CA Unpub Decisions

While his young neighbor walked home from school, defendant Lourth Pak, an admitted former gang member, confronted him about the color (red) of his jacket. During the course of a disputed interaction between defendant and the victim, defendant hit the victim and also took his jacket. A jury found him guilty of robbery and inflicting corporal injury on a child (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 273d, subd. (a)), and found that he had committed both offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Although defendant was accused of burning the jacket, the jury acquitted him of arson. (§ 451, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on self-defense with respect to the corporal injury charge, and that the failure to give the instruction violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Plaintiff and appellant Samuel Kornhauser (appellant) filed a malicious prosecution action against defendant and respondent Phyllis E. Andelin (respondent), an attorney who represented appellant’s former clients in an unsuccessful prior action for attorney malpractice against appellant. Respondent moved to strike appellant’s action pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 425.16). The trial court granted the motion and awarded attorney fees to respondent. We affirm.

Appellant Breathe California of Los Angeles County (Breathe LA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting a motion to enforce a consent judgment filed by respondent American Lung Association in California (ALAC). The issue on appeal is whether the consent judgment obligates Breathe LA to share with ALAC the income from three bequests, despite language in the bequests that may restrict sharing. Because we conclude the trial court erred in interpreting the consent judgment to require sharing, we reverse and remand.

Appellant Kevin Dwayne Hohman appeals from his convictions for inflicting corporal injury on a person he was dating, unlawfully taking a motor vehicle, and petty theft. Appellant was sentenced to five years in state prison. He argues the trial court erred in precluding cross-examination of the complaining witness about her intent to seek a visa as a crime victim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Rincon EV Realty LLC and Rincon ET Realty LLC (collectively, Rincon), along with a third entity, purchased a San Francisco apartment complex (the Property) in 2007, financing the purchase in part with a $110 million loan. In October 2010, after changes in the ownership of the loan, CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (CP III) purchased the Property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Between February 2009 and September 2010 (i.e., prior to the foreclosure sale), Rincon filed four applications with the Assessment Appeals Board of the City and County of San Francisco (the Board), challenging certain assessments of the Property. Beginning in 2011, CP III sought to be substituted as the applicant in connection with the four assessment appeals. The Board denied CP III’s request, but ruled it could participate with Rincon in one of the assessment appeals.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to their first amended complaint. They argue that sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend was an abuse of discretion, and that they have stated causes of action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Business and Professions Code section 17200. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the judgment.

Appellant Christopher Krueger was convicted of possessing drugs and paraphernalia the police found in his bedroom during a probation search for his former girlfriend. On appeal, he contends the contraband was unlawfully seized, and his admissions to the police were involuntarily rendered. The Attorney General disagrees with these claims and maintains appellant should not even be allowed to raise them because he did not renew his suppression motion in the trial court. While we reject the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument, we agree with her on the merits and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Christopher Krueger was convicted of possessing drugs and paraphernalia the police found in his bedroom during a probation search for his former girlfriend. On appeal, he contends the contraband was unlawfully seized, and his admissions to the police were involuntarily rendered. The Attorney General disagrees with these claims and maintains appellant should not even be allowed to raise them because he did not renew his suppression motion in the trial court. While we reject the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument, we agree with her on the merits and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Christopher Krueger was convicted of possessing drugs and paraphernalia the police found in his bedroom during a probation search for his former girlfriend. On appeal, he contends the contraband was unlawfully seized, and his admissions to the police were involuntarily rendered. The Attorney General disagrees with these claims and maintains appellant should not even be allowed to raise them because he did not renew his suppression motion in the trial court. While we reject the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument, we agree with her on the merits and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Christopher Krueger was convicted of possessing drugs and paraphernalia the police found in his bedroom during a probation search for his former girlfriend. On appeal, he contends the contraband was unlawfully seized, and his admissions to the police were involuntarily rendered. The Attorney General disagrees with these claims and maintains appellant should not even be allowed to raise them because he did not renew his suppression motion in the trial court. While we reject the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument, we agree with her on the merits and affirm the judgment.

Appellants Andre Ricardo Pierson and Dwight Ladale Stephen stand convicted of multiple counts of robbery. On appeal, they do not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions, nor do they dispute they were members of a criminal street gang when they committed their crimes. Instead, they maintain there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding they committed them for the benefit of or in association with their gang. They also contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to bifurcate the gang allegations, and their attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s description of those allegations in closing argument. Finding appellants’ arguments unpersuasive, we affirm the judgments against them.

Petitioner Rebecca D. Duke seeks writ relief based on her claim that real parties in interest Gregory Klis and David W. Lewis (real parties) committed conversion when they enforced a writ of execution against shares of stock Duke owned in Skinsation Medical Aesthetics, a Medical Group, Inc. (Skinsation). Duke and real parties were, individually, guarantors on a liability that gave rise to the judgment from which the writ of execution arose. Real parties contend they were legally entitled to take an assignment of the judgment and enforce the full amount of the debt against the principal obligor, Skinsation. According to real parties, this permitted them to levy Duke’s shares of stock in Skinsation. The trial court sustained real parties’ demurrer without leave to amend as to Duke’s cause of action for conversion.

Praneel Nand (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of child endangerment under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury or death (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a); count I), infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count II), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count III), threatening to commit a crime (§ 422; count IV), false imprisonment (§ 236; counts V-VII), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count VIII), and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count IX). Following a court trial, he was found to have been convicted, pursuant to section 273.5, subdivision (f), of two domestic-violence-related offenses within seven years of the current offenses.

Defendant Allen E. Howell was charged under Penal Code sections 288a, 288 and 288.5 with three counts of child molestation involving the same victim. The jury convicted defendant of lewd and lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)) (count 2) and continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) (count 3). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of oral copulation of a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)) (count 1) and that count was dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of 12 years on count 3 and, relying on section 667.6, subdivision (c), the full middle term of six years on count 2, for a total determinate prison term of 18 years.