CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant M.S., Sr. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order transferring this dependency proceeding to the tribal court for the Picuris Pueblo of New Mexico pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He contends the juvenile court erred in transferring the case and in failing to order that notice be provided to the Osage Nation. He further asserts that the court should not have transferred the proceeding until after it had taken jurisdiction. Plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) concedes error in failing to notice the Osage Nation and in transferring the proceeding, but argues that the court was not required to take jurisdiction prior to transfer. Notwithstanding the asserted errors, CFS contends the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We agree that the trial court erred and that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner D.P. (Mother) seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the orders of the juvenile court denying her reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to her three children J.P., L.P.,
and M.P. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her reunification services under section 361.5 subdivision (b)(6), and finding reunification was not in the children’s best interest. For the reasons explained below, we dismiss the petition.

Defendant and appellant Daniel B. DelaRosa pled guilty to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In return, the remaining allegation was dismissed, and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions, including reporting to his probation officer as directed and keeping his probation officer informed of his place of residence. Defendant, however, failed to comply with both of these conditions. Following a hearing, the trial court found defendant in violation of his probation and revoked and terminated defendant’s probation. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to two years in county jail with 296 days’ credit for time served. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in revoking and terminating his probation, rather than reinstating him on probation. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

E.H. (Mother) and S.W. (Father) have a history of abusing drugs and failing to meet the medical needs of their toddler son that led to the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removing their children from their home. Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Father contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his petition because he had made a prima facie showing his circumstances had changed and his request was in the best interest of the children. We find no error and affirm the order denying Father’s section 388 petition.

Appellants are the dependent children in this case, half siblings E.S. and N.W., who were living in a foster home with L.C. (foster mother). Foster mother applied for de facto parent status but did not serve her papers on any parties in the action. The court granted her application for de facto parent status without notice to the other parties or a hearing. Afterward, the children moved to vacate the court’s order on the ground that the court had violated their due process rights by granting de facto parent status without notice and a hearing. At the hearing on the motion to vacate, foster mother voluntarily relinquished her de facto parent status. The court nevertheless ruled that its de facto parent order was valid when granted.

The parties to this appeal dispute who should control the disposition of the remains of Charles Robert Yothers II (decedent). The decedent was killed in an automobile accident; he was 29 years old. The trial court ordered that the decedent’s body be released to his father, plaintiff and respondent Jeffrey Allen Yothers. The decedent’s mother, objector and appellant Patricia Mares, contends that the trial court should have released the remains to her.
We affirm the judgment.

In 2005, a man was shot and killed at an apartment complex in Rialto. In 2013, a professed eyewitness came forward and identified defendant Michael Anthony Castrellon as the killer. She told the police and testified at trial that the victim tried to buy marijuana from defendant; defendant accused the victim of killing one of his “homeboys,” then shot him.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and miscellaneous sentencing orders.

Carlos Brain, a minority owner of plaintiffs and appellants JohnRe Care, LLC, and JohnRe Management, LLC, brought a derivative action on behalf of the two companies. Defendants and respondents Johnny Sicat and Rebecca Sicat jointly own 75 percent of both companies. The complaint alleged seven causes of action, all relating to the Sicats’ activities in running the companies and the businesses operated by the companies. The Sicats filed a special motion to strike, or anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, hereafter section 425.16), arguing that the suit was an effort to interfere with their right of petition in an unrelated suit brought by Brain for involuntary dissolution of JohnRe Care and JohnRe Management. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the instant suit does not arise from the Sicats’ right to petition within the meaning of section 425.16. We agree, and we will reverse the order, as well as the related judgment for attorney fee

Ruth E. Haringa filed for legal separation from Rudy Haringa and, six years later, they entered into a stipulated judgment of dissolution that divided their community assets. Inter alia, the judgment allocated certain pieces of real property between Ruth and Rudy, awarded Rudy full ownership of two dairy businesses, and obligated him to make a $3,000,000 equalization payment to Ruth. Eleven years after the judgment was entered, Ruth requested, pursuant to Family Code section 2556, that the family court divide community assets that were omitted from or unadjudicated by the judgment. In particular, Ruth argued Rudy transferred ownership in certain dairy farms to his now-deceased brother before Ruth and Rudy separated, without Ruth’s knowledge and consent, and the community estate’s interest in those dairies was not adjudicated in the judgment.

Appellant, Bennie M. III (Bennie), and his former spouse, respondent, Cynthia B., formerly Cynthia M. (Cynthia), are the parents of a girl, J., born in September 2008. Bennie appeals from the October 16, 2015, postjudgment order of the family court, denying his request for sole legal and physical custody of J. and supervised visitation for Cynthia. Pursuant to the October 16, 2015, order, the parties continue to have joint legal and physical custody of J., as they have had since February 2013. Cynthia has not filed a respondent’s brief.

This matter relates to a proposed development in the Highland Hills area of the City of San Bernardino that has been pending, in various permutations, for decades. Plaintiff and appellant Highland Hills Homeowners Association (HOA) brought suit alleging, among other things, violations of the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code § 21000 et seq. (CEQA). The lawsuit resulted in a settlement agreement and stipulated judgment, which was later amended twice by the parties. The “Second Addendum” to the settlement agreement implemented an expedited procedure for approval of “minor modifications” to the project.In the present appeal, HOA challenges the trial court’s order confirming that proposed changes to the project constitute “a minor modification under the Second Addendum § 1.4 thereby not requiring a supplemental or subsequent CEQA report . . . .”

In 1972, the dead body of a young woman was found in the desert. In 2012, defendant Michael Jerome Hayes was charged with her murder.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming prejudice from the 40-year lapse of time. The trial court granted the motion; however, in a previous appeal, we reversed. On remand, defendant moved to dismiss again, several times, but without success.
Defendant’s first trial ended in a hung jury. His second trial ended in a conviction for first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole.
In this appeal, defendant raises several contentions relating to the denial of his motions to dismiss. He raises additional contentions relating to the evidence and the jury instructions. We find no error; hence, we will affirm.

A jury found Marvin Oswaldo Arevalo guilty of two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (counts 1 & 2); one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition by a prohibited person (id., § 30305, subd. (a)) (count 3); two counts of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) (counts 5 & 6); and possession of drug paraphernalia (id., § 11364) (count 7). Counts 5 and 7 were based on law enforcement's discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia during a search of Arevalo's person after detaining him on March 18, 2014. The remaining counts were based on contraband that law enforcement found during a search of Arevalo's residence on January 19, 2012. The trial court sentenced Arevalo to a term of three years four months in prison.

This appeal involves a deed of trust with inconsistent descriptions of the property it encumbers and considers how that inconsistency impacts a priority dispute between two lenders.
In 2004, Frank Eder owned two adjacent undeveloped lots. One had a street address of 70 Royal Saint Georges, and the other, 68 Royal Saint Georges.
In two separate loans made the same day, Eder borrowed against each property. In several places, the deed of trust securing a $648,050 loan describes the encumbered property as 70 Royal Saint Georges, Rancho Mirage, California. However, on another page, the trust deed describes the property by legal description: Lot 16 of tract No. 25361, as shown in a certain map in the records of Riverside County. The problem is that the address and legal description do not match. There is no such property.