In re Brian N.
Filed 2/14/06 In re Brian N. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
| In re BRIAN N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B179996 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PJ32890) |
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN N., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Morton Rochman, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Melissa J. Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Erin M. Pitman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The juvenile court sustained a petition charging minor with carjacking in violation of Penal Code section 215, subdivision (a) (count 1); two counts of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (counts 3 and 12); three counts of grand theft of an automobile in violation of section 487, subdivision (d)(1) (counts 6, 8, and 10); and three counts of joy riding in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (counts 7, 9, and 11). The court placed minor in the Right of Passage program for a period not to exceed 15 years eight months.
Minor appeals on the grounds that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support sustaining the petition on the charges of carjacking and assault with a deadly weapon on an accomplice liability theory, and (2) the minute order of December 8, 2004, should be redacted to accurately reflect the court's order prohibiting the use or possession of narcotics.FACTS
On July 22, 2004, Vazgen and Haigoosh Ghadimian, husband and wife, lived on Rhodesia Avenue in Sunland in Los Angeles County. They were visited that day by their nephew, Norik Ghidimi and other relatives. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Vazgen looked out of the window and saw someone trying to get into his car. Vazgen and the other family members went outside and saw that the person was already turning the car around. Vazgen pounded on the car, and he and the others were yelling at the driver to stop. Vazgen fell down, and the driver of the car stopped for a second and then drove over Vazgen at a high rate of speed. The driver then drove towards Ghidimi and hit him with the car at the same high rate of speed. Vazgen was seriously injured. During his hospitalization his caregivers told Haigoosh three times that Vazgen was dying. Vazgen was still in the hospital at the time of the adjudicational hearing and was unable to move. Ghidimi's left knee was injured. He had surgery, and eight screws were placed in his leg.
Minor told police that he and another juvenile, Ramiro M., were driving a stolen car and agreed to steal another car because they were afraid the theft had been reported. They saw a white Camry on Rhodesia Avenue and agreed that Ramiro would steal it while minor remained in the other car, parked a distance away. Minor watched Ramiro's actions in the rearview mirror. Minor saw a group of people running towards the car Ramiro was in, and he saw the car strike one of the males. Minor left as soon as he saw that occur.
The parties stipulated that Fransouhi Romoghlian was deemed to have testified that she is the owner of the 1991 Toyota Camry listed in counts 6 and 7 of the petition and that she gave no one permission to take her car from 1001 Pahl Avenue in Los Angeles. The parties also stipulated that Marie Delia Lopez Paniagua was deemed to have testified that she is the owner of the 1985 Toyota Camry listed in counts 8 and 9 of the petition and that she did not give anyone permission to take her car from 13459½ Fillmore Street in Los Angeles. Lastly, the parties stipulated that Francisco Diaz was deemed to have testified that he was the owner of the 1989 Toyota Camry listed in counts 10 and 11 and that he gave no one permission to take his vehicle from 7139 Greeley Street in Los Angeles.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Minor's Argument
Minor contends that Ramiro's commission of the carjacking and felony assaults was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their planned crime. Because minor was found guilty on an aiding and abetting theory, he is liable only for the crime, or target offense, and any other offense that was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. Minor asserts that no case supports the theory that the nontargeted offenses of carjacking and felonious assault are reasonably foreseeable crimes stemming from the commission of a grand theft automobile.
B. Relevant Authority
The standard of appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence was set out in People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557. When an appellate court seeks to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it â€
