Singh v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal.StateUniversity

Filed 4/17/07 Singh v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. State University CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia Y. Cowett, Judge. Affirmed.

On the day set for trial, plaintiff Rahul Singh and defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University (University) entered into a written settlement agreement, and orally confirmed the agreement on the record before the court. A few days later, Singh sought to renegotiate the terms of the settlement agreement and, when University rejected his request, sought to vacate the settlement and reinstate his lawsuit. The court denied his motion, and granted University's cross-motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Singh argues on appeal that because he was the victim of extrinsic fraud, the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to vacate the settlement agreement.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Lawsuit

Singh's lawsuit asserted University denied him promotion and tenure in retaliation for his complaints about gender discrimination in a hiring decision made by University. University denied Singh's allegations. Trial was set for September 16, 2005. Prior to trial, University sought and obtained summary adjudication on one of Singh's claims against it.

At the trial readiness conference on September 2, 2005, Singh's attorney (Mr. Golden) sought leave to depose a witness after the discovery cut-off date because the witness (Ms. Taylor) was temporarily in San Diego from Australia and it was unclear whether she would still be available during the time set for trial. The court granted Singh leave to take Ms. Taylor's deposition to preserve her testimony for trial.^[1]

Shortly after Taylor's deposition, Singh relieved Mr. Golden as his counsel and began representing himself in propria persona. Singh moved to continue the trial date to enable him to represent himself, and the court set a new trial readiness conference and calendared trial for October 13, 2005. At the trial readiness conference, Singh was unprepared to submit his exhibits or provide proposed jury instructions, as required by local rules. Instead, he moved for an order precluding live testimony at trial, and asserted his former attorney had tampered with certain evidence and given confidential attorney-client materials to opposing counsel. Ms. Westover, attorney for University, denied Singh's allegations of wrongdoing.

B. The Settlement

In the final week before the scheduled October 13 trial date, Singh remained unprepared for trial and ignored University's repeated requests to meet and confer, and prepare the required trial documents. On October 12, Singh finally met with University's counsel (Westover) but appeared at the meeting without exhibits, exhibit lists, or jury instructions. Westover then again offered a settlement to Singh, the terms of which included a waiver of costs recovered by a codefendant against Singh, a payment of $10,000, and an agreement to hire Singh to teach one semester at the pay rate of $35,000. The parties continued to negotiate and Singh, who needed cash to pay outstanding bills, asked for $15,000 plus an advance of $10,000 against his teaching salary, with the remainder being paid over the course of the semester. University agreed, and the parties began preparing the written documentation of the settlement agreement. Westover agreed to finalize the written agreement that evening and to e-mail it to Singh that night so they could sign it the following day. Westover contacted the court to inform it of the settlement, and the clerk told Westover it would be necessary to appear for trial call the following day.

Westover completed the draft of the settlement agreement and employment letters, e-mailed them to Singh, and asked Singh to contact the department chair to discuss courses for the semester. Westover also asked Singh to arrive early at court the next day to sign the settlement papers.

The following morning, Singh and Westover met outside the courtroom and Singh asked to alter the agreement. He wanted to increase the advance payment to a total of $35,000, with a corresponding reduction in his semester payments. Westover stated she needed University approval because of collective bargaining concerns and would contact University to determine if that was feasible; they then entered the courtroom. At that time, the parties told the court they had reached a tentative settlement with a total value of approximately $50,000, but they were still discussing the amount of the salary advance. Singh stated it was a tentative settlement, and that he wanted a hearing with a settlement judge, but the court replied there did not appear to be a need for that hearing. Westover surmised Singh wanted a settlement judge to get a "second opinion" on the fairness of the terms, but the court stated there appeared to be no need for a settlement judge and, at this late date, Singh should either agree to the terms or reject them and go to trial. The court then trailed the matter to allow the parties to determine if the money could be allocated in an acceptable manner.

