In re Antonio S.

Filed 7/12/07 In re Antonio S. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Jan Levine, Judge. Affirmed.

Anna L. Ollinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Maricela P.

Ernesto Paz Ray, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Federico M.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, Owen L. Gallagher, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Maricela P. and Umberto M. (appellants) appeal the orders of the juvenile court declaring certain children dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (j) and removing them from their custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1) and (c)(4).[1] They contend that the courts findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This family consists of appellant, Maricela P. (Mother), her current spouse and co-appellant, Federico M. (Umberto) and the following children, Antonio, Cielo, Miah [the natural children of Maricela P. and Hanoi S.],[2] and Joaquin [the natural child of Maricela and Umberto]. Prior to July 19, 2006, all four children were residing in the home of mother and Umberto.

The family first came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) in May 2004 when it was alleged that Antonio had been the victim of sexual abuse by an unknown perpetrator. The Department was unable to confirm the allegation and the matter was closed as unfounded.

In December 2005, Hanoi reported to the Department that Antonio had stated that his step-father, Umberto, had been, and was, sexually abusing him. The Department was again unable to confirm the allegation and the matter was closed as inconclusive.

On July 14, 2006, the Department filed a petition to declare all four minors dependents of the court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (c),(d), and (j)[3] of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The Department prepared a Detention Report for the court. The report advised the court that on July 19, 2006, Antonios teacher observed him making obscene sexual gesture stimulating masturbation and oral copulation. After being called into the office, Antonio told his teacher that, prior to going to bed, he would have to take a shower. He stated that after taking a shower he would get into bed, and his step-father, Umberto, would come into his room with a flashlight and get into bed with him. Antonio stated that they would then play a game where Umberto pretended to look for crabs in his butt. During the game, Umberto would place things into Antonios butt and then find them. Antonio stated that he believed Umberto put his finger into his anus because it hurt badly. He stated that after Umberto was finished playing with him, he would spray a mist in the room that smelled like bananas, and they would pretend that the mist made him sleepy.

Antonio stated that he told his mother what Umberto was doing; however mother told him not to tell anyone. Mother reportedly asked Umberto if he had done anything to Antonio and Umberto lied, saying no. Miah said she was not touched by Umberto. Cielo stated, Umberto makes her feel icky.

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie case for the childrens detention. The Department removed Joaquin from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt; the other half-siblings were placed with their father, Hanoi S. Mother was permitted to have monitored visitation with her children in a neutral setting with a Department monitor a minimum of two times per week. Additionally, Mother was to have reasonable telephone contact with the children. Mother could also have unmonitored visits with Joaquin at the aunts home. The court ordered monitored visitation between Umberto and Joaquin. However, no visitation was ordered between Umberto and Antonio, Cielo or Miah. The matter was continued to August 14, 2006 for a pre-trial resolution conference (PRC) and for adjudication on September 5, 2006.

On September 29, 2006, after a contested hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be true. The court determined that, by clear and convincing evidence, substantial danger existed to the physical health of the minors. Antonio, Cielo and Miah were ordered placed in the home of their natural father, and Joaquin was removed from his mothers home and placed in the home of his maternal aunt.

When reaching his conclusions, the juvenile court found:

Neither mother nor [Umberto] told a consistent story about where [Umberto] lived, and for what period of time. At the outset of the case, [Umberto] stated both to [Department] and to the court and detention, with mother present, that he lived with her, but by that time he testified at the adjudication, he said he spent only Friday nights that her home. When interviewed shortly after detention, mother said [Umberto] did not live with her; [Umberto] had just repeated some four times to [Department] that he did. Then, when faced with the contradiction, mother changed her story to say he lived with her a couple days a week. At trial, they finally told the same story that [Umberto] was there only on Friday nights except the Wednesday evening that [the Sheriffs deputy] found him there when he went to interview, and arrest, him.

[Umberto] and mother were also inconsistent about [Umberto] showering or not, with [Antonio]; whether he ever did; whether he did for a short while and stopped; whether he was just in the bathroom fully close to teach [Antonio] to wash his private parts, or whether he showered with him in his shorts. The substance of these factual issues matters far less than the fact that parents could not tell a straight story. That makes it impossible to know what the truth is, and causes the Court to wonder what else they have not been straightforward about, including their flat denials that the abuse ever occurred or that [Antonio] told his mother about it. (Emphasis in original.)

