In re G.F.

Filed 5/31/07 In re G.F. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Jacqueline H. Lewis, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Judy Weissberg-Ortiz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Appeal by Joyce C., (appellant) mother of minors G.F. and Gi.F. (minors) from juvenile courts May 17, 2006, jurisdictional findings and declaration of dependency.[1] We find that substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction finding of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).[2] Finding no error, we affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The history of this case begins in the Family Law Court. On November 29, 2005, in connection with the parents dissolution action, the family court awarded legal custody of the minors to the parents jointly and primary physical custody of the minors to the appellant. The minors father, Jose F. (Father), was awarded weekend visits on the second and fourth weekends of each month.

Immediately thereafter, on November 30, 2005, a call was placed to the Child Abuse Hotline bringing the family to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (Department). The call indicated that the minors were at risk of emotional harm by their father.[3]A social worker from the Department investigated the referral and interviewed the appellant, Father and the minors. Appellant told social worker that father was breaking into the house by opening windows with a screwdriver, has been stalking the family and threatened to kill the child G. with a large kitchen knife. The minors gave similar reports to the social worker.

On December 12, 2005, as a result of the social workers preliminary investigation and the allegations, the Department filed a petition pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions code alleging that the minors were persons described under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (i) and (j).[4]All of the allegations of the petition pertained to Father. The court considered a Detention Report, dated the same date. The report detailed the interviews of appellant and the minors.[5]

At the arraignment and detention hearing held that date, the juvenile court ordered that the minors be detained from the father and released to the custody of appellant. Fathers visits with the minors were ordered to be monitored in a neutral setting. The court issued a temporary restraining order against the father. The matter was set for January 3, 2006 for an order to show cause for a permanent order.

On January 3, 2006, the Department filed its first jurisdiction and disposition report with the court.[6] That report included information received from the minors and appellant. Appellant reported that an incident occurred in May 2005 when father went with appellant and the children to Hurricane Harbor at Magic Mountain. Approximately two weeks after the outing, G. told appellant that while in the locker room, his father brandished a big knife and tried to hide it in the sleeve of G.s shirt. When G. asked about the knife, Father told him he was going to use the knife to kill appellant and that he would kill the entire family if G. told anyone about the incident. Appellant further reported that Father had poked G. with the knife in a threatening manner. Appellant reported the incident to the Burbank Police Department, but they refused to take any action.

Appellant also reported that Father had broken into her home on several occasions and threatened to kill both children. He had broken into the home as recently as November 25, 2005. Appellant told the investigator that she believed that Father was coming into the home to obtain information regarding appellants financial accounts. Appellant believed that Father was interested in obtaining a portion of the settlement proceeds from another daughters wrongful death. Appellant admitted that she had never personally caught Father breaking into the home, but she sees evidence that he has been there. Specifically, she states she had found the windows in the home broken into with their screens unhooked, the lock on the garage door broken, her clothes moved around in her closet, and a lot of her paperwork was taken and later returned (after father makes copies, according to mother). Appellant also reported that Father has followed her around in his car five or six times and that when he breaks in the house; he hides in the attic, in closets, or behind the (large-screen) television. Appellant stated these entries generally happened when she was in the kitchen, and the children would see him but do not tell her because he threatened them.

Appellant also reported an incident where Father allegedly tied Gi. to a chair with rope and put tape over her mouth to keep her from calling for help. Father reportedly told Gi. that he would kill us all if she did not do what he said. Gi. did not report the incident to appellant until several days after it occurred. Appellant estimated that Father has broken into the home twenty times.

In response to an inquiry by the investigator, appellant reported an incident in April 2002 where Father stabbed himself in the leg with a knife and was subsequently involuntarily hospitalized at the psychiatric ward at Olive View Medical Center. She reported this incident occurred after she confronted him about cheating on her and he got angry. She continued, stating he would always get really [angry] and hit walls and things. Mother clarified that he was sober at the time of this incident. Mother also reiterated her belief the Father has problems and needs help.

The investigator interviewed G. and he also described the knife incident at Hurricane Harbor. G. said that his father poked him along his left arm with a knife. G. then stated [i]t didnt hurt, it made little holes. It was bleeding. The investigator did not observe any marks, cuts, or scars on either of G.s arms. G. also stated that after the incident, Father tried to put the knife up G.s sleeve. Neither his mother nor his sister was present when this incident occurred.