The parties then left the courtroom and Westover obtained University's approval to increase the salary advance to $19,000, with a corresponding reduction of the salary to $16,000. The parties then interlineated the settlement documents to reflect this new allocation of the salary component of the agreement, and Singh signed the written settlement agreement. They then returned to the courtroom to confirm the settlement on the record. Westover advised the court on the record that the final agreement had been approved, Singh had signed the interlineated agreement, and Westover would reprint the document and obtain signatures on the new agreement. The court then specifically asked whether Singh had signed the agreement and assented to its terms, and Singh said yes. The court then stated the case would be dismissed without prejudice, with the understanding the parties would submit a dismissal with prejudice within 30 days, and the hearing concluded.

C. The Hearing to Enforce the Settlement

The following Monday, Singh began reneging on the settlement agreement. He first asked Westover to amend the agreement to provide he would receive tenure; Westover declined the request. On October 20, Singh wrote to the trial judge asking for "leniency" until he could find an attorney to assist his decision on whether to settle or to go to trial. However, Westover continued communicating with Singh to tender the check and to encourage Singh to arrange his teaching responsibilities. On October 26, Singh appeared in court, asking for some undefined ex parte relief, and apparently resurrected his accusations of illegal or unethical conduct by attorneys Golden and Westover. Westover stated she had made no misrepresentations to Singh to induce his agreement to settle, and assured the court there had been no misconduct in the deposition of Taylor, the handling of exhibits, or the receipt of privileged information. Westover advised the court she had the settlement check and was prepared to tender it, but Singh stated "I don't want it." The court resolved the impasse by directing the parties to file cross-motions--one by Singh to set aside the settlement, and one by University to enforce the settlement--and set a hearing for December 9.

University timely filed its motion to enforce the settlement, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6,^[2]with severance of the conditions requiring Singh to return to work and for University to pay Singh for that work. Singh's cross-motion, made without citation to legal authority, argued the settlement should be set aside because University's attorney had engaged in fraud and unethical conduct. University's reply noted Singh did not dispute the underlying facts showing the settlement was enforceable under section 664.6, and denied Singh's allegations of collateral misconduct by its attorney.

The court ruled the settlement was valid and binding, Singh was provided ample time to decide whether to settle, and no grounds (under either section 473 or otherwise) existed to set aside the settlement agreement. After confirming that Singh consented to sever the employment condition and compensation element from the remainder of the settlement agreement, the court's judgment ordered the settlement agreement (excluding the employment condition and compensation) specifically enforced.

II

LEGAL STANDARDS

Section 664.6 provides: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. . . ." This sectiongrants authority to a trial court to enforce settlement agreements without the need to file a new lawsuit. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809.)

To be enforceable pursuant to the summary procedures of section 664.6, a settlement agreement must either be entered into orally before a court or must be in writing and signed by the parties. These alternative requirements are designed to "decrease the likelihood of misunderstandings . . . . Thus the statute requires the 'parties' to stipulate in writing or orally before the court that they have settled the case. The litigants' direct participation tends to ensure that the settlement is the result of their mature reflection and deliberate assent. This protects the parties against hasty and improvident settlement agreements by impressing upon them the seriousness and finality of the decision to settle, and minimizes the possibility of conflicting interpretations of the settlement. [Citations.] It also protects parties from impairment of their substantial rights without their knowledge and consent." (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 585, fn. omitted.)

When ruling on a motion to enter judgment to enforce a settlement agreement under section 664.6, the trial court acts as a trier of fact on whether the parties agreed to a valid and binding settlement, and may consider both oral testimony and declarations. If the same judge presides over both the settlement and the section 664.6 hearing, the judge also may use the benefit of his or her own recollection. (Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91, 97.) The appellate court then determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by substantial evidence.^[3](Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 565.)

III

ANALYSIS

A. Substantial Evidence

The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Singh entered into a valid and binding agreement to settle the action. The minutes of the court and the reporter's transcript both reflect a settlement was reached; University's counsel provided a declaration describing the terms of the agreement, as well as the written and signed copies of the agreement; the trial judge was present at the hearing at which Singh affirmed his agreement to the terms of the settlement; and Singh never claimed the settlement agreement did not reflect the agreement reached on October 13. The court in Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530 was presented with a factual showing substantively indistinguishable from the facts presented in this appeal: the minutes of the court recited that a settlement had been reached; the declaration of the moving party's counsel stated the terms of the settlement reached between the parties and attached the written agreement reflecting the terms; the appellant did not dispute that the terms recited by the moving party's counsel and contained in the writing were an accurate statement of the terms agreed upon at the hearing; and the judge who presided at the court hearing at which the settlement was reached also presided at the hearing on the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and therefore knew the terms recited in the moving party's motion were the terms agreed to by the parties at the earlier hearing.^[4](Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1533-1534.) The Kohn court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the factual finding under section 664.6 that the parties entered into a valid and binding agreement to settle the litigation. (Ibid.) We similarly conclude substantial evidence supports the factual finding that Singh and University entered into a valid and binding agreement to settle the litigation, and therefore the order entered under section 664.6 should be affirmed.