The juvenile court sustained the petition as alleged in subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (j) of section 300. As to disposition, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was, or would be, a substantial danger if the children were returned to their mother or Umberto. After removing the children from the custody of their mother, Antonio, Cielo and Miah were placed with their father, Hanoi S. Joaquin was removed from the custody of Mother and Umberto, and placed with his maternal aunt. Family maintenance services were ordered for Antonio, Cielo and Miah, and family reunification services were ordered for Joaquin. Mother was allowed monitored visits no less than two times a week; with Department discretion to liberalize. Umberto was allowed monitored visits with Joaquin; with Department discretion to liberalize. Various forms of counseling were ordered for both appellants and the children.

On October 10, 2006, the mother filed a Notice of Appeal from the jurisdiction and dispositional findings and orders of the court made on September 29, 2006. Umberto filed a similar Notice of Appeal on October 17, 2006.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Mothers Contentions:

Appellants contend that the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings and removal of the minors from the mothers home were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she alleges that as to the allegations of sexual abuse, there were no supporting facts alleging the purported acts were for the purpose of arousal, appeal or gratification. . . .  [] The evidence presented in this case is insufficient to support a finding that Umbertos touching of Antonios intimate parts was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification as set forth in Penal Code section 1165.1, subdivision (b)(4). There were no statements in the report by the deputy or in his testimony which would support a finding that Umberto touched Antonio for the purpose of sexual gratification. She also argues that because the evidence does not support the courts finding of sexual abuse, then the allegation that Antonio suffered or would suffer serious physical harm as a result of appellants failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect must also fail. For the same reason, she further contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the siblings were at risk of sexual abuse as well.

Additionally, Mother argues there was no evidence that Antonio was suffering or at the risk of suffering serious emotional damage due to irregular school attendance. Acknowledging that Antonio was a seriously disturbed child, Mother contends [a]bsent evidence that Antonios behavior problems were caused by his school absences, the court erred in sustaining this allegation. Without the connection between the school absences and Antonios emotional behavior, his emotional disturbances will not be attributed to the fault of his mother.

Mother also challenges the disposition order, arguing that the risks involved in returning Antonio to her custody were not established and there were reasonable alternatives to removal of the children from her home. Lastly, mother joins in any of Umbertos contentions.

Umbertos Contentions

Umberto contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that Umberto sexually abused Antonio and that the juvenile court erred when it removed Joaquin from Umberto because there was no proof of a substantial danger to the child if he were to return home. Umberto also joined in any of mothers arguments that might inure to his benefit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The juvenile court sustained the petition as alleged in subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (j) of section 300. To sustain a jurisdictional finding under section 300, the juvenile court must make the necessary findings by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)

We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to both the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908, 924; In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) As explained in the case of In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal. App.4th 1635, 1649: We review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, which supports the courts conclusions. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. [Citation.] In making this determination, all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564.) The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.)

Additionally, under the substantial evidence rule, we have no power to pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine where the weight of the evidence lies. Rather, we accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.] (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135 (disapproved on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6); In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) We must affirm the juvenile courts decision unless it can be said that no rational fact finder could have reached the same conclusion. (In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 629; In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 535, 563.)

DISCUSSION

Appellants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (j).[4]

Sexual Abuse Section 300, subdivision (d)

Appellants contentions regarding sufficiency of the evidence begin with a primary challenge to the allegation pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d) which applies when a child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse. Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (b)(4) defines sexual abuse to include: The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts (including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks) or the clothing covering them, of a child, or of the perpetrator by the child, for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification, except that, it does not include acts which may reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities; interactions with, or demonstrations of affection for, the child; or acts performed with a valid medical purpose.[5]

The standard of proof at a jurisdiction hearing that is required to sustain allegations of sexual abuse pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d) is a preponderance of the evidence. ( 356; 355, subd. (a).) Appellants contend here that this section does not apply because there were no supporting facts alleging the purported acts were for the purpose of arousal, appeal or gratification.[6]

Section 300, subdivision (d) allows the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of a minor where there is any intrusion by one person into the genitals or anal opening of another person, including the use of any object for this purpose. (Pen. Code 11165.1, subd. (b)(3).) The petition alleges, and Anthony testified, that this event occurred and the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions. (People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 221.)[7] The evidence is sufficient to sustain the section

300, subdivision (d) allegation.

