CA Unpub Decisions

It is ordered the opinion filed September 27, 2017, be modified as follows:
On page 16, after the carry-over paragraph and before the first full paragraph, insert the following new paragraph:
“The Attorney General’s petition for rehearing suggests two conceivable tactical reasons why defendant’s counsel did not object to his statements to the police on Miranda and Siebert grounds. First, admitting defendant’s statements allowed the jury to hear he had denied some of the allegations, without having him testify at trial. Second, admitting defendant’s statements allowed him to argue J.F. had initiated some of the inappropriate conduct. While these could be rational tactical reasons in some cases, they are not supported by the record in this case. They cannot be reconciled with the fact defendant’s counsel twice sought to exclude his statements to the police on voluntariness grounds. There is simply no rational tactical reason why counsel would seek exclusion on volun

Defendant Raul Mejia appeals from an order denying a petition for resentencing of his conviction for violating Penal Code section 487h (grand theft of cargo) as a misdemeanor.
This is our second opinion in this case. In our first opinion we held that the trial court correctly denied the petition and we affirmed because defendant had not proved the value of property he stole did not exceed $950 in value. (People v. Mejia (Mar. 15, 2016, G051527) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 18, 2016, S233345.) The California Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review, and later transferred the case back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski).

Alex Jessie Rosales appeals from the trial court’s denial of his redesignation petition under Proposition 47, with regard to two felony convictions for vehicle burglary. We detect no error in the trial court’s denial of Rosales’s petition for Proposition 47 relief. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

Roberto Chaidez appeals from orders denying his requests for resentencing under Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126) and Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2006 a jury convicted Roberto Chaidez of two counts of residential burglary of an inhabited dwelling (§§ 459, 460); receiving stolen property (§ 496); and unlawfully taking and driving a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). In bifurcated proceedings, the jury found true special allegations that Chaidez had incurred two prior felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)); two strike priors (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12); and three prior prison terms (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The court sentenced Chaidez to 60 years to life. (§ 654.) (People v. Chaidez (Sept. 10, 2008, D049656) [nonpub. opn.] (Chaidez).)

Defendant Anthony Bradley appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 application to redesignate his conviction for grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c)) from a felony to a misdemeanor. He contends the trial court erred in finding his crime ineligible for resentencing. We agree and shall reverse and remand for additional proceedings on the application.

Appellant K.B. III, father of minor K.B., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) He contends the juvenile court erred in finding the minor adoptable because an adoptive home study had not been completed for the foster parents seeking to adopt the minor. He also contends the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) by failing to notify the Round Valley tribes of the dependency proceedings. We agree the latter contention and shall conditionally reverse the orders terminating parental rights and remand for compliance with the ICWA.

Plaintiff and appellant Adam Anderson challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of mandate to set aside the decision of defendant State Personnel Board (the Board) sustaining the termination of his employment by real party in interest and respondent California Department of Developmental Services (the Department). Anderson claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his writ petition because its findings are not supported by the evidence and the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate. We shall affirm the judgment.

The present appeal is the converse of plaintiff’s prior appeal in this matter. Here, defendant Rajinder Singh Bal appeals from the final judgment in favor of plaintiff Cross Petroleum on defendant Bal’s guaranty of a credit agreement between plaintiff Cross Petroleum and a gas station that Bal’s former codefendants owned and operated (who are no longer parties to this action). In response to our previous opinion on the appeal of plaintiff Cross Petroleum, in which we reversed and remanded because we found the guaranty was not void for uncertainty (Cross Petroleum v. Bal (June 11, 2015, C075956) [nonpub. opn.] (Cross Petroleum)), the trial court rejected defendant Bal’s claim of exoneration (which we had directed it to consider) without receiving any additional evidence (which we had given it discretion to admit on remand). It is now defendant Bal’s turn to appeal.

This opinion issues following remand from the Supreme Court directing us to vacate our original opinion and to reconsider the appeal in light of People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1130.
Defendant Bobby Jan Phommachanh was convicted of multiple crimes following an incident in which he fired multiple gunshots in a bar thereby injuring two people. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a “kill zone” instruction with respect to charges of attempted murder, (2) he cannot be convicted of multiple counts of shooting at an occupied building, (3) he should have been awarded more presentence custody credit, and (4) we must remand to the trial court to state the statutory authority for a $500 surcharge imposed. The People oppose some of defendant’s contentions, concede others, and request remand to the trial court for clarification of yet another aspect of sentencing. We will modify the judgment to award defendant presentence conduct cred

Appointed counsel for defendant Joseph Anthony Dibartolomeo has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the underlying cases and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the entire record, we have found two sentencing errors and four clerical errors that must be corrected. We will modify the judgment to correct the sentencing errors and direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment. Finding no other arguable error on appeal that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment as modified.

James (Jim) Hoff appeals from a judgment on reserved issues in this marital dissolution proceeding. Jim’s primary argument on appeal is that an earlier “partial judgment” limited the superior court’s jurisdiction over the issues remaining for trial and the court exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding those issues on grounds that were not specifically reserved in the “partial judgment.” We disagree and affirm the judgment. We do not, however, find the appeal so egregious as to warrant the imposition of sanctions. Therefore, we deny respondent Sharon Hoff’s motion for sanctions.

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Human Potential Consultants, LLC (HPC) appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendant and cross-complainant Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections) after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Corrections on its cross-complaint for breach of contract, money had and received, and declaratory relief. HPC’s arguments reflect a significant misunderstanding of the record on appeal. Based on the actual state of the record, we reject HPC’s belated challenge to Corrections’ separate statement of undisputed facts as well as its mistaken assertion that the trial court relied on the concept of judicial exhaustion to grant summary judgment in Corrections’ favor. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

After a jury found Christopher Dunaway guilty of second degree murder, the trial court sentenced him in 1995 to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison plus one year for a weapon enhancement. In June 2014, the Board of Parole Hearings found Dunaway suitable for parole but the Governor reversed the board’s decision. The trial court denied Dunaway’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and Dunaway sought relief in this court.
Meanwhile, the board once again found Dunaway suitable for parole and the Governor once again reversed the board’s decision. Dunaway filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause and consolidated his petitions.

Plaintiff Phillip Linza entered into a loan modification agreement with defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation (PHH) that reduced his monthly payments on his home loan. Soon after, PHH incorrectly notified him that his payments were substantially higher than the amount actually due and sent two notices of intention to foreclose; each contained incorrect information. Linza stopped making any payments. He first contacted PHH and then filed a claim with the Department of Corporations. The matter was not resolved to Linza’s satisfaction and he sued PHH for breach of contract and various torts. The jury returned a verdict in his favor of over $16 million, including $15.7 million in punitive damages. The trial court granted PHH’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) as to the tort causes of action, but denied its motion for a new trial on the contract causes of action.