CA Unpub Decisions

Willmark Communities Inc. and their codefendants (collectively Defendants), appeal from a trial court order regarding precertification communications in a putative class action filed by Davis Parker, Jill Miller, and Paul Miller (collectively Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs are former tenants of apartment complexes owned or managed by Defendants, and their complaint alleges improper security deposit practices.

Defendant Dennis Wayne Mize appeals from the trial court’s order denying his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition for resentencing on his prior prison term enhancement. He contends the trial court should have stricken the prison prior because the felony underlying the enhancement had subsequently been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18. We find that reducing the underlying felony to a misdemeanor does not require elimination of a previously-imposed enhancement that was supported by the felony. We shall therefore affirm the trial court’s order.

K.A. (Mother) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1) and (d), pertaining to her 10-year-old mildly autistic daughter, M.T. She contends the court erred in sustaining allegations that she failed to protect M.T. from sexual abuse by “a thirteen year old unrelated child,” as defined by subdivisions (b)(1) and (d), and that she placed M.T. at risk of serious physical harm, as defined by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), when she twice assaulted M.T.’s maternal grandmother (MGM) in M.T.’s presence. She does not, however, challenge the juvenile court’s true finding under subdivision (b)(1) that, on more than one occasion, Mother left M.T. alone and unattended without adult supervision for as many as six hours, placing her at risk of serious physical harm. Accordingly, as we shall explain, because jurisdiction may be sustained on the bas

Keith H., father of 10-year-old Isadora H., appeals from the juvenile court’s October 3, 2016 jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring Isadora a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Keith contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding that his arrangements for Isadora’s care and supervision put her at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. We agree and reverse.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), T.L. (Mother) appeals from the dispositional order, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the removal of her then 21-month-old son, Lyric C., from her custody. We affirm.

Marcos Munoz appeals from the judgment entered on his conviction for first degree murder, with firearm and gang enhancements, contending the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by allowing the prosecution to admit hearsay evidence, and insufficient evidence supported the gang enhancement finding. We conclude the trial court erred in admitting hearsay but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject Munoz’s contention that the gang enhancement was unfounded. Therefore, we affirm.

Defendant Cushfield Maintenance West Corporation appeals the trial court’s $12,600 discovery sanction order. Defendant argues that it acted with substantial justification in refusing to respond to discovery requests by plaintiff Saundra Hall and that the imposition of sanctions was unjust. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s implicit finding that defendant did not meet and confer in a reasonable and good faith manner.

Farid Farhoumand appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of child custody deprivation and kidnapping for the purpose of committing rape. Farhoumand contends insufficient evidence supported the aggravated kidnapping conviction because no evidence suggested that when he kidnapped the victim he intended to rape her. He further contends the trial court made an evidentiary and an instructional error. We affirm.

A jury convicted petitioner Lamont T. Tarkington (Tarkington) and codefendant Darris Allen (Allen) of five counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of second degree commercial burglary (§ 459). The jury also found that Tarkington and Allen robbed the bank for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that a principal used a firearm in the commission of that crime (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that Tarkington had a prior serious felony conviction. The court sentenced Tarkington to 39 years 4 months in state prison.

Savoeun Soeur appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of premeditated attempted murder, and further found special circumstance, gang and firearm enhancement allegations to be true. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for the murders. We reject Soeur’s contentions of reversible error affecting the jury’s verdicts. We conditionally vacate the judgment and remand the matter for reconsideration because the record does not demonstrate that in sentencing Soeur, a juvenile offender who was 17 years old at the time of the crimes, the trial court gave due consideration to whether his crimes reflected transient immaturity or irreparable corruption.

Lisandro Reyes was accused of committing second degree robbery and assault with a deadly weapon when he was 17 years old. He was tried and convicted in adult criminal court and sentenced to serve 28 years to life in state prison.
After Reyes’s conviction, but while this case was on appeal, the voters passed Proposition 57, which changed the standards by which courts determine whether minors will be tried in juvenile or adult court. We conclude that Proposition 57 applies retroactively, and thus we conditionally reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This action stems from a car accident between defendant and appellant Roxanna Aminirad and plaintiff and respondent Nathan Barker, who was injured. Aminirad admitted liability, and the matter was tried to a jury on causation and damages. The jury awarded damages to Barker. Aminirad appeals, and Barker cross-appeals. In her appeal, Aminirad contends that the trial court improperly excluded expert testimony about causation, that she was deprived of a fair trial because insurance was mentioned, and that an award of future medical damages was improper. In his cross-appeal, Barker contends that the trial court improperly taxed costs. We affirm.

In 2015, defendant Anthony Jones pled no contest to one felony count of grand theft in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c), for an agreed upon sentence. In 2017, defendant filed a petition to reduce his offense to a misdemeanor, and implicitly to be resentenced, under Proposition 47, which was denied. Defendant timely appealed from that order. Defendant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, to determine whether there are any arguable issues for review. Defendant has been informed of his right to file supplemental briefing, and he has not done so. After our independent review of the record, we find no errors or other issues requiring further briefing, and we affirm.

A mother and her son settled a lawsuit over disputed real estate transactions between the two of them, but they conditioned their settlement agreement on court approval. Two of the son’s siblings objected to the settlement, and the probate court declined to approve it. The son argues in this appeal that the court erred, but we disagree and therefore affirm.