CA Unpub Decisions

Mother, R.M., and father J.B., lost custody of their children when police responded to an incident between mother and the boyfriend of mother’s adult daughter. San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) responded and found the conditions of the home filthy and unsanitary. Mother and father worked on their case plan, and for a short time the children were returned to her custody, except for C.B., whose needs were greater due to developmental delays and chronic MRSA infection. The permanent plan for most of the children was legal guardianship, but CFS recommended adoption for C.B. because mother never achieved the ability to properly supervise and monitor him. At a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26, parental rights were terminated and both parents appealed.

Appointed counsel for defendant Brandon Owen Yates asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel’s brief includes defendant’s personal request that we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reinstate probation. We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no further communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

As relevant to this petition, defendant and real party in interest Hossain Sahlolbei (Dr. Sahlolbei) was charged with violating Government Code section 1090, which generally prohibits acts constituting a conflict of interest on the part of ‘[m]embers of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees . . . .” The trial court followed People v. Christiansen (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1181 (Christiansen), which held that independent contractors cannot be held criminally liable under section 1090, and dismissed the charge (one of two pending against Dr. Sahlolbei). The People sought review, and this court affirmed the trial court in a split decision, the majority also relying on Christiansen. The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, disapproving Christiansen to the extent it is inconsistent with a finding that an independent contractor can be held criminally liable under section 1090.

On October 2, 2013, appellant Meghan Elizabeth Keagy pled guilty to one count of violating Penal Code section 459, second degree commercial burglary, and one count of violating section 1320, subdivision (b), failure to appear. At the time of her plea, both offenses were felonies. On February 23, 2016, the superior court granted Keagy’s petition to reduce the burglary conviction to a misdemeanor, but denied her oral motion to reduce the section 1320 offense to a misdemeanor. Keagy appeals the denial of her motion to reduce the section 1320 offense to a misdemeanor. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Aldo Fidel Casas Escobedo of 11 counts of lewd acts with a child under age 14 (counts 1-5, 9-14; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), three counts of lewd acts with a child under age 16 (counts 15-17; § 288, subd. (c)(1)), and three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a child under 16 (counts 18-20; § 261.5, subd. (d)). The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 34 years.
On appeal, Escobedo argues that the judgment on counts 18 through 20 must be reversed, because prosecution of those offenses is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Eyner Armando Alamilla was convicted of unlawful infliction of injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), but acquitted of false imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 236.) The trial court sentenced him to state prison for three years, but suspended execution of the sentence in favor of formal probation for a period of 36 months. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction. We disagree and affirm.

Allen Lyons pleaded guilty to felony indecent exposure, and admitted a prior felony indecent exposure offense. The probation department prepared a report showing Lyons has a lengthy criminal history, is at moderate-to-high risk of committing another sexual offense, and has been repeatedly unsuccessful while on probation. With the prosecution's agreement, the court nonetheless granted Lyons three years' formal probation on the condition that he comply with numerous requirements to ensure he will be appropriately supervised and monitored.

This case arose out of a fall John Sanders suffered one day in February 2013 at the Pine Creek Shopping Center in Grass Valley (hereafter, the shopping center) as he descended a stairway with a bag of food from the Wonderful III Chinese Restaurant. Sanders sued the restaurant (operated by Sinh Do, also known as Wilson Do) and two entities associated with the shopping center, PK II Pinecreek, L.P. (Pinecreek) and Kimco Realty Corporation (Kimco). In turn, the Pinecreek defendants filed a cross-complaint against Do for declaratory relief, express indemnity, contribution, equitable indemnity, and apportionment.

Paul A. Sanchez appeals an order determining him to be an mentally disordered offender (MDO) and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals for involuntary treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) We conclude that Sanchez’s underlying offense, indecent exposure following unlawful entry into a residence, is a qualifying MDO offense and affirm. (§§ 314, subd. 1, 2962, subds. (e)(2)(P) & (Q), (f).)

A jury convicted John Tayanita Norris of two counts of oral copulation on a child age 10 years or younger. (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 15 years to life in state prison. Norris contends: (1) his conviction on count 2 should be reversed because of insufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of that offense, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting the corpus delicti rules to jurors, (3) CALCRIM No. 1128 is overly broad because it does not instruct the jury on a sexual intent element, and (4) his sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment. We reverse Norris’s conviction on count 2, and otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant Joseph Smith (defendant) appeals from his attempted murder conviction. He contends that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that the trial court erred in granting his motion for self-representation after the verdict. We find no merit to defendant’s contentions, and affirm the judgment.

In a five-count information, defendant was charged with two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder in violation of Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), and 664 (counts 1 and 2); two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (counts 3 and 4); and possession of an assault weapon in violation of section 30605, subdivision (a) (count 5). The information alleged as to counts 1 and 2 that defendant personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm in the commission of the offenses, causing great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). Pursuant to 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), it was alleged as to all counts that the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. The information further alleged that defendant suffered two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b)

Appellant Jesse James Palato appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury for annoying or molesting a child (count 3), contacting a minor to commit a lewd act (count 4), and attempting to arrange a meeting with a minor for a lewd purpose (count 7). These charges arose from appellant’s communications with two young boys via the Facebook social media application: count 3 involved 11-year-old victim F.H., while counts 4 and 7 involved 13-year-old victim A.M. At trial, evidence was admitted that appellant engaged in similar Facebook communications with the mother of a third boy, eight-year-old D.R., believing that appellant was communicating with D.R.

Philip O. (Father), father of D.F. (Child) appeals from an order following a six-month status review hearing (Order) conducted under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e). He contends that the juvenile court erred in two respects: (1) terminating his reunification services; and (2) ruling that further notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) was not required. Because the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, the petitioner in the juvenile court and a party with "an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child" in a dependency proceeding— acknowledges that the ICWA notices were deficient and stipulates for a limited remand to determine the sufficiency of updated ICWA notice, we will reverse that part of the Order.