There is also, separately considered, adequate evidence of intent. In cases of this variety, the determination of intent of the perpetrator can be based on a variety of factors. [T]he trier of fact looks to all the circumstances, including the charged act, to determine whether it was performed with the required specific intent. (People v. Scott [(1994)] 9 Cal.4th 331, 344, fn. 7; accord, People v. Owen (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 617, 619 [157 P.2d 432]; People v. McCurdy [(1923)] 60 Cal.App. 499, 502.). (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 445.) [T]he circumstances which bear on the sexual nature of the encounter are those facts which indicate that the actor touched the child in order to obtain sexual gratification. For this evaluation, the trier of fact has always been free to consider the relationship of the parties, the nature of the touching, and the presence or absence of any nonsexual purpose under section 288. (Id. at p. 450, fn. 16.) When appropriate, the trier of fact may also consider if any coercion, bribery, or deceit was used to obtain the victim's cooperation or to avoid detection. (People v. Hyche (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 661, 664)

Here, the evidence is that Umberto touched Antonio looking for crabs in his butt and inserted objects into his anus. Antonio testified that he thought Umberto also placed his finger in his anus, causing him severe pain. This activity was carried on at night under the bed covers with a flashlight. After the activity, Umberto would spray the room with room spray, which could arguable be done to help avoid detection of the activity. Even without independent evidence of intent, this described behavior is bizarre, inconsistent with any identifiably innocent purpose and sufficient to establish Umbertos intent to achieve sexual arousal. No purpose other than sexual gratification seems reasonable. No non-sexual explanation is provided or obvious from the facts.

Sufficiency of evidence re Mother

The evidence of sexual abuse is sufficient to sustain the petition against Mother in this incident. Antonio stated that he told his mother what Umberto was doing; however Mother told him not to tell anyone. The decision by Mother not to investigate the allegations by Antonio was in spite of the fact that there had been two prior reports of sexual abuse of Antonio. Although both investigations ended with unfounded or inconclusive findings, any responsible parent in Mothers situation would not simply have told their child not to tell anyone of the incidents. Similar allegations regarding parental inaction have been found sufficient to support jurisdiction in other cases. (See e.g., In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849; In re Katrina W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 441.)

Physical Harm - Section 300, subdivision (b)

The substantial evidence that supports the finding under section 300, subdivision (d). Umbertos abuse of Antonio places the children at risk of the same abuse also supports the finding of physical harm under section 300, subdivision (b).

Sibling Abuse - Section 300, subdivision (j)

Appellants contend substantial evidence does not support the finding under section 300, subdivision (j) (sibling abuse) that the sexual abuse of Antonio placed the remaining children at risk of being sexually abused. Section 300, subdivision (j) provides that a child who comes within the following description is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court: [t]he childs sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e) or (i) and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse of neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian and any other [facts] the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child. (See, In re Lucero L.,supra, 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1237, fn. 4) The substantial evidence that supports the finding under section 300, subdivision (d). Umbertos abuse of Antonio places the children at risk of the same abuse also supports the finding of sibling abuse under section 300, subdivision (j).

Serious Emotional Damage Section 300, subdivision (c)

The petition also alleged jurisdiction under Section 300 (c) which provides for jurisdiction where there is evidence that the children or were at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage. The factual allegations on which the subdivision (c) allegation was based stated that mothers failed to ensure that Antonio attended school on a regular basis. The Jurisdiction/Disposition report indicated that Antonio has a learning disability in auditory and visual motor perception and that he should be in a special day class. The report also indicated that while in mothers care, . . . Antonio . . .  and mother were sent to the Los Angeles County School Attendance Review Board (SARB.) A referral to SARB was completed by Roosevelt Elementary School on 01/31/06 indicating that child had an excessive amount of non-valid excuses, 17 for the current school year and 43 for the prior school year. The referral further states the following, Antonios mother was a No show to a SART meeting on 01/19/06. A contract was mailed home. Antonio is in SDC and his absences have had a negative impact on his academic and disciplinary progress. Antonios SDC teacher has had difficulty in getting mom to keep appointments for conferences and for the planning of the IEP.

Mother argues this is insufficient evidence to sustain count 2 of the petition alleging Antonio was at substantial risk of serious harm due to mothers failure to assure his proper attendance at school. While we agree that school attendance is of vital importance to children, we need not address the merits of this argument. A reversal of the jurisdictional order is not required when substantial evidence supports the other allegations. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112-113.) It is well-established that [t]he reviewing court may affirm a juvenile court judgment if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several grounds, without addressing a claim that substantial evidence does not support another ground. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 873, 875; see also In re Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 630; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330.)

Juvenile Court Removal [Disposition] Order

A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of the parent or parents with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds for removal from custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c) apply. Section 361, subdivision (c), provides, in relevant part: A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence [that] [] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minors physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minors parents or guardians physical custody. ( 361, subd. (c)(1); see also In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 528.)