B. The Refusal to Vacate the Settlement

Singh's principal claim appears to be that he was forced to agree to the settlement because, in the months leading to trial, his ability to prevail at trial had been crippled by his attorney's malfeasance^[5]and the improper conduct of University's counsel,^[6]and conduct amounted to extrinsic fraud that would allow the court to vacate the settlement agreement and restore his case for trial.

A court has the power to set aside a judgment when the party shows the judgment was obtained because his or her opponent deprived the movant of the opportunity to have a trial by exercising extrinsic fraud or because the opponent conspired with the movant's attorney to ensure an adverse judgment was entered against the moving party. (See, e.g., United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61; Caldwell v. Taylor (1933) 218 Cal. 471.) However, Singh presented his claims (and the evidentiary basis therefore) to the trial court below, but the trial court rejected his motion to vacate, impliedly concluding Singh had not been the victim of extrinsic fraud or of a conspiracy between his attorney and University's attorney. Although Singh appears to suggest on appeal that we should reweigh his evidence of extrinsic fraud or conspiracy, it is for the trial court to weigh the evidence and determine questions of fact, and this court is limited to deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that University's counsel did not perpetrate extrinsic fraud or engage in a conspiracy with Singh's counsel. (See, e.g., Sanserino v. Shamberger (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 630, 634.)

There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling. (Cf. Estate of Carter (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154 [review of ruling on motion to vacate limited to deciding whether substantial evidence supports ruling].) Singh's former attorney and University's counsel both denied Singh's allegations, which alone would suffice to support the ruling. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.) Moreover, apart from Singh's conclusory allegations and arguments, there was no evidence undermining the veracity of the attorneys' denials. On this record, the trial court's ruling denying Singh's request to vacate the judgment may not be reversed.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. University is entitled to costs on appeal.

McDONALD, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McINTYRE, J.

AARON, J.

Publication courtesy of San Diego pro bono legal advice.

Analysis and review provided by Poway Property line attorney.

^[1] Singh subsequently tried to take Taylor's deposition a second time but the court refused to allow a second deposition.

^[2] All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

^[3] Although an appellate court exercises de novo review on the question of whether the statutory requirements of section 664.6 were met (Conservatorship of McElroy (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 536, 544), Singh does not dispute that the statutory requirements were satisfied here. There was a writing signed by the party to be charged (Levy v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 580), and there was also an oral affirmation by Singh before the court confirming his agreement to the terms contained in the writing. (Johnson v. Department of Corrections (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1700, 1703-1704.) Accordingly, we examine only whether there was substantial evidence to support the court's ruling.

^[4] Singh asserts Kohn is distinguishable because Kohn did not have claims of evidence tampering, collusion between attorneys, and attorney perjury that so undermined the settling party's case on the merits that it pressured the settling party into accepting the settlement. However, these claims were presented to and rejected by the trial court below, and because substantial evidence supports rejection of Singh's factual assertions (see section III.B), Kohn remains controlling.

^[5] Singh apparently contends he gave an employment handbook to his attorney that specified it was University policy to retain certain records for two years, but when his attorney returned it to him it had been altered to state it was University policy to retain certain records for one year, and this was somehow critical to Singh's claim against University. He also claimed he gave his attorney a list of questions for his attorney to ask University witnesses, but his attorney turned those over to University's counsel.

^[6] Singh apparently claimed University attorneys (1) "bought" favorable testimony from a key witness (2) paid Singh's attorneys to work against Singh's interests, (3) prematurely cancelled the appearance of all witnesses the day before trial, and (4) obtained an order quashing a trial subpoena for a critical witness by perpetrating a fraud on the court. University's counsel categorically denied these allegations.