Trujillo v. Huerta

Filed 6/21/07 Trujillo v. Huerta CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Andria K. Richey, Judge. Affirmed.

J. B. Casas, Jr., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Richard A. Hofman and Richard A. Hofman for Defendants and Respondents.

Nelson Atilio Trujillo (appellant) filed a complaint for specific performance, breach of contract, quiet title, equitable estoppel, and declaratory relief against Saul Huerta, Nubia Huerta, Jose Raul Huerta, and Elsi A. Huerta (collectively referred to as respondents, individually referred to by their first names for the sake of clarity, with no disrespect intended) after they attempted to evict him from a home in which respondents held title. Respondents filed two demurrers which were sustained with leave to amend.[1] The trial court sustained the demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend and the action was dismissed. We affirm the judgment (order of dismissal).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of this appeal, we assume the facts alleged by appellant in his pleading are true. (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 814.)

Appellant is married to Yvette Trujillo, the sister of respondent Saul and the daughter of respondents Jose and Elsi. In 1998, respondents purchased a home in La Puente (hereinafter the Property). Appellant alleged that prior to the purchase of the Property, he entered into an oral contract with respondents wherein it was agreed that they would purchase the property for appellant and Saul.[2] Appellant and Saul were to occupy the Property jointly and each would pay one-half of the taxes, mortgage payments, insurance, and maintenance. In exchange, respondents would give appellant an interest in the Property. According to this agreement, Saul, Nubia, Jose, and Elsi would remain on title but Saul and appellant would be equitable owners. The agreement also provided that 50% of the title would be transferred to appellant when he Requested that it be transferred to him.

Appellant and Saul took possession of the Property and appellant paid one-half of the mortgage, property taxes, insurance, and maintenance. At some point prior to May 2005, respondents served appellant with a notice to quit the Property and appellant instituted this action. Appellant alleged that he performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on his part to be performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of that agreement except those that required respondents cooperation, and that respondents breached the agreement by failing to transfer a 50 percent interest to him and acknowledge his ownership in the Property.

Respondents demurrer to the second amended complaint, filed in November 2005, contended that the complaint was vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible, with a failure to allege the material terms of the contract, in particular, the element of consideration.

The trial courts minute order dated December 21, 2005, stated: Court will sustain demurrer without leave to amend for the reasons stated in the moving papers at pages 5-7. The terms of the alleged oral contract remain deficient, despite three attempts to plead a proper contract. Although plaintiff argues in the opposition that consideration is reasonable if plaintiff agrees to pay the fair value of the property, there is nothing in any of the pleadings to date, including the opposition, suggesting that plaintiff agreed to pay anything. The fact that he is paying rent is irrelevant to this issue, as pled. He has not alleged that there was any agreement that the property would be transferred to him if he paid a certain price; nor has he alleged he has tendered any such price. All claims are defective as a result. . . .

The order of dismissal was entered on January 25, 2006.

DISCUSSION

On appeal of an order sustaining a demurrer, we review the complaint de novo and determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action. (Lee v. Los AngelesCounty Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 853.) Then we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. (Ibid.)

The basis of each of the causes of action in appellants complaint is that respondents made an oral agreement which they failed to honor.

Under California law, a contract will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite (and this is a question of law) for the court to ascertain the parties obligations and to determine whether those obligations have been performed or breached. (Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 613, 623.) To be enforceable, a promise must be definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the duty[,] and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for the assessment of damages. (Ladas v. CaliforniaState Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 770; see also Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone [(1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 396] at p. 407.) Where a contract is so uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties in material particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and unenforceable. (Cal. Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, 481; see also Civ. Code,  1598; Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. (Rest.2d Contracts, 33, subd. (2); accord, Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick [(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793] at p. 811.) But [if] . . . a supposed contract does not provide a basis for determining what obligations the parties have agreed to, and hence does not make possible a determination of whether those agreed obligations have been breached, there is no contract. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 209.)

Here, the details of the alleged oral agreement are conspicuously absent from the complaint. In particular, the complaint does not allege when respondents would effect the transfer in title; merely that they would do so at the request of appellant. Unlike Khoury v. Malys of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, cited by appellant, the complaint does not set forth performance within a commercially reasonable time which was known to both parties. (Id. at p. 616.) The complaint does not include any details about the amounts to be paid and the time those payments were to be made. For example, was appellant bound to inhabit the premises and make the monthly payments for a fixed term, or could he request a transfer of title immediately?

Also missing from the complaint are any allegations regarding the consideration to be paid for the transfer of title. In order to establish a contract, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish that consideration was given for the oral agreement. (Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist Church (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1135-1137, citing Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 242, 259.) Consideration is a benefit conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor or prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered as an inducement to the promisor. (Conservatorship of OConnor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1102; Civ. Code, 1605.)

Appellant contends that his payment of one-half of the monthly mortgage, maintenance, and taxes was the consideration for the promise to transfer title, but this brings us back to the defects we have noted. Was there a set amount to be paid or a fixed period of time before title was to be transferred? All appellant alleged is that he was paying a monthly amount to respondents and was occupying the property in exchange. There is nothing to suggest that he had to do anything further to obtain title, other than simply ask for it.

As appellant did not plead the terms of a valid and enforceable contract, his causes of action for specific performance, quiet title, and declaratory relief also fail.

Appellant also pleads a cause of action for equitable estoppel. In order to establish equitable estoppel, it must be established that respondents intended to induce reliance by appellant, or acted so as to cause appellant to reasonably believe that reliance was intended. (Medina v. Board of Retirement (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 864, 868.) The required elements for promissory estoppel in California are . . . (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) his reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance. (Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 890, citing Thomson v. Internat. Alliance of Stage Employees (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 446, 454.) Appellant does not allege how the promise by respondents caused him to act to his detriment or whether he changed his position in reliance on respondents promise. All he alleges is that he occupied the Property and paid one-half of the mortgage and expenses. No estoppel has been pled.

Finally, we decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. In determining whether the defect in the complaint can be cured by amendment, the burden is on the plaintiff to so demonstrate, whether to the trial court or to this court. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 853-854.) After ample notice of the deficiencies, appellant had two opportunities to amend his complaint to provide the particular elements of the contract but failed to do so in his amended pleadings. Nor has he explained to this court how he can amend his complaint to allege an enforceable agreement. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order of dismissal) is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

SUZUKAWA, J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J. MANELLA, J.

Publication Courtesy of San Diego County Legal Resource Directory.

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[1] The original complaint included a cause of action for interference with economic interest which was later omitted from subsequent amended pleadings.

[2] Although the complaint says Raul in paragraph 7, we assume that this was a typographical error and that appellant meant Saul, and not Jose Raul, as appellant alleged that Saul shared possession of the property.