Florida Decisions

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death for the murder of his five year old stepson, Eugene Christian ("Eugene"), appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851. Applying the two prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 96 (1984), court determine that Henry has failed to establish either that his counsel's performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In doing so, court recognize that defense counsel's strategy entailed significant risk to the defendant and should be employed with caution and only after careful analysis. Nevertheless, court cannot find that this strategy fell below the "wide range of professionally competent assistance" when evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time defense counsel suggested and Henry agreed to this strategy. See id. at 689-90. Furthermore, Henry has not shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [allegedly] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; see also Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 345-46 (Fla. 2004).

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death for the murder of his five year old stepson, Eugene Christian ("Eugene"), appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851. Applying the two prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 96 (1984), court determine that Henry has failed to establish either that his counsel's performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In doing so, court recognize that defense counsel's strategy entailed significant risk to the defendant and should be employed with caution and only after careful analysis. Nevertheless, court cannot find that this strategy fell below the "wide range of professionally competent assistance" when evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time defense counsel suggested and Henry agreed to this strategy. See id. at 689-90. Furthermore, Henry has not shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [allegedly] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; see also Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 345-46 (Fla. 2004).

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death for the murder of his five year old stepson, Eugene Christian ("Eugene"), appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851. Applying the two prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 96 (1984), court determine that Henry has failed to establish either that his counsel's performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In doing so, court recognize that defense counsel's strategy entailed significant risk to the defendant and should be employed with caution and only after careful analysis. Nevertheless, court cannot find that this strategy fell below the "wide range of professionally competent assistance" when evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time defense counsel suggested and Henry agreed to this strategy. See id. at 689-90. Furthermore, Henry has not shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [allegedly] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; see also Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 345-46 (Fla. 2004).

Court initially accepted jurisdiction to review State v. Campbell, 911 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal certifying a question to this Court as one involving great public importance. See art. V, S 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. However, during oral argument, the parties conceded that the facts as outlined in the Fourth District's decision are materially different from those depicted in the trial court record. Neither of the parties filed a motion for rehearing with the Fourth District to address these materially disparate facts. Court conclude that reviewing a case under such circumstances would place the instant proceeding in the procedural posture of a rehearing. This Court lacks jurisdiction to rehear a decision issued by a district court; therefore, court exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed. It is so ordered.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (the Committee) petitions this Court to amend the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. On December 14, 2006, the Committee filed Report No. 2006-03, proposing an amendment to Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases 3.6(g) Justifiable Use of Non-Deadly Force. Along with the report, the committee filed a Motion to Expedite Report 2006-3. The Committee asks the Court to expedite the review and consideration of the amendments proposed to jury instruction 3.6(g) Justifiable Use of Non-Deadly Force.

In this consolidated case, court review two decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal: All Children's Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Administrative Hearings, 863 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Ferguson, 869 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In each case, the Second District certified conflict with decisions from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal on an issue regarding the subject matter jurisdiction of administrative law judges under the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act as found in sections 766.301 through 766.316, Florida Statutes (1997 & Supp. 1998) (NICA). See Univ. of Miami v. M.A., 793 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Gugelmin v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 815 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Behan v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 664 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); O'Leary v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).1
Court frame the question in conflict as follows:
Does an administrative law judge (ALJ), when considering a NICA claim, have jurisdiction to determine whether or not a health care provider has complied with the "notice to obstetrical patients of participation in the plan" as required by section 766.316
In the two cases before us, the Second District held that the NICA statute, as it existed prior to the 2003 amendment, did not give the ALJ any jurisdiction to determine this notice issue.2 The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts had reached the opposite conclusion; and, subsequent to the Second District's certification of conflict, the First District issued an opinion aligning itself with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. See Tabb v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
As explained below, court hold that when notice is raised as part of a claim filed under NICA, an ALJ has jurisdiction to make findings regarding whether a health care provider has satisfied the "notice to obstetrical patients" requirement of section 766.316, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998). In light of this holding, court quash the Second District's decision in All Children's Hospital, Inc. and remand that case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, because the conflict question has become moot in Ferguson, court dismiss that case.

In this consolidated case, court review two decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal: All Children's Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Administrative Hearings, 863 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Ferguson, 869 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In each case, the Second District certified conflict with decisions from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal on an issue regarding the subject matter jurisdiction of administrative law judges under the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act as found in sections 766.301 through 766.316, Florida Statutes (1997 & Supp. 1998) (NICA). See Univ. of Miami v. M.A., 793 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Gugelmin v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 815 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Behan v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 664 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); O'Leary v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).1
Court frame the question in conflict as follows:
Does an administrative law judge (ALJ), when considering a NICA claim, have jurisdiction to determine whether or not a health care provider has complied with the "notice to obstetrical patients of participation in the plan" as required by section 766.316
In the two cases before us, the Second District held that the NICA statute, as it existed prior to the 2003 amendment, did not give the ALJ any jurisdiction to determine this notice issue.2 The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts had reached the opposite conclusion; and, subsequent to the Second District's certification of conflict, the First District issued an opinion aligning itself with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. See Tabb v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
As explained below, court hold that when notice is raised as part of a claim filed under NICA, an ALJ has jurisdiction to make findings regarding whether a health care provider has satisfied the "notice to obstetrical patients" requirement of section 766.316, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998). In light of this holding, court quash the Second District's decision in All Children's Hospital, Inc. and remand that case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, because the conflict question has become moot in Ferguson, court dismiss that case.

Court have for review a referee's report regarding alleged ethical breaches by Gerald John D'Ambrosio. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons explained herein, we disapprove the referee's recommendation that D'Ambrosio be disbarred. Instead, court impose a one year suspension.

Defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Court affirm the trial court's denial of Peede's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Court affirm the trial court's denial of Peede's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Court affirm the trial court's denial of Peede's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Court have on appeal a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal declaring invalid portions of section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2003), as applied to appeals to the district courts. Court have jurisdiction. See art.V, S 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the decision of the district court and hold that the district courts of appeal have discretionary jurisdiction over nonfinal appeals certified by the county court to be of great public importance when the order is one that is otherwise appealable to the circuit court under section 924.07, Florida Statutes.

Court initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in University of Miami v. Ruiz, 916 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2005), certifying conflict with Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc. v. Alexander, 909 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), on a question of law. See art. V, S 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, court have now determined that Ruiz and Alexander address different situations and are not in conflict. Because there is no conflict, court exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is hereby dismissed.
It is so ordered.

Court have for review State v. Sachs, 926 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), in which the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling based upon the parties' stipulation at the trial level as to the controlling effect of State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), aff'd, 938 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2006). At the time the Third District Court issued its decision in Sachs, Harden was pending review in this Court. Court recently affirmed the Third District Court's decision in Harden. See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2006). As a result, court issued an order on September 20, 2006, directing the appellant to show cause why this Court should not summarily affirm Sachs in light of our decision in Harden. Appellant agreed that "Harden is controlling in the instant case, and summary affirmance is appropriate." Therefore, based upon our decision in Harden and the appellant's response to the order to show cause, court summarily affirm the decision of the Third District Court in Sachs.
It is so ordered.