CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Joseph Salazar of the second degree murder of Sergio Guzman, and found true that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing death and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d), & 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) He was 16 years old at the time of the crime, but 22 years old at the time of trial and sentencing. The trial court sentenced him to 40 years to life in state prison. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting two recordings, made while appellant was in custody awaiting trial, in which he expressed a willingness to plead guilty to a determinate term to avoid a life sentence; (2) conditioning the admissibility of excluding expert testimony on why innocent defendants consider pleading guilty on appellant taking the stand: and (3) refusing to instruct the jury on third-party culpability.

In April 2016, defendant and appellant Felipe Medina was tried and adjudged a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.; hereafter the Act). He was committed to Coalinga State Hospital (Coalinga) for an indefinite term in accordance with the Act.
Defendant challenges his commitment as an SVP and contends the trial court erred in allowing the People to present, through its expert witnesses, hearsay evidence which he contends was inadmissible under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).
We affirm.

Appellants Hutchinson Aerospace & Industry, Inc., and employee Marie Dhaine (together Hutchinson) appeal after the trial court denied their motion to compel arbitration of employment-related claims brought by former employees Miguel Diaz and Jose Martinez. The court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement because it was unconscionable. We affirm.

Defendant Julius Darnell Harris appeals his conviction for first degree murder and true findings regarding firearm and gang allegations; defendant Michael Dunn appeals his conviction for second degree murder and true findings regarding firearm and gang allegations.
Harris contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense and heat-of-passion. Harris also contends his lawyer was ineffective by failing to request that the jury be instructed on provocation to reduce the degree of murder.
We reverse on the imposition of multiple prison priors and find that Dunn is entitled to an additional day of credit; otherwise we hold that reversible error did not occur and affirm both judgments.

Defendants Security National Guaranty, Inc. (SNC) and its principal, Edmond Ghandour, appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff Evariste Group, LLC (Evariste), enjoining SNC from serving as manager of the parties’ resort development project. Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion because it misinterpreted the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU) in the course of finding Evariste is likely to prevail on the merits of its action and that it is favored with respect to the balance of harms. We find no merit to defendants’ arguments and affirm.

Father of A.B. and L.B., appeals from orders, filed April 29, 2016 (one as to each child), making jurisdictional and dispositional findings on a consolidated Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition filed by respondent Sonoma County Human Services Department (the agency). He raises two issues: (1) the court failed to advise him of his rights to contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, and failed to make findings of a knowing waiver of those rights; and (2) the court and the agency failed in their respective duties to consider the children’s paternal aunt as a possible placement for the children. In Case No. A150487, father appeals from orders, filed December 2, 2016 (one as to each child), which, among other things, denied father visitation as being detrimental to the children. The agency opposes both appeals and has filed motions to dismiss on the ground that these appeals have been rendered moot by later orders.

Defendant Glen Hollis Shafer appeals from the trial court’s order sentencing him to a maximum prison term after he violated his probation for the fifth time. He argues the trial court erred when it imposed this maximum term without deducting 88 days he previously spent in custody after his fourth probation violation. As a condition to the reinstatement of probation after this fourth violation, defendant waived his credits for this time in custody “for all purposes.” He now argues that regardless of his prior waiver, the trial court’s failure to deduct these 88 days from his total sentence resulted in its imposition of a sentence that was beyond the maximum allowed by law and exceeded the court’s jurisdiction. We conclude the trial court properly imposed the maximum sentence on defendant without deducting his 88 days in custody, which he previously waived as a legitimate condition of probation. Therefore, we affirm.

This case comes before us for review under the procedures prescribed in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442 (Wende). Qadirah Bey (Qadirah) appeals from her convictions by no contest pleas of one count of conspiracy (Pen. Code, § 182), eight counts of filing false instruments (§ 115), three counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), one count of failing to make unemployment insurance contributions (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2108), one count of failing to make disability insurance contributions (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2110.3), one count of willfully failing to withhold unemployment insurance contributions from employee remuneration (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2110.5), three counts of failing to file a tax return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706), and two counts of insurance fraud. (§ 550, subd. (a)(1)), with enhancements based on the amounts of the losses. We find no meritorious issues and affirm.

Appellant Marivic Martin Aliga was convicted by jury verdict of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possession of a billy (Pen. Code, § 22210), and misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1) following execution of a search warrant at her parents’ home, where she stayed in a bedroom in the garage. The sheriff’s deputies and police officers who executed the warrant discovered 6.78 grams of methamphetamine in two plastic baggies in Aliga’s bra. They also discovered approximately 28.6 grams of methamphetamine in three separate baggies in Aliga’s bedroom. Aliga denied selling drugs. We have reviewed the record and conclude that no meritorious issues exist, and we therefore affirm the conviction.

Appellant Robert Bamber argues the trial court improperly denied his petition for resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act. Bamber contends the trial court must apply the standard for dangerousness articulated in Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. After the parties’ briefs were submitted, our Supreme Court decided People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 (Valencia), which held that Proposition 47’s definition of unreasonable risk of danger to public safety does not apply to resentencing under Proposition 36.
Under the less restrictive definition in Proposition 36, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bamber’s petition because he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We affirm.

Michael E. Boyd appeals from an order denying his ex parte application for an order staying the printing of ballot materials prepared for the November 2016 local election in the respondent jurisdictions, the City of Santa Cruz (City) and the County of Santa Cruz (County). We conclude that the relief appellant seeks, the issuance of a peremptory writ enjoining the cannabis business tax and sales and use tax operative in these jurisdictions, is unavailable to appellant in these procedural circumstances. Consequently, we must dismiss the appeal.

Defendant Anthony Robert Mizner appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing of his conviction for possession of methamphetamine (Health and Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) as a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18. Defendant was sentenced as a third strike offender to a prison term of 27 years to life, which consisted of a 25-year to life term imposed under the Three Strikes law plus two years for prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof on him and that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that resentencing him posed an unreasonable risk of danger that he would commit a homicide. We find no error or abuse of discretion and affirm the order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing.

Defendant Johnny Lee Hicks, after having been previously convicted of attempted second degree robbery, was released from prison on parole in March 2015. In a hearing on September 29, 2015, he admitted that he had violated the terms of his parole, and the court sentenced him to 10 days in jail with credit for 10 days served. The judge ordered defendant upon his release from custody to report immediately to the Salinas Parole Office and to participate in an outpatient drug treatment program. He failed to do so, and additional parole violation proceedings were instituted. On October 29, 2015, the court found after a contested hearing that defendant had willfully violated the terms of his parole by failing to report to the parole office, and it ordered him to serve 90 days in jail, with 23 days credit for time served. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in finding the parole violation.

In a 1998 marital settlement agreement, Jonathan Schafer (Father) promised to pay Jennifer Kay Weltlich (now Blomquist; “Mother”) monthly support of $1,599 for their first child. Mother now appeals from a court order establishing the support arrearage owed by Father for that child. On appeal, Mother, in pro. per., asks this court to order a wide range of relief on issues not determined by or even presented to the trial court. She also disputes two of the trial court’s determinations: (1) Father did not owe her child support payments for 24 months between 1999 and 2001 because he was then supporting the family during reconciliation attempts; and (2) almost all Father’s payments to Mother were credited as support for their first child, and not as support for their second child or as repayments of an alleged loan from Mother to Father. Because Mother has identified no prejudicial error, we will affirm the court’s orders.