G. also reported that Father comes into the house and tells him if you dont make a mess Ill kill you. When questioned as to why his father wanted him to make a mess, G. stated [s]o my mom has to clean and he could hide behind the mess. G. said his father comes into the house through the garage or the windows and then hides inside the house. G. told the investigator he was afraid of his father and afraid that Father will come out of the attic with his knife. G. told the investigator that Father tied Gi. to a chair with rope on her hands and feet. However, G. indicated that he did personally see the incident. G. told the investigator that he saw the incident where Father stabbed himself in the leg.

The investigator also interviewed the daughter, Gi. When questioned, Gi. claimed to recall the incident where G. was poked in arm with a knife. She obtained her information from G. Gi. also gave accounts of Father entering the house through various vents, windows and other openings. Gi. reported her fear of her father and her belief that he would kill them.

The investigator concluded that [t]he children appear to have been traumatized by what they perceive to be threatening actions by their father. They are frightened of him, particularly Gi. Based on their statements, placing either child in their fathers care would be inappropriate. It is therefore respectfully recommended that they remain placed in their mothers care.

On January 3, 2006, the court conducted a hearing and the temporary restraining order was reissued and the case was set for adjudication on February 22, 2006. An order to show cause for a permanent order was continued to the same date.

On February 22, 2006, the Department filed a first amended section 300 petition, which now also contained allegations against appellant. Specifically, it was alleged that appellant was inadequately supervising the minors, that she was exposing the minors to violent altercations with Father, and that she was inducing the minors to erroneously believe that Father had broken into their residence and threatened them with harm. The first amended petition repeated the initial allegations against Father; many of which were subsequently dismissed by the court, upon request of the Department.

On February 22, 2006, a new social worker filed a new jurisdiction and disposition report.[7] The investigator stated that none of the allegations of various violent or threatening acts by Father appeared to be true. In preparation of this new report, the social worker spoke with various individuals including both parents, four of appellants neighbors and also visited appellants residence. As a result of her investigation, the social worker concluded the following regarding the allegation that father had poked G. with a knife at Magic Mountain/Hurricane Harbor: It defies reason that [Father] would be able to slip such a large, threatening object out of the house, into Hurricane Harbor and to believe he could conceal it in this small boys clothing. . . .  Mothers report as to how the knife was removed from the home and later returned also makes no sense.

The claim that Father was regularly breaking into the house also makes no sense. She noted that the neighboring homes are only a few feet away. Additionally,

None of the neighbors who closely scrutinize this household has ever seen anyone attempting to crawl into a window. Further, the windows are unscreened and left open for days at a time. At least one of the windows mother alleges father uses (above the bathtub) is much too small for a grown man to crawl through. The other windows are readily visible from the street and from the next-door neighbors home. [Appellants] account that [Father] gains entry to the attic through a ceiling crawl space also makes no sense as it cannot be reached from the ground without a ladder.

The social worker also questioned Gi.s accounts that her father tied her to a chair. She found that Gi. was unable to provide any detail or context, even under close questioning. Her only statement he roped me was repetitious and seemingly rote. [] As noted before, mothers home is very small probably less than 1,000 square feet. Again, it defies reason that father would perform such a threatening and frightening act while mother was only a few feet away.

The investigator also contacted the Burbank Police Department and was informed that there was no record of any reports of illegal entry into appellants residence during the preceding two years. She attached a report from an investigation by the Burbank Police Department into the break-in allegations made by appellant against Father. Appellant had reported to Officer Rickard that Father had come into the residence on some twenty-five occasions without her consent. She did not notice the break-ins because she was always doing the dishes or cleaning, and her dogs did not bark at Father because he throws the dogs around. Officer Rickard was of the opinion that appellants story of twenty-five undiscovered trespasses by her ex-husband while she was present in the home is not credible. The officer was also of the opinion that the minors had been coached by appellant to repeat that Father came inside the house through the window.

The report did not change the Departments recommendations regarding custody and visitation, but the Department reported grave concerns about appellants actions, her mental health and the level of care she was providing to the minors.

