CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Juan Jose Sevilla of felony child abuse/endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a), count 1), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b), count 2), and negligent storage of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 25100, subd. (c), count 3). A trial court sentenced him to four years in state prison, but suspended execution of the sentence and placed him on probation for four years, under specified terms.
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on counts 1 and 3. We disagree and affirm.

In August 2016, while intoxicated on methamphetamine, Ut Van Nguyen tackled 72-year-old Carlos V. from behind, knocking Carlos to the ground and then falling on top of him. A jury convicted Nguyen of elder abuse in circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1), count 1) and simple assault. (§ 240, count 3.) Nguyen received a three-year prison term for the elder abuse conviction. The court also imposed 180 days in custody for the assault conviction. The parties did not object to the sentence. Nguyen argues, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court should have stayed his sentence on the assault count under section 654 because it was based on the same conduct as his conviction for elder abuse. We agree.

Gregory Larson pled guilty to burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Larson was sentenced to prison for the midterm of four years. During sentencing, the court imposed a drug program fee of $615 and a laboratory analysis fee of $205. Larson was also ordered to "stay away from" and not to visit the victims, C.N. and her son.
On appeal, Larson contends (1) the court was not authorized to impose a no contact order, (2) the court was not authorized to add penalty assessments to the laboratory analysis and drug program fees, and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to state the basis for each fine, fee, and penalty assessment. Respondent agrees the no contact order should be stricken and the abstract of judgment should be corrected to show the basis for the fees. We affirm and remand to modify the abstract of judgment and strike the no contact order. In doing so, we conclude Larson's challenge to the penalty assessment fees is without merit.

A jury convicted Mohammed Raad Agab of the first-degree murder of his mother and the deliberate and premeditated attempted murder of his half-brother (brother). The jury sustained allegations Agab personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon—a knife—to commit the crimes, and inflicted great bodily injury on his brother. The court sentenced Agab to a total prison term of 26 years to life.
Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). After having independently reviewed the entire record for error, as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

Maryann Jolin appeals a judgment after a court trial approving in part and denying in part an amended accounting of a temporary conservatorship. Jolin challenges the court's imposition of a surcharge against her of $9,857.19 for failing to comply with a court order, commingling conservatorship assets with other funds, and failing to properly account for the assets of the conservatorship estate. Jolin contends the court erred in imposing the surcharge because there was no breach resulting in loss to the conservatee's estate and there was no basis for ordering payment as directed by the court. Jolin also contends the court exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion in awarding costs to Marcia Zedalis Maire, who is Jolin's sister, because it did not find Jolin opposed Maire's objections to the accounting without reasonable cause and in bad faith as required by Probate Code section 2622.5.

Richard Phillips (Father) petitioned for $12,000 in monthly child support from his former wife, Jennifer Phillips (Mother). After an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered Mother to pay $416 in monthly child support.
On appeal, Father challenges the support amount. Father contends the court erred by: (1) failing to calculate Mother's income based on the entire monthly cash amount she receives from her parents (Maternal Grandparents), rather than only a portion of that amount; and (2) declining to find special circumstances supported an upward deviation from the statutory guidelines. We reject these contentions and affirm.

In the lawsuit underlying this appeal, attorney John A. Delisi filed a complaint against his former client, Allan Wagner, for breach of contract and a common count for services rendered. Delisi sought attorney fees and costs allegedly due from a retention in which Delisi represented Wagner in his contested dissolution of marriage proceedings (Dissolution Action) with his former wife, Yoshie Wagner (Yoshie). In a third amended cross-complaint (TAC C), Wagner named as cross-defendants Delisi and Brandon Smith, who had been Yoshie's attorney in the Dissolution Action. Wagner alleged causes of action against Delisi for breach of contract and negligence and against Delisi and Smith for "misconduct, willful concealment," "abuse of attorney-client fiduciary relationship," "violations of rules of court, duties," and "collusion with opposing counsel."

Daedalus Property Management, Inc. (Daedalus) appeals from a judgment against it after a bench trial in its lawsuit against Pensco Services, LLC, FBO Robert L. Earl IRA (Pensco) in which Daedalus sought to cancel a deed of trust held by beneficiary Pensco as a result of a loan that was secured by real property currently owned by Daedalus and that was obtained by Daniel Rivas on behalf of Daedalus's predecessor corporation, Costa Casa Property Management, Inc. (Costa Casa). According to Daedalus, the evidence presented at trial established that Rivas lacked authority to obtain the loan and encumber real property on behalf of Costa Casa. We conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that Rivas had ostensible authority to bind Costa Casa to the loan and the deed of trust, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

Petitioner the Attorney General of the State of California seeks a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its order requiring that he rescind the circulating title and summary he prepared for a proposed 2018 ballot initiative measure to repeal portions of Senate Bill 1, the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017, and replace it with the title and summary approved by the court. Respondent court ruled the circulating materials prepared by the Attorney General are confusing, misleading, and likely to create prejudice against the proposed measure.After the Attorney General filed his writ petition in this court, and initial opposition was filed by the real party in interest Travis Allen, we issued an order to preserve our jurisdiction, staying respondent court’s ruling and any proceedings thereon, pending further order of this court.

A CVS clerk sold a can of Coors Light to a minor decoy working for the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (the Department). The sole issue in these writ proceedings is whether the minor made a face-to-face identification of the seller as required by California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 141 (hereafter Rule 141), subdivision (b)(5). The Department suspended Garfield Beach CVS, LLC and Longs Drug Stores California, LLC doing business as CVS Pharmacy Store 9376 (CVS)’s liquor license for 10 days, but CVS appealed and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (the Appeals Board) reversed, finding that an in-store identification of the clerk to the peace officer from about 10 feet away did not constitute a face-to-face identification. We disagree and annul the decision of the Appeals Board.

Defendant Michael Mann appeals from his convictions of sexually abusing a minor. He contends prejudicial error occurred in his trial because (1) the trial court refused to allow him to represent himself; (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; (3) the court refused to allow him to cross-examine the expert witness on interrogation techniques used in a different child sex abuse case; (4) the court refused to allow him to impeach the testifying victim; (5) prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) cumulative error. We reject each of defendant’s contentions except we find one incident of misconduct occurred. However, the misconduct was not prejudicial. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

In October 2000, appellant Keith Bryant Tribble was charged with two carjackings (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)), one occurring April 10, 2000 and one occurring April 14, 2000. He also was charged with kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§ 211) in connection with the April 10 carjacking, and assault with a deadly weapon (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)) in connection with the April 14 carjacking. It was further alleged that appellant personally used a handgun within the meaning of sections 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.53, subdivision (b), in connection with the April 10 crimes, and that appellant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions or juvenile adjudications for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law. (§ 667, subd. (b)-(i) & § 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).)

M.R. (Father) appeals orders of the juvenile court declaring that his minor children M.A.R. and H.M.R. are adoptable, and terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) We conclude that the court properly determined that the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption does not apply, and affirm. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

Melanie N. appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to six-year-old Savanna N. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the court violated due process by proceeding with the termination hearing in her absence because the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to exercise due diligence to locate her and failed to serve notice on the grandparents (§ 294, subd. (f)(7)(A)). We conclude, even assuming error, that on this record Melanie has not and cannot demonstrate prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating her parental rights.