding under section 361.2, subdivision (a), and that the court abused its discretion in ordering father to participate in a domestic violence assessment.

Defendant Audeamus, a California corporation (Employer), appeals the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted by a former employee. The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that (1) there was no arbitration agreement between the former employee and Employer, (2) the arbitration agreement between her and Employer’s parent company was not drafted to cover her disputes with Employer, and (3) the legal principles that allow a nonsignatory to an agreement to enforce an arbitration provision did not apply in the circumstances of this case. As explained below, Employer has not carried its burden of affirmatively demonstrating superior court error.
We therefore affirm the order denying the motion to compel arbitration.

A jury convicted appellant Glen Edward Maynor and his codefendants, Trichelle K. Burton and Tyquan Maurice Jones, of conspiracy to commit robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 212.5, subd. (c)), carjacking (§ 215 subd. (a)), assault (§ 243, subd. (a)), attempted kidnapping to commit robbery (§§ 664, 209, subd. (b)), and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)). In addition, the trial court found Maynor had suffered two prior strikes within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) and 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 54 years to life.
Maynor raises the following claims on appeal: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted kidnapping to commit robbery; (2) his conviction for attempted robbery must be reversed because attempted robbery is a necessarily included offense of attempted kidnapping to commit robbery;

A jury convicted appellant Tyquan Maurice Jones and his codefendants, Trichelle K. Burton and Glen Edward Maynor, of conspiracy to commit robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 212.5, subd. (c)), carjacking (§ 215 subd. (a)), assault (§ 243, subd. (a)), attempted kidnapping to commit robbery (§§ 664, 209, subd. (b)), and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced Jones to an aggregate prison term of eight years eight months.
Jones raises the following claims on appeal: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted kidnapping to commit robbery; (2) his conviction for attempted robbery must be reversed because attempted robbery is a necessarily included offense of attempted kidnapping to commit robbery; (3) he is entitled to an opportunity to request a hearing on his ability to pay court-imposed fines and fees; and (4) the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence on Jones’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robb

A jury convicted appellant Trichelle K. Burton and her codefendants, Glen Edward Maynor and Tyquan Maurice Jones, of conspiracy to commit robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 212.5, subd. (c)), carjacking (§ 215 subd. (a)), assault (§ 243, subd. (a)), attempted kidnapping to commit robbery (§§ 664, 209, subd. (b)), and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)). Burton was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of six years eight months.
Burton raises the following claims on appeal: (1) As to count 1, she should have been charged with multiple conspiracies instead of a single overarching conspiracy to commit robbery; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a prior uncharged act: the robbery of victim K.A.

Adrian Isaac Vasquez (defendant) appeals his convictions stemming from two separate incidents where law enforcement found him in possession of another person’s vehicle. The incidents occurred on January 22, 2018, and May 7, 2018, respectively.
Defendant’s appeal primarily raises a Miranda issue. He claims the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made to law enforcement during the January 22, 2018 incident.
In supplemental briefing, defendant asks for resentencing in light of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518).
We will remand the matter for resentencing in accordance with Assembly Bill 518. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

In 2018, defendant Adrian Gentry pled guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), as well as one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and admitted an allegation that a principal used a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)), in return for dismissal of charges of murder, attempted murder, gun discharge allegations, and gang enhancement allegations. Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, amending sections 188 and 189, pertaining to felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition on the ground that resentencing relief was limited to convictions for murder. Defendant appealed that denial.
While defendant’s appeal was pending, the Legislature amended section 1170.95 to extend its resentencing provisions to convictions for attempted murder and manslaughter.

This is a petition for writ of mandate by petitioner Jonatan Josue Navarro Argot after the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Appellate Division) affirmed the trial judge’s order denying his motion to vacate his conviction on the ground that he pled guilty to misdemeanor soliciting prostitution without understanding the immigration consequences of his plea. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) We conclude the trial judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence but deny the petition for writ of mandate because Navarro Argot had an adequate legal remedy by way of his direct appeal to the Appellate Division.

Defendant and appellant, Michael Wohlfeil, was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, count 1); two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), counts 2 & 3); false imprisonment by violence (§ 237, subd. (a), count 4); and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c), count 5). Additionally, the jury found true special allegations that defendant intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of count 1, and his sentence included a 20-year prison enhancement in connection with that finding (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). Defendant appeals, requesting only that we remand the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to consider whether to strike the enhancement and impose a lesser, uncharged firearm enhancement in its place under the authority of section 12022.53, subdivision (h).

T.C., mother of the minors (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 396.) She challenges the court’s finding of adoptability and its finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply. Finding no merit in mother’s claims, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.