CA Unpub Decisions

Michael Oshea Sims was convicted of robbery in 2013 and sentenced to state prison with several enhancements, including three one-year enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), for having served separate prison terms for felonies. Sims now purports to appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion for modification of his sentence after two of the felony convictions that were the bases for the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements were redesignated as misdemeanors under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014. We treat Sims’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and deny relief: Sims was not eligible for resentencing to dismiss a prior prison term enhancement once his conviction for the underlying offense had become final.

Defendant William Kenneth King, Jr. appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of attempting to bomb a hospital with a Molotov cocktail. Appellate counsel filed an opening brief in which he raised no issues (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436), and we requested briefing on several issues related to defendant’s alleged strike prior. Defendant now contends that there is insufficient evidence his prior conviction was a strike offense and that the trial court’s resolution of that question violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The People concede the former point but dispute the latter.

Ashok Behl brought an unlawful detainer action against Alejandra Jackson and her adult children, Donte, Jaffar, Genevieve, and Randall Franchesco for failure to pay rent. The Jacksons signed a stipulated judgment which required them to pay $116,693.82 in holdover damages, but later moved to set aside the judgment on the ground of mistake or inadvertence pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). That motion was denied. We affirm.

John Alberto Soto appeals a judgment following conviction of infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, with findings that he suffered a prior serious felony strike conviction and served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).) We affirm.

Berniel Garrett and Precious Reed were convicted at a joint trial of evading an officer with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) On appeal Garrett contends the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor evading. Reed’s appointed counsel, after reviewing the record, identified no meritorious issues. Our own independent review of the record similarly found no error. We affirm both judgments.

This case involves two appeals and a cross-appeal from the trial court’s order on two special motions to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute. The court granted in its entirety the motion brought by defendants Louis Bacon and Jack Palladino (collectively, Bacon/Palladino) with regard to claims alleged against them by plaintiffs Nygård International Partnership and Nygård Inc. (we will refer to both plaintiffs as the singular Nygård), and granted the motion brought by defendant Stephen J. Feralio as to some claims alleged against him, but denied the motion as to other claims. Nygård appeals from the order granting Bacon/Palladino’s motion; Feralio appeals from the order denying in part his motion; and Nygård cross-appeals from the order granting in part Feralio’s motion. We conclude that none of the claims alleged by Nygård arise from activity protected under section 425.16. Accordingly, we reverse the order to the extent

Andrew Redmond appeals from an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under Penal Code section 4852.01. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition. We will affirm the order.

Ro.S. is the father of G.S. and Re.S., the children at issue in this dependency matter. The father appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders after the children were declared dependent minors under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The father contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Alternatively, he challenges a dispositional order requiring him to “develop a network” of family, friends, and/or professionals to help him create a plan “to show everyone” that he can provide adequate supervision for the children.
For reasons that we will explain, we will modify the challenged dispositional order and affirm the juvenile court’s orders as modified.

Fareed Sepehry-Fard, defendant in the underlying action brought by Capital One, N.A. and Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., seeks appellate review of an order denying his motion to disqualify the judge presiding over the case and to “voir dire” the other judges on the Santa Clara County Superior Court. As none of the issues raised in appellant’s brief amounts to a viable challenge to the ruling, we will uphold the order.

Laboratory Specialists International, Inc. (LSI) appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing its lawsuit against Shimadzu Scientific Instruments, Inc. (Shimadzu) under the forum selection clause in the parties’ contract. An order granting a motion to stay or dismiss on improper fourm grounds is immediately appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(3); all further statutory references are to this code.) LSI contends Shimadzu committed a fatal procedural misstep by requesting a dismissal in its demurrer dismissal based on the forum selection clause, rather than by a separate motion, and that the trial court erred by granting Shimadzu leave to recast its request for dismissal in a separate motion. In the alternative, LSI contends the court erred by: (1) dismissing LSI’s tort claims, which LSI argues did not arise out of or “pertain[]” to the parties’ contract; (2) finding the forum selection clause mandated Maryland as the proper fourm, rather than conducting

Twenty years after pleading guilty to a variety of charges and being sentenced, Victor Hermosillo, Jr., sought to have his case reopened, the judgment vacated, and his plea withdrawn pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5. He appeals from the trial court order denying that request. We find no error and affirm the order.

The stipulated judgment dividing the marital estate of appellant Monalisa Berbey and respondent Lucky Lee Gold awarded Berbey their community property home as her sole and separate property. At the time, the home carried two mortgages in Gold’s name only. The judgment required Berbey to use her best efforts to refinance those mortgages to remove Gold’s name, and further required Berbey to make the mortgage payments, indemnify Gold against all claims relating to the home, and immediately list the home for sale if she was more than 30 days late on any mortgage payment. Gold had the right to make Berbey’s missed payments and obtain reimbursement from her.

A jury convicted defendant Frank Acosta, Jr., of transportation and possession for sale of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11378, 11379, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted having six prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance, three prior convictions for transportation of a controlled substance, and the service of three prior prison terms. The court sentenced defendant to 10 years.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he possessed methamphetamine, or in the alternative, that he possessed methamphetamine for sale. Defendant also contends the court failed to rule on his oral motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, that his attorney’s failure to pursue a motion for a new trial amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject defendant’s arguments and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Ricardo Perez appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of carjacking and three counts of second degree robbery. The jury also found true the sentencing enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the carjacking offense and in two of the second degree robbery offenses. Defendant admitted prior conviction and prior prison term enhancement allegations.
We affirm. For the reasons we explain, defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence supported his conviction as an aider and abettor in the second degree robbery of Juana Perez (charged as count 4 in the amended information) is without merit. The trial court did not err by refusing defendant’s request that the jury be given a pinpoint instruction stating that a pellet gun is not a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 16520. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.)