P. v. Robinson

Filed 8/9/07 P. v. Robinson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT^*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D. Oglesby, Judge.

Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, and John G. McLean, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Appellant Eddie Dewayne Robinson appeals from a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and driving a vehicle with a prior felony conviction of an offense which occurred within 10 years of the current offense. (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a) & 23550.) Robinson entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offenses. On appeal, he contends he was not competent at the time of sentencing and that his request for a competency hearing was denied by the trial court in violation of his due process rights.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES

On February 22, 2005, the California Highway Patrol arrested Robinson for multiple felony Penal Code and Vehicle Code violations. During transport, Robinson was noted to be erratic and was swearing and moving about. At one point, he began to hit his head on the window forcefully. During arraignment, defense counsel reported to the court his belief that Robinson was not competent to stand trial. Counsel requested a Penal Code section 1368^[1]evaluation. The court suspended the proceedings and appointed forensic psychologist Dr. Gil Schmidt to evaluate Robinson. Dr. Schmidt reported that, [w]hile Mr. [Robinson] initially appeared incapable of understanding and functioning within the judicial system, his mental stability noticeably improved as the evaluation process proceeded . In Dr. Schmidts professional opinion, Robinson suffered from paranoid-type schizophrenia, alcohol dependency, and cannabis dependency. Dr. Schmidt opined that Robinson was not competent to stand trial, noting that this conclusion was based on Robinsons need to move freely about during the evaluation in order to calm himself, something that would be unacceptable in a courtroom. Dr. Schmidt recommended that the case be trailed until Robinsons mental condition stabilized.

The court ordered a subsequent evaluation which was performed by Dr. Meghan Hamill of the Kern County Mental Health Department. Dr. Hamills opinion was similar to Dr. Schmidts. Dr. Hamill agreed that Robinson should be committed due to his being acutely psychotic, and his multiple symptoms consistent with a mood, thought, and anxiety disorder. On August 11, 2005, the court followed the recommendations of Drs. Schmidt and Hamill and committed Robinson to Patton State Hospital for treatment and restoration for a period not to exceed three years.

On January 24, 2006, based on a reportby his treating physicians at Patton State Hospital, Robinson was adjudged to be competent. The court reinstated proceedings. At the time of his release from Patton State Hospital, Robinsons psychiatric diagnosis was [f]ictitious disorder, [d]epressive [d]isorder, [p]olysubstance [a]buse, and [s]houlder [p]ain. It was noted that while Robinson did have residual symptoms, they would not affect his capacity to stand trial.

On February 1, 2006, defense counsel, after having spoken with Robinson twice, informed the court that a doubt has arisen in my mind regarding [Robinsons] ability to stand trial and rationally assist his counsel in preparing a defense. Defense counsel requested that a doctor be appointed pursuant to section 1368. The court again suspended proceedings and reappointed Dr. Schmidt to evaluate Robinson. In his February 12, 2006, report, Dr. Schmidt opined that Robinson was competent to stand trial. He noted that Robinson presented a very dramatic behavior style, attempting to portray mental retardation, paranoid ideations, and a blatant refusal to answer standardized evaluation questions, and that in his opinion, Robinson was feigning his symptoms in order to avoid criminal prosecution. The court agreed and reinstated proceedings. On March 1, 2006, Robinson entered his plea.

On March 29, 2006, defense counsel, after having read a letter written by Robinson, reported that he again felt Robinson was not competent. The proceedings were again suspended and Dr. Schmidt was reappointed to evaluate Robinson. Defense counsel requested that a different doctor be appointed due to Robinsons apparent distrust of Dr. Schmidt. The court denied this request.

In his report dated April 8, 2006, Dr. Schmidt found Robinson competent, within reason. Dr. Schmidt reported that Mr. [Robinson] appears to be under-medicated in that his mental health condition continues to be disruptive. [His] psychiatric medications are not providing full benefit at this time and need to be reevaluated for Mr. [Robinsons] behavior to be acceptable in court. Dr. Schmidt concluded, however, that Robinson did not need to be hospitalized.

On April 27, 2006, the trial court reinstated proceedings. Defense counsel reiterated his concern about Robinsons competence and again requested that the court appoint another doctor to evaluate Robinson. The court, after reviewing all prior psychological evaluations, and after questioning defense counsel, found nothing to warrant an additional stay of the proceedings or to justify another evaluation. The court further stated that it was inclined to accept Dr. Schmidts opinion that Robinson was malingering. The court thereafter sentenced Robinson to the upper term of three years.

DISCUSSION

Robinson contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his request for an examination as to his competence. He also contends that the evidence presented showed that he was not competent, and the courts denial of his request for a competency hearing was in violation of his due process rights. We find substantial evidence in the record to support the courts finding that Robinson was competent at the time of his sentencing.

A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he suffers from a mental disorder rendering him unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist counsel with his defense. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951.) Due process requires that the court conduct a competency hearing whenever substantial evidence of incompetency is introduced. (Ibid.) Once the defendant has come forward with substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial, due process requires that a full competency hearing be held. (See Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375.) Substantial evidence means evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the defendants ability to stand trial and assist counsel. (People v. Ramos (2004)34 Cal.4th 494, 507.) It is only after there is evidence presented that raises a reasonable doubt as to a defendants ability to understand the nature of the proceedings, or to assist counsel in the conduct of his defense, that a competency hearing is required. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 952.)

Here, the trial court reviewed the record, which consisted of the reports of all of the psychologists who evaluated Robinson, and questioned defense counsel about Robinsons behavior. Counsel was not able to identify any behavior substantially different than prior behaviors already determined insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to Robinsons competency. All of Robinsons treating and evaluating physicians were of the opinion that Robinson was competent. Defense counsels only showing was to say that Robinsons behavior was more aggravated and more extreme than in the past. No additional behaviors or problems were identified. In order to establish incompetence, the showing made must be substantial in nature. The behavior identified must be more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel. (People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 508.) The court gave Robinson an opportunity to present evidence that would warrant a new evaluation. None was presented.

The courts denial of the request for yet another evaluation was based on professional opinions and courtroom behavior. There was no evidence to suggest any change necessitating another look at Robinsons competence to participate in sentencing. The request for a competency hearing was properly denied.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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^*Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Dawson, J.

^[1]All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.