If the child is to be removed from the home, the burden of proof is substantially greater than at the jurisdictional hearing. (Compare 361, subd. (c)(1) with 355, subd. (a); In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) The Court of Appeal has held: At a dispositional hearing, the courts findings must be made on clear and convincing evidence. The court must find that the welfare of the child requires that she be removed from parental custody because of a substantial danger, or risk of danger, to her physical health if she is returned home and that there are no reasonable means to protect her without removing her. ( 361, subd. (b)(1) [see now subd. (c)], Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1456(c) [see now 1465(d)].) Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) The heavier burden of proof is intended to protect the fundamental right of a parent to retain custody of a child. Section 361 was intended to allow a court to remove a child from parental custody only in extreme cases of abuse or neglect. (In re Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1656; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 171; In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58, 65.) Despite the heightened burden of proof required for removal at disposition, for appellate review we employ the substantial evidence test, however bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof. (In re Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1654; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1326.)
In the application of the substantial evidence test, no showing a child has actually been harmed is required. (In re Diamond H, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136; In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.) The Court of Appeal has explained: A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citation.] (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136; In re Jamie M., supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 536.)

Appellants argue it was error to order the childrens removal from parental custody when there was no evidence of a risk of harm and less drastic alternatives were available. In the instant case, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts removal order. As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the findings of sexual abuse of Antonio by Umberto and that there were no reasonable means to protect him from further abuse without his removal from the home. The juvenile court specifically found that appellants were not credible witnesses. First, both appellants were deceptive with the investigation regarding where Umberto lived and also both Umberto and mother were in denial with respect to the abuse itself. Mother inappropriately told Antonio that the reason he could not go home was because of what he said causing Antonio to believe that it was all it fault. The juvenile court reasonably could have inferred that removal was the only reasonable means to prevent further abuse.

Appellants also contend that the juvenile court failed to consider less drastic measures than removal and failed to make a reasonable means finding. However the minute order of July 24, 2006, contains a reasonable means finding and also states that there were no reasonable means to protect the minors without removal from appellants custody. Accordingly, the juvenile court did consider less drastic measures than removal and did make an express reasonable means finding.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

COOPER, P. J.

We concur:

RUBIN, J.

FLIER, J.

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated all unidentified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] Hanoi is divorced from mother and is not a party to this appeal. There is an ongoing custody case in the family law court for Antonio, Cielo and Miah. Hanoi S. has filed for full custody of all three children.

[3] The section 300 petition provides in part; Counts b-1, d-1 and j-1: on numerous prior occasions on a daily basis the child Antonio [S.s] mother, Marcella [P.s] male companion, Umberto [M.], father of the child Joaquin [M.] sexually abused the child. Such sexual abuse consisted of, but was not limited to the [M.] father fondling and digitally penetrating the childs anus causing the childs severe pain. Further, the childs mother knew that the child was being sexually abused by the [M.] father and failed to take action to protect the child. Further, the childs mother told the child not to disclose the sexual abuse of the child by the [M.] father. Count c-1: the child Antonio [S.s] mother, Maricela [P.] failed to ensure the childs regular school attendance. Such failure to ensure the childs regular school attendance deprives a child of an education and ongoing peer relationships conducive to the childs normal growth and development.

4. Section 300. Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court:

[]. . . []

(b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the childs parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parents or guardians mental illness, developmental disability, or substance

abuse. . . . 

(c) The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care. . . . 

(d) The child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse.

[]. . . []

(j) The childs sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child. [] It is the intent of the Legislature that nothing in this section disrupt the family unnecessarily or intrude inappropriately into family life, prohibit the use of reasonable methods of parental discipline, or prescribe a particular method of parenting.

[5] Penal Code section 11165.1, subd. (a) lists other Penal Code section violations that constitute sexual abuse under subdivision (d) of section 300, including Penal Code sections 288, subd. (a) and 647.6.

[6] Sexual battery [under Penal Code section 243.4] is a specific intent crime. It consists of touching an intimate part of another, against the victims will, committed for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse. (People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [citing Pen. Code 243.4, subd. (d)].) In discussing the specific intent element with regard to Penal Code section 288, our Supreme Court has stated that the trier of fact looks to all the circumstances, including the charged act, to determine whether it was performed with the required specific intent. [Citations.] Other relevant factors can include defendants extrajudicial statements [citation], other acts of lewd conduct admitted or charged in the case [citations], the relationship of the parties [citation], and any coercion, bribery, or deceit used to obtain the victims cooperation or to avoid detection [citation]. (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 445.) Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), has a specific intent element concerning sexual arousal or gratification that is substantially similar to the specific intent element under Penal Code section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1).

[7] Corroboration of the statements of children who allege they have been sexually abused is an additional safeguard, but is not required, in dependency proceedings. (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1248-1249; see also Halagan v. Ohanesian (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 14, 21 [the trier of fact may accept that portion of the testimony it believes true, particularly where it is corroborated by other evidence].)