On February 22, 2006, the juvenile court dismissed the December 12, 2005 petition and the first amended petition was filed. All of the allegations against Father contained in the first amended petition were dismissed. The matter was continued until April 13, 2006 for a contested hearing. However, by March 14, 2006, the Departments concerns about appellants behavior and the safety of the minors caused the Department to file a section 385 ex parte application seeking removal of the minors from appellants custody and their placement with their father. The report stated that mother appears to be emotional unwell, which has led her to instill unreasonable fear of their father in the children on an ongoing basis. Further, appellant had continued to resist visitations from occurring between Father and the minors. Appellant reluctantly brought the minors to the DCFS office for a monitored visit to take place. At that time, she objected in the minors presence that it was wrong for them to be forced to see their father. In spite of interference from appellant and appellants sister, the social worker reported that the children had an exceptionally rewarding visit with their father in spite of having been kept from seeing him for at least six months. Within minutes of the visit starting, they began to hug and kiss him. They climbed on his lap and chattered about school, the Lenten season and so forth. They drew pictures with him. . . .

The Department also identified further concerns regarding appellants mental stability and the safety of the minors in her custody. Among the items identified were:

        Appellant refused to disclose to the Department the identity of the minors counselor.

        Appellant kept her fathers unembalmed remains in her garage.

        Two to three years earlier, appellant, referring to a ten-year-old child, had accused the paternal grandparents of keeping a woman for Father.

        Appellant continued to be convinced that Father was hiding in her house.

The opinion of the social worker was that appellant may in fact be operating under a delusional system of thought and encouraging similar thoughts in her children. [] These children have, on an ongoing basis, experienced dual realities: that which their mother has imposed upon them and what they actually experience.

The Department filed a supplemental report, dated March 14, 2006, informing the court that, the previous day, appellant and her brother (posing as an attorney) went to the childrens school and demanded to see the minors. When the school personnel denied appellants request, she became belligerent and accused the school secretary of having an affair with Father and sneaking him inside the school. The school officials reported that appellants language was very abusive and seemingly delusional.

At the March 14, 2006 hearing on the Departments ex parte application for the detention of the minors from the appellant, the juvenile court denied the Departments application on the basis that the request had not been properly presented before the court and that the Department should file the appropriate petition in which to allow the court to proceed. As a result, on March 15, 20025, the Department filed its second amended section 300 petition, and reiterated its request for the detention of the minors from appellant and release to Father. The second amended petition alleged that the minors were at risk of harm due to:

        The parents history of violent altercation [(a)(1) and (b(1)]

        [A]ppellants mental and emotional problems, including the delusional belief that [F]ather was hiding inside her residence, that G. was being threatened at knife point and that Gi. was tied with a rope [(b)(2)] and (c)(1)];

        [F]athers mental and emotional problems, including the 2002 incident of self-stabbing and subsequent hospitalization [(b)(3)];

        [A]ppellants failure to ensure the minors regular school attendance [b)(4)]; and

        [A]ppellants failure to adequately supervise the minors when they played outside their home. [(b)(5)].

After consideration of the new information, on March 15, 2006, the court ordered that the minors be detained from appellant and be released to Father. Appellants visits were ordered to be monitored.

The contested disposition hearing began on April 13, 2006 and continued intermittently until May 17, 2006. Those testifying at trial included: the emergency response social worker who detained the children; the social worker who prepared the first jurisdiction and disposition report; the social worker who prepared the amended jurisdiction and disposition report; the minors, appellant, appellants friend, and the minors ten-year-old cousin.

The social worker, Ms. Duval testified regarding the results of her investigation and her jurisdiction and disposition report of February 22, 2006. She also testified that she spoke with the minors one week after they had been placed with their father and they told her that they were not afraid of their father and liked being with him.

G. testified at the hearing that his father had never told him he was going to kill him. He also recanted his report that his father had hidden in the attic. During this testimony, appellant began yelling at Father in the open courtroom and was admonished by the bailiff to remain quiet. After a few more minutes, while G. was still testifying, appellant stomped out of the courtroom. The proceedings were interrupted while the court waited for appellant to reenter the courtroom.

On May 17, 2006, at the conclusion of the testimony and both sides having rested, the court began to render its decision. At this point, appellant became verbally belligerent, stating to the court [w]hatever you are saying does not make no sense and I told you at the beginning of this case, I dont want you in the case. I want to change courts. I want to change courts. This interruption caused appellant to be escorted from the courtroom.

Ultimately the court stated its conclusions:

I actually cannot really say it any better than the one line of [minors counsel]. That was these children have been transitioned between mothers delusional world and reality. I think that really sums up this case without making a really extensive record.

[] . . . []

The court is not a therapist, but mothers testimony was inconsistent, erratic and delusional. The record is frankly replete with evidence to substantiate that, as well as mothers testimony, although frankly mothers testimony is some of the most telling here.

