CA Unpub Decisions

Jason Reynolds, Brittany Lundquist, and David Pherrin (collectively plaintiffs) filed a class action lawsuit against Shea Properties Management Company, Inc. (Shea). Plaintiffs allege that Shea improperly deducts fees for cleaning and painting from tenants’ security deposits after tenants vacate their apartments. Plaintiffs allege that the fees are improper because they are governed by policies requiring that the tenant be charged for (1) all cleaning costs and (2) some or all painting costs depending solely on the duration of the tenancy rather than on an assessment of the actual condition of the paint. Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of their motion for class certification.

After hearing testimony that George Gouda drove directly at a vehicle carrying his ex-girlfriend and her mother causing it to crash, a jury convicted Gouda of, among other crimes, attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. Gouda argues the evidence was insufficient to support those convictions and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We affirm.

Charles Brumbaugh appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer by MUFG Union Bank, N.A. without leave to amend to his complaint for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and common counts. Brumbaugh contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the first three causes of action, the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and Brumbaugh can amend his complaint to state a cause of action for promissory estoppel. We reverse and remand with directions.

Plaintiffs Infospan, Inc. and Infospan (Pvt.) Ltd. appeal from an order quashing the service of summons on two foreign defendants, Ensign Communique (Pvt.) Ltd. and Shaheen Foundation PAF (collectively defendants), and vacating a $17 million default judgment and the defaults entered against defendants. The trial court found that the determination in a prior action that defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state was binding and conclusive in this action. The court therefore granted defendants’ motion to quash the service of summons and set aside the defaults and default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Juan Jose Vargas was convicted by a jury of one count of assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found true the special allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, his former girlfriend. Defendant was sentenced to an eight-year prison term.
The sole issue on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence supporting the great bodily injury finding. Because we find there is ample evidence in the record supporting the jury’s true finding, we affirm.

Plaintiff Yolanda C. Mendoza (Mendoza) sued defendants Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars-Sinai) and Christine Patrick (Patrick) for discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), as well as other causes of action. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and awarded costs to defendants. Mendoza appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because triable issues of material fact exist as to her claims. We vacate the costs award but otherwise affirm.

In 2001, Marta Smith obtained a default marital dissolution judgment against Gary David Smith. That judgment confirmed a property, located in Mountain View, California (Mountain View Property), to Gary as his separate property. In 2016, Gary requested that Marta sign paperwork to transfer the Mountain View Property into his name. She refused. Gary subsequently filed a motion to enforce the parties’ 2001 marital dissolution judgment. Marta objected to Gary’s motion because she claimed a community property interest in the Mountain View Property, which was never adjudicated. The trial court granted Gary’s motion and concluded that the marital dissolution judgment awarded the Mountain View Property to Gary as his separate property. We agree and affirm.

Defendants and judgment debtors Townsend H. Porter, Jr. (Porter) and the Townsend H. Porter, Jr. Revocable Trust (collectively, petitioners) challenge an order of the trial court granting plaintiff 1st Source Bank’s “Motion to Expand Receiver’s Authority.” The bank sought this order at the request of the receiver after a review of financial records obtained in another case indicated there were $4.9 million in unaccounted transfers to Porter Family Vineyards, LLC, in which defendants have a significant ownership interest. We affirm.

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition. (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction. Defendant also asks this court to conduct an independent review of two in camera hearings to determine whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash and traverse a search warrant or abused its discretion by denying discovery of police personnel records. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the failure to give a unanimity instruction was reversible error because the evidence disclosed more than one way in which defendant might have possessed ammunition and it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt the jurors unanimously agreed he committed the same criminal act. We reject defendant’s other claims of error.

Defendant Ronald Vernon Cupp appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of ten violations of attempting to record a false or forged document (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a) (§ 115(a)) and five counts of forgery (§ 470, subd. (d) (§ 470(d)). He contends his conduct could be prosecuted exclusively under section 115(a) because it is more specific than section 470(d), and that his convictions for forgery should therefore be reversed. We shall affirm the judgment.

Father R.R. and Mother, S.B. appeal from an order terminating their parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, appellants’ counsel filed letter briefs pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835 (Phoenix H.), stating the case and facts, but raising no arguable issues on appeal. Pursuant to Phoenix H., after appellants made a showing of good cause, we allowed them both to file supplemental briefs. In their supplemental briefs, appellants fail to raise arguable issues on appeal from the order terminating parental rights. Therefore, we will dismiss the appeal.

Defendant Andrew Alden Rangel pleaded no contest to two drug offenses and two sex offenses. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on three years’ probation, and required defendant to register as a sex offender. (Pen. Code, § 290.) Among the probation conditions the trial court imposed were two statutorily required by section 1203.067, subdivision (b). Pursuant to section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3), defendant was ordered to “waive any privilege against self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examinations, which shall be part of the sex offender management program.” And pursuant to section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(4), defendant was ordered to “waive any psychotherapist-patient privilege to enable communication between the sex offender management professional and the Probation Officer.” Defendant objected to the probation conditions imposed pursuant to section 1203.067, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) below and he challenges those c

Defendant challenges his conviction for possession of child pornography based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of transitory possession. He also challenges a probation condition requiring him to undertake substance abuse treatment for marijuana use. For the reasons stated here, we conclude that there was no instructional error but that the trial court abused its discretion under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 ordering substance abuse treatment. With that condition stricken, we will affirm the judgment.

William John Wallace pleaded guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, subd. (a) [count 1]; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code) and solicitation to commit murder (§ 653f, subd. (b) [counts 2 & 3]) in exchange for a prison term of nine years. Wallace appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. Because our independent review of the record discloses no arguable issues, and Wallace waived his right to appeal, we dismiss the appeal.