CA Unpub Decisions

Leroy C. (Father) challenges a juvenile court order asserting dependency jurisdiction over his daughter, S.T.-C. Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that S.T.-C. was suffering, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c). We affirm the juvenile court order.

N.H. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that her children, E.H. (born March 2010) and B.H. (born July 2012) were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to Mother’s substance abuse. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain the court’s finding and therefore affirm.

Ardas (Alex) Yanik (Alex) and Anna Topuzoglu Yanik (Anna) (appellants) appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by respondents Sunrise Financial, LLC, William Mahanian, Mehrdad Ebrahimpour, David Ebrahimpour, Jacklin Ebrahimpour, Pars, Inc. and CBS Auto Body Shop, Inc. (collectively respondents). Appellants have failed to show error, therefore we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Sheron Doll challenges the order denying her motions for prejudgment and appellate attorney fees against her former landlord, Mahin Ghaffari, and her daughter, Fariba Ghaffari (jointly, Ghaffari). Finding no error, we affirm

Appellant Kendrick D. Chester challenges his convictions for robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon. He contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his requests to substitute his retained counsel and to represent himself, by admitting a tainted in-court identification of him, and by refusing to sever the charges into separate trials. We affirm.

Richard Baker (appellant) appeals from an order awarding attorney fees to Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science (CDU) pursuant to Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b). The award was issued after the trial court determined that appellant’s case against CDU, brought on the grounds of discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, was “unreasonable, frivolous and meritless.” We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion to make the award, therefore we affirm.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether a minor plaintiff suing a school district for damages suffered as a result of alleged childhood sexual abuse that occurred on March 8, 2012, must comply with the claim presentation and filing requirements of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 910, 945.6), or whether her claims come within an exception to the claim presentation and filing requirements accorded by Government Code section 905, subdivision (m). We hold that the statutory exception applies to the minor’s state law claims against the school district and that the trial court erred by sustaining, without leave to amend, the school district’s demurrer to those claims. We therefore reverse the order dismissing the school district from this action.

In this appeal we are asked to review a portion of a restitution award after appellant entered a no contest plea to felony driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol causing great bodily injury, a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (f). We have reviewed the proceedings below and affirm the challenged portion of the award.

Plaintiffs Nancy Woodall and Michael Woodall brought a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the City of Lafayette’s (City) denial of design review approval for their construction of a new home. Plaintiffs purchased a 1950’s, ranch-style home in Lafayette, which they sought to demolish and replace with an English-style country house. After the design review commission initially approved the design, the Lafayette Planning Commission (Planning Commission) and City Council (Council) denied approval because the project was not compatible with the neighborhood and unreasonably affected views of adjacent properties. Plaintiffs sought review of the decision, arguing the Council’s administrative findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court denied the writ petition. We affirm.

The Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) brought an employment discrimination suit, on behalf of itself and Maria Escueta, against Escueta’s employer, Fortune Players Group, Inc. (FPG). (Gov. Code, § 12965.) The jury found FPG discriminated against Escueta on the basis of her gender, race and national origin, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (id., § 12900 et seq.). Escueta was awarded economic and noneconomic damages. FPG appeals from the judgment, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in a pretrial evidentiary ruling and in denying FPG’s motion for new trial. FPG also maintains substantial evidence does not support the jury’s economic damages award. We disagree and affirm.

On November 8, 2006, Robert Forest pointed a handgun at Stanley Douglass. Forest was arrested the next day and charged with felony assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2).) Following a preliminary hearing, he was held to answer, and his motion to set aside the information was denied, but the case never went to trial. On January 18, 2008, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the information for insufficient evidence. On October 7, 2008, Forest unsuccessfully applied to the superior court for a finding of factual innocence. (§ 851.8, subd. (c).) Defendant unsuccessfully appealed from that decision. In 2016, defendant unsuccessfully sought to vacate the superior court’s prior judgment denying his 2008 application by petitioning for a writ of coram nobis. He appeals the denial of that petition. We deny the petition on the merits.

Appellant Marina Yiu appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress both evidence found at the time of her arrest and her post-arrest custodial statement. She argues that her landlord and co-resident could not consent to allow officers to enter and arrest her within her rented bedroom for the crime of vandalizing cars. We conclude that the officers did not have consent to enter Yiu’s bedroom, but even if the car keys found in her jacket at the time of her arrest should have been suppressed, any error in admitting the keys at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We further conclude the officers did have probable cause to arrest Yiu, so her subsequent Mirandized statement was admissible at trial. We affirm.

Appellant, T.P., a minor, appeals from a dispositional order issued pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after the juvenile court determined she committed second degree robbery. Appellant challenges a condition of her probation that requires her to submit to warrantless searches of all electronic devices under her control and to provide the probation department and law enforcement any passwords necessary to conduct such searches. She challenges this condition on two grounds, first, that it violates the limits placed upon a trial court’s sentencing discretion by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and, second, that it is unconstitutionally overbroad. Under the particularized facts of this case, we conclude that the electronic search condition as applied to appellant is reasonable under the Lent test and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, we affirm the imposition of this condition of probation.

Defendant Sidney Lee Robinson, who represented himself at trial, appeals from his convictions for theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)) and second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Defendant contends: (1) He was deprived of reasonable access to the jail law library during his trial, in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) the prosecution failed to comply with its duty under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by not dismissing his burglary conviction under Proposition 47, which went into effect after defendant was convicted but before he was sentenced. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.