In re O.M.
Filed 4/23/07 In re O.M. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re O.M., Z.B., and R.M., Minors.
RAYMOND M., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Real Parties in Interest. | B195919 (Super. Ct. No. CK38625) |
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate. David S. Milton, Judge. Petition denied.
Claudette Boehm for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Senior Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
Petitioner Raymond M. seeks extraordinary relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (l);[1]Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile courts order, made at the 12-month review hearing ( 366.21, subd. (e)) held just six weeks before the expiration of the 18-month statutory limit for reunification ( 361.5, subd. (a)(3), 366.22), setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for nine-year-old O.M., seven-year-old Z.B., and six-year-old R.M. We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
O.M., Z.B. and R.M. were removed from Raymond M.s care and adjudged dependent children of the juvenile court based on Raymond M.s physical abuse of Z.B. and his failure to protect Z.B. from abuse by her maternal grandmother, placing all three children at substantial risk of physical and emotional harm. Raymond M. is not the biological father of O.M. or Z.B. and has not been found by the court to be a presumed father as to either child. Although Raymond M. was considered only an alleged father as to R.M. as of the 12-month review hearing, during the pendency of this writ proceeding, the juvenile court found him to be R.M.s presumed father.[2]
As of the 12-month review hearing, Raymond M.s visitation with the children had been inconsistent ‑‑ he had missed more than half of his scheduled visits during the previous five months; and had acted inappropriately during those visits he made ‑‑ by using profanity, inappropriately referring to the childrens body parts, and praising R.M. for hitting O.M. and Z.B. Moreover, by the time of the hearing Raymond M. had completed just 12 weeks of a court-ordered 52-week domestic violence program.
At the hearing Raymond M.s counsel requested that the court extend reunification services to the 18-month date, but made no challenge to the adequacy of the reunification services offered to him by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and did not request extension of reunification services beyond the 18-month statutory time limit. The juvenile court terminated services upon its findings that, although Raymond M. had substantially complied with his case plan, he had not made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the removal of the children from his custody and there was not a substantial probability the children could be safely returned to him within the short time remaining before the 18-month statutory limit for reunification. (See Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 306 [At the section 366.21, subdivision (f), permanency review hearing, to be held within 12 months from the date the child enters foster care, the court again determines whether the child should be returned to the custody of his or her parent or guardian . . . . If the child is not returned to his or her parent because the juvenile court finds a substantial risk of detriment to the child exists, the court must terminate reunification services and facilitate the alternative permanent plan (generally by setting a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan pursuant to section 366.26) unless reasonable services have not been offered or provided or there is a substantial probability of return of the child within 18 months from the date of the childs removal from his or her home].)
CONTENTIONS
Raymond M. contends (1) because he substantially complied with the requirements of his case plan, the children should be returned to his custody or, at least, reunification services should be extended beyond the 18-month statutory limit to enable him to fully comply; and (2) the Department did not offer him reasonable reunification services.
DISCUSSION
O.M. and Z.B.
Because Raymond M. is, at most, an alleged father as to O.M. and Z.B., he does not have the right to reunification services or to custody as to those children and thus lacks standing to seek any relief in this court. ( 361.5, subd. (a); Fam. Code, 3010, subd. (a); In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448-451; In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715.)
R.M.
1. Adequacy of reunification services
Raymond M. did not contend at the 12-month hearing that the services provided to him by the Department were inadequate. By failing to object to the adequacy of services in the juvenile court, Raymond M. has forfeited his right to assert error in this court. (In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339; In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)
2. Return of R.M. to Raymond M.s Custody
At the 12-month review hearing, the court may not order the return of a child to his parents custody if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the childs safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. ( 366.21, subd. (f); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) The mere completion of the requirements of the reunification plan ‑‑ such as participating in counseling and treatment programs and visiting the children ‑‑ is just one consideration under the statute; and the court must also consider to what extent the parent has ameliorated the conditions that required court jurisdiction. (See In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1139-1142.) The record, as we have set forth, contains substantial evidence that, as of the 12-month review hearing, Raymond M. had not resolved the problems that led to R.M.s removal from his custody and remained unable to care for R.M. without a substantial risk of detriment to R.M.s well-being.[3]
3. Extension of reunification beyond the statutory limit
We reject Raymond M.s claim that services should be extended beyond the 18-month statutory limit set by the Legislature. ( 361.5, subd. (a)(3), 366.22.) First, Raymond M. made no request for an extension in the juvenile court. Additionally, such an extension is not permitted absent truly exceptional circumstances, which are not present in this case. (See, e.g., In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777-1778 [no reunification plan was ever developed by the Department for the father]; In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1793-1796 [mother was hospitalized during most of the reunification period, and after her release the Department attempted to restrict visitation]; In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1209, 1212-1214 [the Departments reunification services for the father were a disgrace].)
DISPOSITION
Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order to conduct a hearing pursuant to section 366.26, the petition is denied on the merits.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
PERLUSS, P. J.
We concur:
JOHNSON, J. WOODS, J.
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[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
[2] The court takes judicial notice of the juvenile courts order of March 6, 2007 finding Raymond M. to be R.M.s presumed father. (Evid. Code, 459, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d)(1).)
[3] When we review the juvenile courts findings under the substantial evidence standard, we inquire only whether there is any evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the courts determination. We resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the findings and may not substitute our deductions for those of the juvenile court. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.)
