In re Christopher G.
Filed 8/6/07 In re Christopher G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re CHRISTOPHER G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER G., Defendant and Appellant. | D049208 (Super. Ct. No. J 210-412) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Desiree Bruce-Lyle, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Christopher G., a minor, admitted that he committed a lewd act upon a victim under 14 years of age while in Arizona. The juvenile court dismissed seven remaining counts for the same conduct against two separate victims, one of which allegedly occurred in California, and committed Christopher to the California Youth Authority (CYA). Christopher contends that: (1) the juvenile court erred when it sustained the petition because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Arizona conduct; (2) his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it placed him in the CYA.
The Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Arizona conduct. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment thereby rendering the remaining issues moot. The sole question before us is the scope of the remand. We conclude that the matter should be remanded to the juvenile court to resolve the California count and to possibly elicit additional jurisdictional facts as to the Arizona counts.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sixteen-year-old Christopher was charged in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with eight counts of committing a lewd act upon a victim under 14 years of age, all felonies. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.) Count one allegedly occurred in California, but the remaining seven counts allegedly occurred in Arizona.
Christopher admitted count five and the juvenile court dismissed all remaining counts with a Harvey waiver. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758.) The juvenile court declared Christopher a ward of the court and committed him to CYA for a maximum period of six years. Christopher appeals.
DISCUSSION
A California superior court has subject matter jurisdiction with regard to any felony offense committed within the state (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097, fn. 8) and a superior court acting as a juvenile court ( 245) is subject to the same jurisdictional rules. (Singer v. Bogen (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 515, 524 [superior court is a court of general jurisdiction and the juvenile court is but a part thereof].) As the Attorney General concedes, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the crime Christopher admitted to committing in Arizona; accordingly, the judgment against Christopher is void and must be set aside. (Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.)
While the parties agree that the true finding against Christopher must be reversed, they disagree regarding the scope of the remand. The People contend that the matter should be remanded with instructions to resolve the California charge and to elicit additional jurisdictional facts as to the Arizona charges. (People v. Betts (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1039, 1046-1047 (Betts) [state may exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts that take place outside of the state if the defendant, with the requisite intent, does a preparatory act in California that is more than a de minimis act toward the eventual completion of the offense].) Christopher argues that double jeopardy prohibits prosecution of the dismissed charges and that the true finding must be reversed with directions to dismiss the petition.
Double jeopardy principles apply to juveniles subject to proceedings held under section 602. (Jesse W. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 41, 44.) However, legal jeopardy does not attach where the court has no jurisdiction. (Anger v. Municipal Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 69, 71.) Because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the counts that allegedly occurred in Arizona, legal jeopardy did not attach to these counts and the juvenile court may consider conducting a hearing to determine whether California could have subject matter jurisdiction over these offenses. (See Betts, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1046-1047.)
We also find that legal jeopardy did not attach to the sole count allegedly committed in California. While a defendant may be placed in jeopardy by pleading guilty, where a guilty plea is properly vacated, the double jeopardy prohibition does not prevent a trial on the offense charged. (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 564-565.) A no contest plea or admission in juvenile court is the equivalent of a guilty plea in criminal courts. (In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1181.) Here, the juvenile court dismissed the sole California charge in connection with Christopher's admission and we have vacated the admission. Accordingly, double jeopardy does not prevent reinstating the California charge.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
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McDONALD, Acting P.J.
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IRION, J.
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