The court found the minors to be persons described under section 300, subdivision (b) and (c). The court declared the minors to be dependents of the juvenile court and placed them in custody of Father. Later, the court was stating the details of the orders and added the following explanation of his ruling: Court believes mother is detrimental to both the physical and emotion health of these children, and any unmonitored contact she has with them further exacerbates the situation until mother is stable.

On May 25, 20026, mother filed a timely notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The juvenile court sustained the petition as alleged in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 300. To sustain a jurisdictional finding under section 300, the juvenile court must make the necessary findings by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to both the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908, 924; In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) As the Court of Appeal explained in the case of In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649: We review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, which supports the courts conclusions. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. In making this determination, all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 168.) The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.)

Additionally, under the substantial evidence rule, we have no power to pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine where the weight of the evidence lies. Rather, we accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.] (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, (disapproved on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6); In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) We must affirm the juvenile courts decision unless it can be said that no rational fact finder could have reached the same conclusion. (In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 629; In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 535, 563.)

APPELLANTS CONTENTIONS

Appellant contends that substantial evidence did not support the courts jurisdictional findings pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).[8] Specifically, appellant contends that substantial evidence did not support a jurisdictional finding that, under count b-1, [appellant] engaged in behavior that constituted neglectful conduct, as a result of which G. and Gi. actually suffered, or there was a substantial risk that they would suffer, serious physical harm or illness, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). According to appellants assessment of the facts, [t]here simply was no showing of any serious physical harm or illness or substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness linked to [appellant]. In addition, [appellant] had no history of physically assaultive behavior.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

Section 300, subdivision (b) provides that the court can assume jurisdiction over a minor when:

[T]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parents or guardians mental illness, developmental disability, or substance

abuse. . . . 

Section 300, subdivision (c) allows jurisdiction when:

The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care. . . . 

To prove a minor comes within the definition of section 300, subdivision (c), the Department must establish the following: (1) serious emotional damage as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior or a substantial risk of severe emotional harm if jurisdiction is not assumed; (2) offending parental conduct; and (3) causation. (In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, 557.)

We find there is sufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional finding of the court. Without repeating the detail of events as described above, we find the evidence is beyond sufficient; it is compelling that appellant in this case is engaging in behavior which is extremely damaging to the well-being of her children. Without the expert assistance of psychiatric professionals, we will not attempt to assess the origin of her mental health issues, however, she has involved her children in a virtual fantasy land of accusations toward their father, which caused the children to believe that their natural father was intent on killing them, that he was stalking their home and spying on them, that he had even injured G. with a knife and had tied Gi. to a chair. It is beyond debate that appellants actions in this regard and the fear that it created in the children was harmful to their physical and mental well being. The juvenile court was well justified in reaching the conclusions regarding jurisdiction in this case.

Appellant also challenges the conclusion, arguing that [n]one of the DCFS social workers assigned to the case ever witnessed [appellant] failing to adequately supervise G. or Gi. Also, [t]he neighbors who complained about Mothers lack of supervision of her children only spoke to the [Department Investigator]. None of them called the child abuse hotline to report that [appellant] was neglecting the children. There were no referrals for negligence on [appellants] part regarding supervision of the children. The juvenile court heard evidence at the contested hearing on this allegation and sustained this count in the petition. The evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the juvenile courts findings and order.

We are also mindful that a reversal of the jurisdictional order is not required when substantial evidence supports the other allegations. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112-113.) It is well-established that [t]he reviewing court may affirm a juvenile court judgment if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several grounds[,] without addressing a claim that substantial evidence does not support another ground. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 873, 875; see also In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 630; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330.)

Disposition

Appellant also challenges the dispositional order of the court. Her argument is since the jurisdictional orders regarding [appellant] must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence, the courts dispositional order removing G. and Gi. from [appellants] custody are rendered moot. For the reasons stated above, we have found that substantial evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. We also find further that the courts removal order was made on the basis of clear and convincing evidence and independently valid.

Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides that a minor may be taken from the custodial parent if [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well being of the minor or would be if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minors physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minors parents or guardians physical custody. At a dispositional hearing, the juvenile courts findings must be made on clear and convincing evidence. The court must find that the welfare of the child requires that she be removed from parental custody because of a substantial danger, or risk of danger, to her physical health if she is returned home and that there are no reasonable means to protect her without removing her. [Citations.] (In re Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal. App.4th 1635, 1654.) In making this determination, the childs best interests are paramount. (In re Corey A. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 339, 346-347.) The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the childs interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.)

