CA Unpub Decisions

Tyson S. Sorci (Father) appeals from an order confirming the registration of an Italian child and spousal support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (former Fam. Code, § 4900 et seq.). Under UIFSA, a support order of a foreign country may be registered for enforcement in California if the foreign country “has enacted a law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under [UIFSA].” (§ 4901, subd. (s)(2); § 4951, subd. (a).) On appeal, Father contends that the trial court (1) “misallocated to Father the burden of proving that Italy is not a state under UIFSA,” (2) “improperly deprived Father of an evidentiary hearing to refute the notion that Italy is such a state,” (3) “erroneously refused to render a statement of decision,” and (4) “erred as a matter of law in concluding that Italy is a state under UIFSA.”

On October 3, 2016, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition for revocation of defendant and appellant Rontae Dunn’s parole (the petition). (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).) The petition alleged four parole violations: criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); violations 1 & 3), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a); violation 2), and battery (§ 242, subd. (a); violation 4).On October 6, 2016, defendant filed a demurrer and motion for sanctions, arguing in each that the petition violated his right to equal protection because revocation petitions filed by the district attorney’s office are subject to different requirements than petitions filed by parole supervising agencies. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion for sanctions.

This action is between two groups of the Elem Indian Colony Pomo Tribe (the Tribe), the “Brown faction” (plaintiffs) and the “Garcia Council” (defendants). Plaintiffs sued the Garcia Council over allegedly defamatory statements published in a notification that warned they would be disenrolled if the Tribe’s General Council found them guilty of specified crimes. The trial court ruled the lawsuit was barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

This is an appeal in a juvenile dependency matter involving minor H.G.R. Minor’s step-father, F.G., challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s order of December 1, 2016, permanently restraining him from contact with minor. We affirm.

After a jury trial, defendant Dimitri Clark was convicted of the felony offense of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 ) and the misdemeanor offense of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years, with the condition that he serve one year in county jail that had been served by the date of sentencing. Defendant contends the judgment should be reversed, alleging prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. Having considered defendant’s contention in light of the record before us, we affirm the judgment for the reasons explained below.

defendant Joshua Neil Harrell was convicted of second degree commercial burglary and forgery arising out of an incident at Wells Fargo in March of 2014 (Solano County Superior Court Case No. FCR306522) (hereafter the Wells Fargo matter). He was also convicted of receiving stolen property and identifying information theft with a prior arising out of a separate incident in April of 2014 (Solano County Superior Court Case No. FCR308925) (hereafter the receiving stolen property/identity theft matter). The jury also found several related enhancement allegations to be true. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of five years eight months in state prison.
Defendant timely appeals, raising issues relating to representation of counsel and issues concerning the application of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that none of the issues has merit and, accordingly, affirm.

During deliberations on various charges, including first degree murder, the jurors were called into the courtroom to be excused for the day. Since the judge who had presided over trial had an appointment, another judge was tasked with excusing the jurors that day. A juror asked the judge what the difference was between first and second-degree murder. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel was present. Without counsel’s input or presence, the judge gave a vague though arguably correct instruction, and referred the jurors to their instruction packet. The judge’s ex parte instruction to the jury violated defendant’s right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. The primary issue is whether this error was prejudicial.

On appeal, defendants contend (1) the action is barred by the statute of limitations, (2) there is no evidence supporting the judgment against Sima Moore (also known as Sima Tahmouressi), (3) the court erred in failing to apportion noneconomic damages, and (4) the $250,000 award of noneconomic damages is not supported by substantial evidence. With no reporter's transcript and no statement of decision, we are unable to meaningfully review these contentions. The record does not show defendants even raised a statute of limitations defense during trial. Nor does the record show either defendant asked the court to apportion noneconomic damages. Moreover, with no statement of decision, we must presume the trial court made all findings necessary to support the judgment for which there is substantial evidence. (LSREF2 Clover Property 4, LLC v. Festival Retail Fund 1, LP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1076.)

allegations were dismissed.
In October 2014, Santamaria was sentenced to a split term of three years, with two years to be served in local custody and one year in mandatory supervision.
In May 2015, Santamaria filed a petition under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18) requesting that his conviction for receiving stolen property be redesignated as a misdemeanor. Following briefing and a hearing the motion was denied.
Santamaria appealed contending the trial court erred in denying his petition. Although he conceded in the trial court that the burden of proof as to the value of the stolen items was on him, he now contended the burden of proof was on the prosecution. Santamaria also argued that the only material which can be considered in ruling on a petition such as this is the record of conviction. We rejected Santamaria's contention and affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition for resentencing.

After her motion to suppress was denied, defendant Karen Sue Takerian entered a negotiated plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (count III) and the remaining felony charges of possession of methamphetamine for sale (count I) and transportation of methamphetamine for sale (count II) were dismissed. The court imposed a 280-day county jail term but stayed execution of sentence pending appeal. suppress. She argues none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied nor did the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We affirm the judgment.

After his motions to traverse the search warrants and suppress the evidence and to reconsider were denied, defendant Kevin Christopher Peel entered a negotiated plea of no contest to six counts of grand theft and admitted the allegation of aggravated white collar crime over $100,000 in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to certain terms and conditions including 240 days in jail with 12 days credit.Defendant now contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to traverse the search warrant without a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2d 667] (Franks).

A series of robberies at Auto Zone and O’Reilly Auto Parts stores led to the death of one employee and the arrest of defendant Michael Eugene Addson. An amended information charged defendant with felony murder (count one); attempted second degree robbery (count two); possession of firearm by a felon (counts three, five, eight & eleven); and armed second degree robbery (counts four, six, seven, nine & ten). Defendant entered a plea of no contest on several counts; a jury found defendant guilty on the remaining counts. The court sentenced defendant to life without possibility of parole plus 25 years to life, plus 35 years. Defendant appeals, arguing instructional error, the court erred in not declaring a mistrial, sentencing error, and the abstract of judgment should be amended. We shall direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment. In all other respects we shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Bobbie Lee Houston was charged by amended information with one count of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)). It was also alleged that he suffered two prior strikes, had served two prison terms, and had two serious felony convictions (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 667, subd. (a)(1), 1170.12). He was convicted by jury of the carjacking count, and admitted the special allegations.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike one of his strike convictions. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 23 years in prison, consisting of the high term for carjacking, doubled because of the strike prior, plus five years for his serious felony conviction.

Defendant and appellant Charles Louis Labeaux (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction of crimes including pimping, pandering, and making a criminal threat. In his assignments of error, defendant contends: conviction on a theory not alleged in the operative information is without notice and resulted in a denial of due process; substantial evidence did not support the conviction of pandering in count 2; the jury instruction regarding pandering contained inapplicable information; the trial court erred in admitting certain telephone call evidence; the trial court erred in failing to give a proper jury instruction regarding accomplices; the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that battery is a lesser included offence of felony child abuse; the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that misdemeanor child abuse is a lesser included offense of felony child abuse;