CA Unpub Decisions

A.C., a minor, appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a petition for felony shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246) and declared appellant a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The petition was sustained based on evidence that appellant fired three or four shots at the victim’s house. The trial court declared the maximum period confinement to be seven years, removed appellant from the physical custody of his parents, and committed appellant to the care and custody of the probation department for purposes of placement in a five-to-seven-month camp-community program. Appellant was awarded 33 days predisposition custody credit. On October 10, 2017, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.

Sara M. (mother) and Enrique G. (father) appeal from the findings and order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. In separately filed briefs, mother and father contend the court’s adoptability finding under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), was not supported by substantial evidence. Both parents further contend the court erred in finding inapplicable the parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.

On December 29, 2016, Judge Laura L. Laesecke issued a search warrant authorizing a search of defendant and appellant Manuel Magallanes, his residence, and vehicles under the control of occupants at defendant’s residence for evidence of the crimes of possessing and/or selling methamphetamine. The warrant application was substantiated by a sealed affidavit based on information from a confidential informant, which Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Barry Quill referenced; Deputy Quill asked that the trial court seal the affidavit pursuant to People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 (Hobbs).

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 342 subsequent petition, finding methamphetamine abuse by J.M. (father) placed his three-year-old daughter, R.M., at substantial risk of serious physical harm. Although the child had never resided in father’s home, the juvenile court also ordered that she not be placed in his custody. Father concedes his “own actions of dirty and missed tests quickly eliminated any possibility of custody;” nonetheless, he appeals, asserting there was no nexus between his illegal drug abuse and the risk of harm to his child. We affirm.

Pleasant Valley Cty Water Dist. v. Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency CA2/6
Pleasant Valley County Water District (PVCWD) appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court denied PVCWD’s writ petition and complaint to invalidate Fox Canyon Ordinance No. 8.8 which clarifies the rules for groundwater extraction surcharges. The trial court found that Ordinance No. 8.8 does not exceed Fox Canyon’s statutory lawmaking authority, that adoption of the ordinance is categorically exempt from California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and that Ordinance No. 8.8 does not violate the equal protection clause of the California constitution. We affirm.

Defendant Jessica Button challenges a trial court order denying her petition pursuant to Proposition 47. Button was convicted of three counts of theft of access card account information; she sought to have the convictions reduced to misdemeanors. The People concede reversal is warranted under People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Solomon Tesfamichael appeals the trial court’s order denying his special motion to strike PMB Stock Co., Inc.’s cross-complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16, subd. (i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13) [order denying an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable].) He contends: (1) the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) prevents PMB from showing a probability of success on its cross-complaint, and (2) PMB has neither stated nor substantiated a legally sufficient claim. We agree with his first contention, and reverse.

Douglas Brown contends the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his motion to withdraw his plea, and failed to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Brown’s motion to withdraw his plea. However, we find the trial court erred in failing to hold a Marsden hearing and conditionally reverse and remand for the trial court to do so.

The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over a child born in 2015. The child’s father asserts that this was improper because the court did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We conclude that the three errors father points out have either been cured or are irrelevant to the adequacy of the notice ICWA requires. Accordingly, we affirm.

A jury convicted Kazuya Onodera of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and two counts of false imprisonment by violence and found true the special allegation she had used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife, in committing the false imprisonment offenses. On appeal Onodera contends the court incompletely answered the jury’s question on assault during deliberation by referring it to the applicable jury instruction and her sentence violates the statutory proscription against multiple punishment in Penal Code section 654. We modify the sentence to strike the prior felony prison term enhancements unlawfully stayed by the trial court and affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant and appellant Narciso Ramirez raises an evidentiary issue following his conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter with firearm use and great bodily injury findings. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment is affirmed.

Isaiah Salvador Zepeda, through his guardian ad litem, sued the County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies Hugo Ramos and Joseph Manfree (collectively the County) for wrongful death/excessive force after the deputies shot and killed his father, Salvador Zepeda, Jr. In a special verdict in favor of the County, the jury found the deputies’ use of lethal force was not unreasonable under the circumstances. On appeal Isaiah contends the trial court made several erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary rulings and defense counsel committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument. We affirm.

Michael O’Neal, Sr. (petitioner) challenges his sentence as unlawful because the trial court purported to amend it by means of nunc pro tunc orders after orally pronouncing sentence on September 18, 2006.
We conclude the trial court erred when it purported to amend petitioner’s sentence through nunc pro tunc orders. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle for challenging an unauthorized sentence. (In re Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 394; In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412, 417; In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 931; see also In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 750.) We shall grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and direct the trial court on remand to: (1) vacate petitioner’s original September 18, 2006 sentence and any and all subsequent orders purporting to affect his sentence; (2) appoint counsel to represent petitioner

Elda Rocha drove her boyfriend Jherome Higuera, a gang member, to an apartment building where he opened fire on a group of teenagers, killing one of them and severely injuring another. Rocha waited for Higuera while he committed the crimes and drove him away after the shooting.
A jury convicted Rocha of one count of second degree murder and three counts of attempted murder. The jury also found true gang-related firearms allegations under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). Rocha argues that there was insufficient evidence she aided and abetted the crimes, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the gang-related firearm enhancements, and that her counsel was ineffective for failing to call a gang expert. She also argues the trial court erred in imposing a term of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), on each of the attempted murder convictions for the two individuals who did not sustain any injuries. We affirm.