CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Hari S. Lal and the Lal Law Firm (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from an order denying the Lal Law Firm’s petition to compel arbitration of claims asserted against defendant Anil V. Shah, M.D. Plaintiffs claim they are owed over $7 million in compensation for legal services rendered to Orange County Physician Investment Network, LLC (OCPIN), an entity for which Shah served as the sole managing agent. The petition to compel arbitration sought to enforce a binding arbitration provision contained in a professional services agreement, entered into by the Lal Law Firm and OCPIN, against Shah in his individual capacity.

Petitioner K.M. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(1)) terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her now two-year-old son, Evan. She alleges error on the following grounds: (1) the court erred in finding she was provided reasonable reunification services; (2) the court applied the wrong standard in assessing the probability of return; and (3) the court was unaware it had discretion to continue services to the 12-month review hearing. We deny the petition.

Gabriel A. (father) and Diana D. (mother) appeal from the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 orders, issued on March 20, 2017, terminating their parental rights to their child E.D., born in 2015. In this case, the juvenile court and Tulare County Health and Human Services (agency) had sufficient information to trigger the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. and California law implementing ICWA. Father and mother’s only challenge on appeal is that the department sent inadequate notice to comply with the law, as it did not include all relevant Indian tribes. We disagree and affirm.

M.V. (mother), appeals from the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 order, issued on March 15, 2017, terminating her parental rights to her children, R.J., born in 2012, and S.J., born in 2014. Mother’s only challenge on appeal is that the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). The error is alleged to have occurred during the jurisdiction and disposition phase of this case, which was concluded in September of 2015. Under California law, mother is permitted to raise this challenge now, despite not having raised the issue in an appeal from the disposition order at the time. (See In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 6.) We affirm.

Appellant Corey Jason Wulf stands convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, felony vandalism, and two counts of misdemeanor driving under the influence. In addition, he admitted a prior strike allegation. On appeal, Wulf contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to suspend criminal proceedings and order a competency trial pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369. We affirm.

On July 27, 2015, a jury found defendant Edwin Quintanilla guilty as follows: count 1, driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a); count 2, driving under the influence with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more and causing bodily injury in violation of section 23153, subdivision (b); and count 3, an infraction for making an unsafe turn. The jury also found defendant guilty of inflicting great bodily injury to Yesenia Rivera pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and causing great bodily injury to more than one person, Maria Del Carmen Contreras, pursuant to section 23558, as to counts 1 and 2. On September 24, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of 16 months for count 1, enhanced by three years pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and one year pursuant to section 23558.

Appellant Rayna Marie Flores appeals her conviction on one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246) , with the special allegation that the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Prior to sentencing, appellant admitted to having one prior strike pursuant to sections 667 and 1170.12. In this appeal, appellant argues we must reverse the gang enhancement and her underlying conviction due to the improper admission of evidence regarding her status as a gang member. In particular, appellant contends the court improperly admitted statements she made during booking which violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and opinion testimony regarding her and her companion’s gang status based on testimonial hearsay that violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront witness

Defendant and appellant Edward Lee Lizarde was charged by felony complaint with infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (f)(1), count 1) and making criminal threats (§ 422, count 2). It was also alleged that he had served five prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The prosecutor subsequently made an oral motion to file an amended complaint to add the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim in the commission of count 1. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 1 and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement. The court dismissed the remaining allegations on the People’s motion. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison on count 1, plus a consecutive four years on the enhancement, for a total sentence of nine years. The court awarded 32 days of presentence custody credits.

Defendant and appellant W.B. (Mother) has a history with child protective services, abusing controlled substances, and untreated mental health issues. As a result, Mother’s four children were removed from her care and custody, including her youngest daughter, six-year-old Q.G., who is the subject of this appeal. On appeal, Mother argues the juvenile court erred in: (1) failing to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v); (2) failing to properly assess the maternal grandmother for Q.G.’s placement; and (3) finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480 et seq.) did not apply because there was insufficient proof the relevant tribes were properly noticed.

Defendant and appellant, Christopher Allen McQuary, filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, which the court denied. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his petition. We affirm.
On October 30, 2003, the People charged defendant by felony complaint with check forgery in the amount of $1,476.58 (count 1; § 470, subd. (d)) and burglary (count 2; § 459). The People additionally alleged defendant had suffered a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) On June 7, 2004, defendant pled guilty to the count 1 offense. As provided in the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to 16 months of imprisonment and dismissed the remaining count and allegation.

Defendant and appellant Cudberto Macias attacked a stranger and his date as they were walking down a street. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) as alleged in count 2. The jury also found true defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant thereafter waived his constitutional rights and admitted he had suffered one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) based on a prior 2002 conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 12 years in state prison with 753 days’ credit for time served as follows: the upper term of four years for the assault conviction, doubled to eight years due to the prior strike, plus the upper term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, plus one ye

Objector and appellant, John Mittelman, former counsel of record for plaintiff, Robert P. Hershowitz, appeals from the judgment dismissing this medical malpractice action. Mittelman challenges, on several grounds, the court’s prejudgment order of November 2, 2015, imposing $3,016 in sanctions against Mittelman for filing this action (the Joseph action), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. (§ 904.1, subd. (b) [sanctions orders of $5,000 or less may be reviewed on appeal from judgment in main action].) No respondents’ brief has been filed. We affirm the order imposing the monetary sanctions.

Defendant Sidney Lee Robinson, who represented himself at trial, appeals from his convictions for theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)) and second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Defendant contends: (1) He was deprived of reasonable access to the jail law library during his trial, in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) the prosecution failed to comply with its duty under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by not dismissing his burglary conviction under Proposition 47, which went into effect after defendant was convicted but before he was sentenced. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Mark Anthony Dean, of three charges from a six-count information. In counts 3 and 4, the jury found defendant guilty of the forcible rape and forcible oral copulation of Jane Doe, as charged on January 7, 2013. (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A).) The jury also found true “One Strike” law (§ 667.61) allegations that defendant committed counts 3 and 4 during the commission of a residential burglary (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c)(1), (7), (d)(4)). In count 5, the jury convicted defendant of committing indecent exposure, as charged on December 24, 2012, and found defendant had five prior indecent exposure convictions. (§ 314, cl. 1.) Defendant was sentenced to 33 years eight months to life in prison: 25 years to life on count 3, plus eight years on count 4, plus eight months on count 5.