We review the juvenile courts findings using the substantial evidence test, bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof. [Citations.] (In re Kristin H, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 1654, see also In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170.) A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, overruled on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 748, fn. 6.)

We find that the substantial evidence that supported the juvenile courts order finding jurisdiction over the children in this case also justified removing the children from the custody of appellant in this case. In additional to the allegations of the petition, the juvenile court also observed the children and appellant on the stand and in the courtroom. During the juvenile courts statement of its reasons for taking jurisdiction, the court also noted: in regard to the childrens testimony, this court was very concerned in regard to mothers intimidation of the witnesses while sitting on the witness stand in open court in front of the judge and everyone else. I can only imagine what shes done to the other witnesses outside of the court. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts removal of the children and their placement with their father.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COOPER, P. J.

We concur:

BOLAND, J.

FLIER, J.

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[1] Minors father, Jose F., has not filed an appeal from the orders of the juvenile court.

[2] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[3] In March 2002, there was a prior referral to the Department after the parents engaged in a physical altercation while father was driving and the children were in the backseat of the car. Both parents filed police reports as a result of that incident.

[4] The allegations of the petition are:

[A-1, B-1, I-1, J-1]: On or about 11-25-05, the children [G.F.] and [Gi.F.]s father, Jose A. [F.] physically abused the child [G]. Said physical abuse includes the childs father stabbing the child in the arm with a knife and threatening to kill the child. Such physical abuse of the child was excessive and caused the child unreasonable pain and suffering. Further that physical abuse of the child by the childs father endangers the child physical and emotional health and safety and places the child and childs sibling [Gi.] at risk of physical harm, damage, danger and death.

[A-2, B-2, J-2]: On or about 11-25-05, the children [G.F.] and [Gi.F.]s father, Jose A. [F.] established an endangering situation for the children in that the childrens father broke into the childrens home. Further the child [G.]s father threatened the child with a knife and repeatedly made statements about killing the child. Further the childs fathers stuck the child in the arm with a knife. Such an endangering situation established for the child by the childs mother endangers the childs physical and emotional health and safety and places the child and the childs sibling [Gi.] at risk of physical harm, damage, danger and death.

[A-3, B-3, J-3]: On or about 11-25-05, the children [G.F.] and [Gi.F.]s father, Jose A. [F.] established an endangering situation for the children in that the childrens father broke into the childrens home. Further the child [Gi.]s father tied the child up and put tape over the childs mouth to prevent the child from calling for help. Such an endangering situation established for the child by the childs mother endangers the childs physical and emotional health and safety and places the child and the childs sibling [G.] at risk of physical harm, damage, danger and death.

[A-4, B-4.]: The children [G.F.] and [Gi.F.]s father, Jose A. [F.] has a history of engaging in violent altercations with childrens mother, [Joyce C.]. Said violent altercations include but are not limited to in March 2002, the childrens father struck childrens mother on the face and pushed the childrens mother out of the fathers car. Further the childrens father repeatedly threat[ens] to kill the childrens in the childrens presence. Such violent conduct by the childrens father endangers the childrens physical and emotional health and safety and places the children at risk of physical harm, and damage.

[B-5.]: The children [G.F.] and [Gi.F.]s father, Jose A. [F.] has demonstrated mental and emotional problems, including depression and suicidal ideation which limits the childrens fathers ability to provide the children with regular care and supervision. Further, on or about April 2002, the childrens father stabbed himself in the leg with a knife. Further the childrens father was involuntarily hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital for evaluation and treatment. Such mental and emotional problems of the childrens father endangers the childrens physical and emotional health, safety and well-being, creates a detrimental home environment and places the children at risk of physical and emotional harm in damage.

[5] The Detention Report was prepared by a social worker from the North Hollywood DCFS Office. The report noted that the social worker also interview the childrens maternal aunt Leslie Cruz. Ms. Cruz was also a social worker in that North Hollywood DCFS office. She repeated the allegations made by appellant in her interview. This report was favorable to appellant in all respects.

[6] This report was also prepared by a social worker from the North Hollywood DCFS office.

[7] This report states: A Pretrial Resolution Conference was on calendar 1/3/06. The investigator who prepared the report for that hearing was found to have a conflict of interest due to a maternal aunt employed in the same office as the investigator.

[8] Appellant emphasizes and respondent agrees that the question under section 300 is whether the circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm. (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.)