CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs and appellants Tom Beyl and Cindy Beyl (collectively, Beyls) sued defendant and respondent City of Yorba Linda (City) to challenge the validity of special assessments the City levied under the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 22500 et seq.; Act). The Beyls seek a judicial declaration the City violated Proposition 218 and the Act in levying the assessments for fiscal year 2015/2016, and a writ of mandate compelling the City to comply with Proposition 218 and the Act. The Beyls also alleged the City violated the constitutional prohibition against gifts of public funds by using public funds to improve private property, and they seek an injunction to prevent the City from doing so in the future.

This is the fourth appeal we have decided in this case. Appellants Gordon Runyon and Donna Runyon appeal from the court’s denial of Donna’s motion for subrogation. We dismiss the appeal, because neither Gordon nor Donna has standing.

Appellant George Ramirez contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash and traverse a search warrant without first conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks). He contends the case must be remanded for the trial court to conduct a Franks hearing. We affirm.

Appellant Corey Jason Wulf stands convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, felony vandalism, and two counts of misdemeanor driving under the influence. In addition, he admitted a prior strike allegation. On appeal, Wulf contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to suspend criminal proceedings and order a competency trial pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369. We affirm.

Appellant Corey Jason Wulf stands convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, felony vandalism, and two counts of misdemeanor driving under the influence. In addition, he admitted a prior strike allegation. On appeal, Wulf contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to suspend criminal proceedings and order a competency trial pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369. We affirm.

Appellant/defendant Haroon Pimentel pleaded no contest to multiple offenses, including felony mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203), with an enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury on a child under the age of five years (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)). The victim was two-year-old, B., who had been living in Pimentel’s apartment with her mother, Sarai Alavez, and her older sister, N. Pimentel and his spouse, Kathy Yoval, committed numerous horrific acts of “discipline” and inflicted grievous injuries on B. B.’s mother did not intervene and participated in these acts. Pimentel was sentenced to 20 years in prison pursuant to a negotiated disposition.

Defendant Jeremy Dale Salter was charged with the murder of John Harley Evans (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The information further alleged that he intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)); personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance and firearm allegations. The trial court imposed life without the possibility of parole plus an enhancement of 25 years to life for firearm discharge causing death. It stayed the enhancement for firearm use.

Defendant and appellant Richard Charles Singleton, Jr., was charged by felony complaint with one count of acquiring the personal identifying information of another person, having been previously convicted of the same violation (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(2), count 1) and forgery (§ 475, subd. (a), count 2). The complaint also alleged that defendant was convicted of prior felonies, which made him ineligible for probation within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). The complaint further alleged that defendant had served one prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 1 and admitted the prison prior. The court dismissed count 2 in the interests of justice. It then imposed the midterm of two years on count 1, plus a consecutive one year on the prison prior. The court suspended the execution of the sentence as to two years of the term and ordered defendant placed on mandatory supervision, under specified con

Defendant and appellant John Taylor Craig III was charged by amended information with criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, count 1), and misdemeanor brandishing an imitation firearm (§ 417.4, count 2). The amended information further alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 1. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The information was orally amended to add a new count of misdemeanor battery. (§ 242, count 3.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to counts 2 and 3. The trial court dismissed count 1 and the section 12022.7 allegation on motion by the People. The court placed defendant on probation for a period of 36 months, under specified conditions.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

In his briefing in this family law matter, plaintiff and appellant V.S. (father) describes himself as “an indigent and incarcerated pro per litigant.” He appeals from a minute order, dated November 18, 2015, awarding sole physical and legal custody of his son A.S. (child) (born August 2004) to the child’s mother, defendant and respondent A.C. (mother), and providing that father is to have “visitation/contact with the minor child at the minor child’s discretion.” Father contends that the trial court erred in a number of respects, including: (1) failing to appoint counsel to represent him; (2) denying his motion pursuant to Family Code section 7605, to require mother to pay for an attorney for father; (3) denying his request for a continuance; (4) proceeding to consider the matter in his absence; (5) finding him to be a natural father, but not a presumed father, of the child; (6) depriving him joint legal custody without making a finding of detriment; and (7) delegating d

Defendant Lamont Dion Williams challenges his convictions in two separate cases. In case No. RIF1500859, he was convicted of four counts of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant. He contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial after a witness referred to his history of committing acts of violence against the victim, and that his conviction for simple assault must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense of his willful infliction of corporal injury conviction. In case No. RIF1500899, defendant was convicted of possessing methamphetamine in jail. He asserts that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession, and it improperly stayed three of his prison prior enhancements when it should have stricken them. We agree that the conviction for simple assault must be reversed, and that the prison prior enhancements must be stricken. Otherwise, we affirm.

In 2015, a jury convicted John Anthony Harrelson of kidnapping (Pen. Code, §§ 207, subd. (a), 208, subd. (b)); count 1) and carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 2). Harrelson admitted a serious/violent felony prior conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and an on-bail enhancement. The court sentenced Harrelson to 21 years in prison as follows: 16 years for kidnapping plus five years. The court struck the on-bail enhancement and the remaining prison prior. The sentence on count 2 was stayed.
In September 2016, this court reversed the kidnapping conviction and remanded the case to the trial court.

In the period between 2000 and 2001, plaintiff and appellant Troy Flowers's application for a securities sales license was rejected by Ohio state officials because they found that he was "not of 'good business repute.' " In addition, Flowers was subjected to discipline by securities regulators with respect to his violation of securities laws and regulations and his failure to cooperate in a securities investigation. A publicly accessible record of this disciplinary history is maintained by defendant and respondent, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA).

This appeal arises from the lease of real property used for an automobile oil changing service center. Appellant CIF Holdings, LP (CIF), the property owner, filed a complaint alleging an unlawful detainer cause of action against respondents, RFG Oil, Inc. (RFG) and its president David R. Gong. CIF also filed a separate action against respondents alleging breach of contract and ejectment. The matters were consolidated and RFG then filed a cross-complaint for breach of lease, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision in favor of respondents on all of CIF's claims. In connection with RFG's cross-complaint, the trial court found that RFG admitted that it owed $140,597 in back rent and ordered RFG to pay CIF this amount. The court subsequently entered a judgment in favor of respondents consistent with its statement of decision.