CA Unpub Decisions

In 2006, defendant Gregoria G. Castillo (Gregoria), as trustee of her separate property trust, owned certain real property (the property) that was then encumbered by an existing first mortgage. Gregoria applied to Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (WAMU), the predecessor in interest to respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), for two loans (a $247,000 refinance loan and a $261,500 home equity line of credit), part of which was to be used to pay off the existing first mortgage. The new WAMU loans were to be secured by the first and second trust deeds, respectively, encumbering the property.

In this case a judgment creditor timely filed an application to extend the enforceability of his judgment under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.110 et seq.; the judgment debtor moved to vacate the extension under section 683.170, and the trial court denied his motion.
We affirm. The judgment debtor did not establish any grounds for denying enforcement of the judgment within the meaning of section 683.170, and hence the trial court did not err in denying his motion. In particular, the judgment debtor failed to show the judgment creditor was the party to any subsequent settlement, which discharged the judgment. The fact that the amount of the extended judgment was smaller than what he owed did not prejudice the judgment debtor. We also reject the judgment debtor's claim that extension of the judgment was barred by the doctrine of laches.

A jury convicted Abdiel Suarez of one count of simple assault as a lesser offense of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. Suarez was also convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.
At sentencing, the trial court reduced count 4 to a misdemeanor. Suarez was placed on summary probation.
Suarez appeals contending his convictions for counts 3 and 4 violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. He contends count 3 is a lesser included offense of count 4. As we will explain, count 3 involves an assault by Suarez in which he kicked the victim. Count 4 involves a separate assault by another person on the same victim using a baton. Although the counts involve the same conduct by Suarez, they are separate offenses involving two different assaults. The conduct produced two separate crimes, although multiple punishments could not be imposed in light of section section 654. Accordingly, we will reject Suarez's contentions and affirm the j

Appellant C.B., father of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant argues that the orders must be reversed and remanded because the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) did not comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.). The Department conceded the ICWA error and need for conditional reversal. We agree.

Appointed counsel for defendant John Matthew Francis, filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment.

A.A. (mother) appeals from the findings and orders made by the juvenile court at the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing concerning her minor child M.H. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (Unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother further contends the juvenile court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the minor because father was adequately caring for him and there was no need for the juvenile court to continue to supervise him. We affirm the judgment (orders).

A jury found defendant Christopher Ruel Brillon guilty of stalking, making a criminal threat, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations he had a prior conviction for stalking and had served a prior prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends his conviction for making a criminal threat must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. He further contends his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be reversed because of improper venue. Anticipating that he may have forfeited his claims, defendant alternatively argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Jeremy Squires obtained a three-year domestic violence restraining order against his former wife, appellant Deana Squires, while they were embroiled in a contentious divorce. Because the parties share the same surname, we will refer to them by their first names. Deana did not appeal or otherwise challenge the order. A few months before the restraining order expired, Jeremy filed a request to renew the order. Deana opposed the renewal, arguing for the first time that the original restraining order was invalid. The court found sufficient evidence to renew the restraining order for five years. On appeal, Deana contends that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the original restraining order and abused its discretion in renewing what she characterizes as a void order. Because Deana’s time to challenge the original restraining order has long since passed and substantial evidence supports the renewed restraining order, we affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Anthony Raymond Randle has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Michael Allen Johnson appeals from a trial court order finding him ineligible for Proposition 47 resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (i) (hereafter, § 1170.18(i); unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code), which renders ineligible for resentencing persons with a prior conviction for murder. (§ 1170.18(i) [statute inapplicable to person with one or more prior conviction(s) for offense specified in § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), which includes murder].) Defendant, an adult, contends the trial court erred in counting his prior juvenile adjudication for a 1992 murder (§ 187), committed when he was 17 years old, as a prior “conviction” disqualifying him from resentencing. We granted his request for judicial notice of voter information guides and legislative history of Proposition 47 and statutes addressing juvenile adjudications.

D.Q. (mother) filed a petition seeking review by extraordinary writ of a juvenile court order setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and to select a permanent plan for her son, E.H. Mother contends (1) E.H. should have been returned to her care at a contested 12-month review hearing, and (2) she was not provided with reasonable reunification services. We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that mother received reasonable reunification services and that returning E.H. to mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety. We deny her petition.

In September 2016, we affirmed Agustin Perez’s (defendant’s) multiple convictions, but identified several sentencing errors to be corrected on remand. Defendant complains that the trial court, during resentencing, did not correct the errors we previously identified. The People agree. Accordingly, we remand for sentencing.

Michael Smith (defendant) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act) (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). We conclude there was no reversible error, and affirm.

A jury convicted Mario Dumas (defendant) of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and other crimes after he punched, kicked, and used a tire iron to attack a woman. Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the injuries he inflicted upon the woman were not sufficiently severe to support a conviction for mayhem. We disagree, and affirm.