Florida Decisions

In this case appellant Charles Joiner was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. (SVPA)). On appeal he attacks the trial court's rulings and the jury's verdict on a number of grounds. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
As we explain it is not clear from the record the trial court understood it had the power to enter a verdict in favor of Joiner in the event the trial court determined that following the first trial of the People's petition the People failed to present sufficient evidence of Joiner's status as an SVP.

Appellant Sherri “Jean” Parks is employed as a plumber by respondent Port of Oakland (Port). She sued the Port for harassment on the basis of her gender and sexual orientation, for failure to prevent such harassment, and for retaliating against her after she complained of the harassment. The trial court granted the Port’s motion for summary adjudication of the harassment and failure to prevent harassment causes of action, but permitted the retaliation cause of action to proceed to trial.
The jury found that the Port did not retaliate against Parks for complaining that she was being harassed. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Port. It also denied Parks’s postjudgment motion to tax costs.
On appeal, Parks argues that the trial court erred in granting the Port’s motion for summary adjudication (the Port’s motion), and in sustaining one of the Port’s objections to evidence Parks submitted in opposition to that motion. Parks also contends that the trial court erred in permitting the Port to recover certain disputed cost items. We agree that the excluded evidence was admissible for a limited purpose, but reject all of Parks’s remaining contentions, and accordingly affirm both the judgment and the order denying the motion to tax costs.

C.A. was three years old when he was removed from the custody of petitioner, C.A. (mother). He was declared a dependent child of the court due to mother’s incarceration and concerns about mother’s mental health and substance abuse. At the contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court accepted the recommendation of the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) to terminate reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a))[1] and set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26. Mother petitions for a writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate that order. Mother argues that Department did not offer reasonable reunification services. Mother also faults Department for failing to provide an opportunity for C.A. to visit with his half sibling, I.R. We reject the arguments and deny the petition.

Gerardo Reyes appeals from the judgment imposed after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187; undesignated section references are to that code), and found that the murder was committed to prevent the victim from testifying ( 190.2, subd. (a)(1)), and that appellant personally used a firearm ( 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant was sentenced to a term of life without possibility of parole, plus four years. He contends that (1) the plea agreement of his co-defendant, under which he testified against appellant, was coercive of that testimony and denied appellant due process and a fair trial; (2) the court erred in allowing an opinion that vouched for the testimony of a prosecution witness; and (3) appellant is entitled to pretrial custody conduct credits.

We have concluded that appellants codefendants plea agreement was unduly coercive of the content of his testimony, depriving appellant of a fair trial. We accordingly reverse the judgment. We also explain that appellant was entitled to pretrial conduct credits.

The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee has filed an out of cycle report of proposed rule amendments in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.140(e).
The Legislature in 2000 passed a law that provided that [n]o person charged with a dangerous crime shall be granted nonmonetary pretrial release at a first appearance hearing. See ch. 2000 178, 2, at 1906, Laws of Fla. (amending section 907.041(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999)). The law also repealed Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.131, Pretrial Release, and 3.132, Pretrial Detention. Seeid., 5, at 1909. Five years later, the Court in State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2005), declared the law unconstitutional and temporarily readopted the rules. The Court ordered that the rules be published for comment in light of the legislation. SeeIn re Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.131 & 3.132, 907 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 2005). The rules were published in The Florida Bar News, and responses were filed by various entities. At the Courts request, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (committee) also filed an out of cycle report. The Court subsequently returned the matter to the committee for further consideration in light of the comments, and the committee has now filed a supplemental report proposing amendments to both rules 3.131 and 3.132.
After reviewing the comments and the committees proposals, court adopt the proposals filed by the committee, with the exception noted below. The major substantive changes are discussed below.

This matter is before the Court on The Florida Bars petition for contempt against John L. Walkden. For the reasons expressed below, court grant the Bars petition for contempt and disbar Walkden from The Florida Bar.

Court have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
WHETHER A CRUISE LINE IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE OF THE SHIPBOARD DOCTOR, COMMITTED ON A SHIPS PASSENGER?
Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). For the reasons that follow, court answer the certified question in the negative.

In 2004, Jesus Delgado was retried for the 1990 murders of Tomas and Violetta Rodriguez pursuant to this Courts decision in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233, 242 (Fla. 2000) (hereinafter Delgado I). Delgado now appeals his convictions and death sentences from his 2004 retrial. For the reasons expressed below, court affirm Delgados convictions and death sentences.

In Galindez v. State, 910 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), the Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeals decision in Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), which held that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), decided after the defendants conviction was final, apply to a subsequent resentencing. As court explain below, court find that any failure to apply Apprendi and Blakely in this case constitutes harmless error. Accordingly, court need not determine whether these Supreme Court cases apply in such resentencings and court decline to resolve the conflict at this time.

In Galindez v. State, 910 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), the Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeals decision in Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), which held that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), decided after the defendants conviction was final, apply to a subsequent resentencing. As court explain below, court find that any failure to apply Apprendi and Blakely in this case constitutes harmless error. Accordingly, court need not determine whether these Supreme Court cases apply in such resentencings and court decline to resolve the conflict at this time.

This case is before the Court on M.B.S.'s motion for rehearing of this Court's order denying him admission to The Florida Bar. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, court reaffirm previous decision to deny M.B.S. admission to The Florida Bar.

This case is before the Court on M.B.S.'s motion for rehearing of this Court's order denying him admission to The Florida Bar. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, court reaffirm previous decision to deny M.B.S. admission to The Florida Bar.

Court have review Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in M.A.F. v. G.L.K., 573 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).1 The conflict issue is whether a wife's misrepresentation of paternity in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is extrinsic or intrinsic fraud. This differentiation is significant because of the one year limitation for filing a motion for relief from judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). As explained below, we agree with the Fourth District that this type of misconduct is intrinsic fraud and, therefore, relief from any judgment based upon such fraud must be sought within one year. Consequently, court approve the Fourth District's decision in Parker finding that the petitioner's motion is time barred, and court disapprove the First District's conflicting decision in M.A.F. Consistent with our resolution of this issue, court also reject the petitioner's alternative request that court reinstate his independent action against his former wife for damages based on this fraud.

Court accepted jurisdiction to review Barnett v. Department of Management Services, 931 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified a question of great public importance. After further consideration, court conclude that court should exercise our discretion and decline review because the circumstances of this case are fact specific. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.
It is so ordered.