In re Tristan R.
Filed 8/8/07 In re Tristan R. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re TRISTAN R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BELINDA R., Defendant and Appellant. | D050481 (Super. Ct. No. J513540) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary M. Bubis, Referee. Affirmed.
Belinda R. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her minor son Tristan R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Belinda challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2000, newborn Tristan became a dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b) based on findings Belinda abused methamphetamine. Belinda successfully reunified with Tristan and the court terminated its jurisdiction in March 2002. However, in June 2005, Tristan became a dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and was removed from Belinda's custody based on findings Belinda physically abused him and continued to use methamphetamine.
Belinda had mental health issues, likely caused by her substance abuse. Other than having weekly supervised visits with Tristan, Belinda did not comply with reunification services. She was homeless and could not provide a safe and nurturing home for Tristan. At a 12-month review hearing, the court terminated services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
Belinda was incarcerated, and Tristan refused to visit her in jail. Tristan later said he did not want to see his mother ever again. He was placed in a concurrent planning foster home in June 2006, and was comfortable and stable there. Tristan said he wanted to be adopted and live with his new daddy forever. The frequency of his therapy had been reduced because he was making progress and doing well in his placement. Belinda was no longer visiting Tristan regularly. Tristan's therapist believed contact with Belinda had been anxiety provoking for him.
Some of Belinda's interaction with Tristan during visits was inappropriate. Tristan did not respond well to her, and refused to hug her at the end of one visit. He refused to go to the next two scheduled visits.
The social worker recommended a permanent plan of adoption for Tristan, whose caregiver was committed to adopting him. There were 13 other families interested in adopting a child like Tristan. In the social worker's opinion, Tristan did not have a parent-child relationship with Belinda, and he would benefit from a stable and permanent adoptive home. He did not want to visit Belinda and appeared fearful of her. The court suspended visits based on the recommendation of Tristan's therapist.
At a contested selection and implementation hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence Tristan was likely to be adopted and none of the circumstances of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied to preclude terminating parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A
We review the judgment for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not consider the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) The parent has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of six specified exceptions. ( 366. 26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(F); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides an exception to the adoption preference if termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.)
To meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) The parent "must show that he or she occupies a 'parental role' in the child's life," resulting in a "significant, positive, emotional attachment" from child to parent. (Ibid.; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
B
Belinda concedes she was unable to visit Tristan consistently throughout the reunification period, but argues she visited him as often as permitted. Even were we to conclude Belinda maintained regular visitation and contact with Tristan, she did not meet her burden of showing her relationship with him was sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the benefits of adoption for him.
The evidence showed Tristan's life with Belinda was unstable. He was removed from her custody on several occasions because of physical abuse and Belinda's mental health issues and drug addiction. At the age of four, Tristan was accompanying Belinda to bars and to make drug deals. Belinda's drug paraphernalia was accessible to Tristan and she smoked methamphetamine in his presence. Belinda was physically and verbally abusive to Tristan, and on one occasion slammed his head into a wall. Although Tristan had a bond with Belinda when he was removed from her custody in 2005, it was not necessarily a healthy one. Tristan was parentified and more concerned about his mother's well-being than his own. Belinda was unable to set appropriate boundaries with Tristan, resulting in his emotional and behavior problems.
Further, during the course of the dependency, the bond between Belinda and Tristan deteriorated to the point Tristan refused to see her. When forced to visit, Tristan regressed and exhibited negative and destructive behavior. Belinda had no parental role in Tristan's life and he no longer looked to her to meet his needs. Tristan is bonded to his caregiver, is thriving in his care and wants to live with him permanently. The caregiver is willing to adopt Tristan and has an approved adoptive home study. Where, as here, the biological parent does not fulfill a parental role, "the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.)
There was no evidence of a "significant, positive, emotional attachment" from Tristan to Belinda such that terminating the parent-child relationship would result in great detriment to Tristan. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Rather, the evidence showed Tristan's need for permanence and stability through adoption outweighed any interest in preserving parental ties. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating Belinda's parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
